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This thesis examines the manifestation of a national security state in Trinidad and Tobago 
(T&T) that emerged in the context of decolonization, during the period between 1946 and 
1978, when the country achieved internal self-government, independence, and, finally, 
became a republic. The T&T national security state developed from its roots in British 
Crown Colony rule, however the concept of the “national security state” was originally 
derived from an analysis of Unites States (US) in the immediate post-WWII period.  
US “national security” rested on an ideological dogma of anti-communism and the 
forceful, interventionist, US-led promotion of Western capitalism as the universal measure 
of freedom. This thesis extends the concept of the “national security state” to the case of 
T&T, in the Southern Caribbean. From this circumstance an appropriate redefinition is 
derived, where the “national security state” is rooted in the aftermath of plantation slavery 
and British Crown Colony rule, coupled with the rise of the US as the unquestioned imperial 
power of the Western Hemisphere and the world in the 20th Century.  
The core aspects of T&T’s Crown Colony constitution remained fundamentally 
intact despite the proclamation of independence in 1962 and republic status in 1976. Eric 
Williams, author of Capitalism and Slavery (1944), became T&T’s first Prime Minister and 
oversaw the consolidation of the national security state that targeted the efforts of the New 
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Chapter I, Introduction and Literature Review 
Introduction  
 
Within the purview of national security in contemporary Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) the 
Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) is given prime attention as the institution most 
responsible for the poor state of affairs. Efforts to address the issues abound, and thus a 
prominent local criminologist, Ramesh Deosaran, headed the recent Police Manpower Audit 
Committee into the TTPS in 2017. In the executive summary of the report it is stated that, 
“the country’s Number One Problem” (emphasis original) is the concern for crime, violence and 
police performance where there is an apparent “inability of the authorities to deal more 
aggressively and positively with the general problem.”1 A major point of initial concern was 
the evident abuses of power in the TTPS,2 worsened by government mismanagement, where 
the fact that the TTPS has had an Acting Commissioner since 2012 “provides a window for 
political interference.”3 The report noted the public discontent with the police,4 and 
prominently highlighted the central importance of the TTPS to national security in T&T 
through its call for the situation “to be treated as an emergency” that required a “non-
partisan will” to address the problem.5 It also admitted that the lack of serious attention on 
these matters had the effect of “keeping crime as a politically volatile issue”, and further, 
“the social, psychological and economic costs are becoming quite high with parallel damage 
to the country’s international reputation.”6 
The government’s directive for the “Manpower Audit” indicates its narrow focus, and 
despite the limited scope the report does give evidence of a larger and more historically 
rooted set of problems. The Cabinet mandated the audit “to examine the extent to which the 
manpower strength of the Service is meeting major objectives and whether its human 
resource capacity is sufficient.”7 At the public release of the report to the government in 
October 2017 the Prime Minister stated that he was already set to take action on the report 
by scheduling it before the Cabinet and the Joint Select Committee on National Security.8 
The authors took a bold posture with the subtitle, “Now is the Time, No Sacred Cows”, and 
this statement on the cover page: 
When one considers the history of previous inquiries, their seemingly ignored 
recommendations, and the range of challenges facing the TTPS, it will be a 
delusion to think that all be well quickly once a permanent Commissioner of 
Police and Deputies are appointed.9 
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From the outset it is established that there is a precedent where reports were produced and 
action was not taken by the government executive and the national security institutions to 
address the identified problems. The Committee highlighted the previous major reports that 
were done for the government, and it is important to note that these reports cover the span 
of T&T’s independence: 1959, 1964, 1972, 1984, 1990, 1991, 2006, 2011, 2013.10  These 
factors suggest that little has been done to update/reform or even decolonize policing in 
T&T. This is not insignificant as the police force is the oldest institution in the country,11 
rooted in the containment of indigenous peoples under the early Spanish rule, and later 
slaves and indentured labourers particularly under the British. 
The police force is only one of many T&T security institutions that go back to the pre-
independence era and the national security doctrine developed in the United States during 
World War II and in the postwar period. The Strategic Services Agency in T&T, a 
centralized intelligence coordination agency created in the mid 1990s, was founded under the 
name of the Office of Strategic Services,12 and a Minister highlighted in Parliament that the 
agency was created due to international imperative.13 The original Office of Strategic Services 
(the predecessor of the CIA) was a US wartime intelligence agency that specialized in 
espionage, propaganda, subversion, and the use of academics in intelligence networks. These 
precedents are not merely symbolic, for as this historical analysis will detail, these forces were 
active in T&T and have been integrated into the State from the time Independence was 
attained. This opening effectively links the contemporary problems of national security in 
T&T to larger historically rooted problems involving imperial influence alongside 
detrimental dynamics of the executive of government and the lack of accountability for those 
who hold State power.  
This thesis examines how T&T’s national security state emerged in the context of 
decolonization, in the period between 1946 and 1978, when the country achieved internal 
self-government, independence, and, finally, became a republic. Focusing on the career of 
historian and statesman Eric Williams and the work of the New World Group of radical 
economists, this thesis shows how the Trinidad and Tobago national security state 
developed from its roots in Crown Colony rule. In the process, it coopted anti-colonial 
intellectuals who became part of the governing elite, such as Williams. It also suppressed the 
anti-imperialist, non-aligned, and anti-capitalist intellectual institutions, such as the New 
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World Group. The national security state thus remained fundamentally intact despite the 
declaration of independence and the achievement of republic status. 
This introduction synthesizes a working definition of the national security state from 
existing theory and historiography. It argues for an imperial role of the United States as the 
birthplace of the national security state. It then makes a case for a distinct conception of a 
national security state in the Caribbean, and T&T specifically, by incorporating the ideas of a 
generation—the radical economists of the New World Group—who in the 1960s and 1970s 
articulated a decolonized social and economic theory rooted in history of the Caribbean. 
These intellectuals are also actors in this study as the targets of the national security state, 
and this thesis uses an analysis of the Crown Colony governance system derived from this 
group as the basis for theorizing the national security state in the independent T&T. 
 
Why study national security today, within a historical framework? 
  
There is ample evidence that national security looms large in the body politic of 
contemporary T&T, notably through the prime economic attention it receives from the 
government. National security in T&T is controlled by an executive that has access to far-
reaching surveillance mechanisms,14 that utilizes foreign military backing in its border 
security emphasis alongside an active paramilitary approach to policing,15 and is directly 
supported by legislation that empowers the State and cuts back on many social liberties.16 
The lack of appropriate historical perspective on the problems of national security in T&T is 
what this thesis seeks to address. More specifically the focus is on the issue of an elected and 
unelected elite that maintains control of the state via its national security institutions, utilizing 
this power for continuation of the status quo where the country is dominated by unbroken 
patterns of private and corporate interests that function at the expense of the general 
population. Most of the work done by national security is to secure these private and 
corporate interests where this principle brings the State into confrontation with the 
population that must face daily struggles of economic downturn, receding social services, 
increasing inequality, persistent social fragmentation and exclusion, and the consequent 
escalating inward cycles of violence. 
There have been many studies on policing and problems of national security in T&T 
over the past decades, and in the last ten years this attention has been particularly 
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heightened. These studies are headlined by the need to secure borders and protect against 
illegal networks of drugs, gangs, guns, and murders as a set of problems that exist aside the 
other concerns regarding the lack of police accountability, the need for “democratic” and 
“community” policing, governance and security issues, “restorative justice” prison reform, 
the death penalty, and improved police detection rates.17 Most of this attention is undertaken 
through criminological frameworks, heavily influenced by US and European approaches, 
with very little attention given to historical circumstances that suggest a problem of a 
different kind. These studies are concerned with a technical contribution to the system of 
national security. While such contributions may indeed alleviate some bureaucratic 
inefficiency or the other, the system in place will continue its miserable performance and the 
conditions on the ground will only continue to worsen unless a more fundamental type of 
shift is undertaken. The conditions for such an undertaking will be greatly heightened when 
there is widespread social acknowledgement and resultant confrontation of the historical 
precedents that lie before the multifaceted issues of national security in contemporary T&T. 
This thesis makes the case for studying national security in a historical perspective by 
situating central problems with the conclusions of two recent prominent reports on matters 
of national security in T&T. One report ignores historical context entirely while the other 
utilizes certain historical assessments to serve its interest in bolstering the T&T government’s 
national security agenda. The position taken here confronts the problematic position of 
both. The first report is the Commission of Enquiry into the 1990 “attempted coup” that 
was initiated in 2010, almost 20 years after the events but not long after the T&T recorded 
its highest murder toll to date. The report was published in 2014 and one of its primary 
outcomes was to “recommend that the entire national security architecture should be 
revisited.”18 Many of the recommendations were censored in the public version of the 
report, and despite noting the central impacts of political manipulation in the management 
of the Special Branch of the police on the breakdown of protocol,19 “the Commission 
concludes, on balance, that burgeoning crime and the changing nature of contemporary crime in Trinidad 
and Tobago have their origins in the events of 1990 and the aftermath thereof.”20 (emphasis added) 
This analysis has already begun to situate the historical precedent for issues of executive 
management and political interference in the security services, and it is important to situate 
the simplistic and problematic ahistorical position of the Commission’s report as it ignores 
these factors in its conclusions and recommendations.  
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To this day the leader of the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen (JaM), Yassin Abu Bakr, maintains 
that 1990 was not an attempted coup d’état but was the culmination of a standoff with the 
government, triggered by the events after a policewoman came to his organization with 
evidence that the Minister of National Security and other high-level security officials were 
involved in drug trafficking at the airport.21 It is known that this policewoman died during a 
training exercise at the Army base in Chaguaramas in that period, by “accident”,22 and that 
the Ministry of National Security was escalating its antagonisms against the JaM in the lead 
up to the events of 27 July 1990.23 The second study considered here states that the title of a 
“coup” is problematic due to details of the actual insurrection,24 and a high level national 
security official in T&T acknowledged that prior to 1990 the JaM was “very anti-drugs”.25 
Elsewhere, Abu Bakr claims he was unknowingly working with the US Drug Enforcement 
Agency before the events of July 1990.26  
There is a serious distortion of the problems of the present, and the history of 1990 as 
worked by the State and elite interests to rationalize the worsening conditions, absolve the 
government for its failures, and invoke a past threat so as to continually justify executive 
national security actions that empower the State and cut back on peoples’ social freedoms 
without addressing the underlying problems. The persistent condemnation of the JaM is a 
recurring discourse used by those who support the workings of national security in 
contemporary T&T. Although the Commission of Enquiry arrived at its conclusion via an 
ahistorical analysis the second study considered explicitly links this concern back to earlier 
contexts, but unfortunately with a similar result.  
This second study was conducted by academics Andy Knight27 and John McCoy, 
directly through collaboration with the T&T national security agencies. The use of historical 
context in this work is done in a very problematic and dangerous way that serves to expand 
the State’s capacity to criminalize the population’s discontents and encourage the 
consolidation of state power. The authors claim to have produced a pioneer study on 
“Homegrown Violent Extremism” in T&T. The primary thrust of the paper is to link the 
fact that T&T records “one of the highest per capita rates of extremist travelers in the 
world” contributing to Daesh,28 to the identified context of “highly developed human and 
narcotic smuggling networks”.29 The authors then link this contemporary circumstance to a 
long history of “political activism and radicalism”30 that goes back to anticolonial labor 
struggles in the 1930s, and Black Power mass mobilizations leading up to the Army revolt 
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and State of Emergency in 1970.31 In this circumstance Knight and McCoy note that the 
fundamental challenge to the newly independent government came from its own political 
demographic. To this the Eric Williams’ government responded with a move to further the 
centralization power in the office of the prime minister, accompanied by a program of 
welfare expenditure that sought to pacify the disenfranchised black population.32 This 
historical context is the detail considered in the body of this thesis.   
Knight and McCoy are consistent in the routine condemnation of the JaM as they link 
the organization to this historical context and assume a preexisting “radical milieu” in 
Trinidad by citing the 1970 events and the Black Power movement.33 The JaM is specifically 
highlighted as a key recent manifestation of this so-called “radical milieu”, but the report 
admits the JaM is not active in extremist recruits and organizing radicalism today. In this 
regard the report acknowledges that a Judge appointed to the issue of extremist travelers 
spoke of two families of the Indo-Islamic community that were key points of recruitment, 
and known to be very wealthy and thus “untouchable in terms of prosecution.”34 
Nevertheless Knight and McCoy conclude, “the point here is this: T&T’s extremist travelers, 
as members of a preexisting radical community, are being socialized into an ideology 
associated with a transnational radical network — one that promotes a specific world 
outlook that rests on violent opposition to the West and its co-religionist enemies.”35 The 
authors’ center the problem on a social movement where distorted radical ideology can be 
inserted into preexisting historical grassroots formations of resistance to unbroken legacies 
of colonial domination. The consequence of this formulation serves as a mechanism that can 
criminalize dissent against the status-quo Westminster political system dominated by an 
unquestioned economic elite with commonplace abuse of State power.  
A critique of knowledge production that legitimizes the national security state is 
important because it is this function that serves to ensure that the logic that demands an 
ideologically bound security State with consolidated executive power is commonplace across 
any partisan divide. The state of decolonization in T&T is questionable in the case where a 
publication produced to commemorate 50 years of independence notes that the constitution 
of the country is still firmly rooted in its Crown Colony foundation.36 Within the unchanged 
constitution lie serious institutional problems of executive abuses of power and lack of 
accountability. The national security state is not so much dependent on individuals, but is a 
much more lasting formation with its various components that maintain the momentum of 
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an agenda based on a fundamental ideological commitment to the West and its project of 
global capitalism under the US imperial banner. This thesis works to situate this national 
security state in its identified foundations in Crown Colony rule in T&T and presents an 
analysis of this national security state as it underwent change but remained fundamentally 
intact despite the declaration of independence and the achievement of republic status. 
 
Established historiography: Eric Williams and the New World Group 
 
Eric Williams and the New World Group are important actors in this thesis, and as there is 
existing literature on these subjects a brief comment is due regarding how this thesis is 
situated within these established fields, and what it contributes. There is an established body 
of historiography on Caribbean decolonization, Trinidad and Tobago, and Eric Williams.37 
Some studies celebrate Williams as a pioneer historian based on the legacy of his 
monumental work Capitalism and Slavery (1944),38 and highlight his contribution to 
postcolonial studies,39 but there are also works that are duly critical of him with respect to his 
political career. An article by Tony Martin makes an important contribution in highlighting 
Williams’ early political career and specifically situates his work with the Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission (AACC) and the Office of Strategic Services as a consultant.40 
Detailed documentation of Williams’ successful efforts in moving through influential US and 
British circles is provided in the article, and the author appropriately included this 
description in its subtitle: Trinidad’s Future Nationalist Leader as Aspiring Imperial Bureaucrat, 
1942-1944. This thesis expands upon the insight given in Martin’s paper by providing further 
details on the strategic importance of Trinidad to the British and the US, by situating the 
consequences of the US military presence in T&T during WWII, and brings this context 
directly into the postwar sequence of political decolonization in T&T. Eric Williams spent 
twelve years working for the AACC,41 after which he entered politics in T&T and became 
the Prime Minister, in a twenty-five year unbroken stint as head of the government.42 
There are also those studies that focus on Williams’ time as head of the government in 
T&T and in this regard there is a difference in treatment of Williams when he led a march to 
challenge the US military base in Trinidad in 1960,43 and when he was a Prime Minister that 
consolidated power and actively suppressed the Black Power uprisings of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.44 Most studies focus on these issues either within the domestic circumstances,45 
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or tend to give a broader regional/international overview.46 This thesis re-examines these 
currents of interest and this historical context by utilizing the lens of national security to 
bring together the concern for domestic circumstances with an analysis of wider imperial 
relations. Further insight into important details of these circumstances is given by utilizing 
sources that either were not considered in these works, or were still classified at the time of 
writing for some of the older works noted. 
The historical analysis of this thesis is an added contribution to the existing 
historiography by specifically bringing together the work of the New World Group (NWG), 
and the historical context of the NWG’s existence as its members became targets of national 
security by newly independent Caribbean States. The NWG was created in 1963, the year 
after T&T became independent, but did not survive the decade of the 1960s. Despite a 
short-lived existence the group’s impact across the Caribbean was significant during that 
period, and its members continued their work through different mediums after its 
dissolution.47 The Thought of The New World is a volume published in 2010 as the outcome of a 
retrospective conference held by the group’s remaining members,48 and is one of the only 
main publications on centered this group. Despite this collection that holds a rich amount of 
material, there has been limited effort to engage the ideas of the NWG and put them to use. 
Using national security as a frame, this thesis links the NWG as actors who are targets of 
concern to the establishment, but at the same time this groups’ ideas provide particularly 
important insights that are used to theorize the basis of the national security state in T&T.       
 
Defining the national security state 
 
The precedent of the national security state as it is known is set by the US. Most notable in 
this regard is the postwar anti-communist posture of the National Security Act of 1947 and 
the infamous National Security Council memo 68. These moves institutionalized a 
centralized executive with the integrated intelligence and coercive agencies of force centered 
on “containment” of a threat that was explicitly ideological. The dogma of free market 
capitalism was institutionalized into the military industrial complex, and effectively channeled 
the momentum of WWII into a globalist arrangement where “communism” stood as the 
central threat to US national security (wherever it could be ‘found’ in the world). It is in this 
way that the US national security state arrived into those parts of the world under US 
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dominance, such as T&T. The Caribbean has long been called the US’s “third border”,49 its 
“soft underbelly”,50 and even “the American Lake”.51  
A symposium of the United States Military Academy at West Point in 198252 provides 
the historical markers of the formation of the national security state and some key 
mechanisms of its imperialist function. The National Security Act of 1947 is the determined 
institutional point of origin for the doctrine of national security and the basis of this 
legislation was to “integrate the domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national 
security” to enable more effective cross coordination of agencies.53 National Security Council 
report 68 is seen to be US President Harry Truman’s most deliberate attempt at defining 
national security, and centered on the threat of the Soviet Union and concerns of domestic 
subversion.54 The institutional outcome was the Department of Defense, the National 
Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which embodied the characteristic 
mechanism of the entire system in “non-accountable, subterranean policymaking and 
security options.”55 The mechanism of shielding “security” from legislative control was the 
institutionalized technique of pre-authorized operations with “actions unspecified”.56 The 
domestic outcome was the “ugly phenomenon of McCarthyism”,57 and in the international 
sphere a “burgeoning reliance on atomic weapons” “eliminated the need for precision in 
strategic planning.”58 
This military symposium publication credited Daniel Yergin with the term the national 
security state, and identified this formation as a state “in which external and national security 
concerns become dominant, while domestic objectives (as evidenced by the fate of Harry 
Truman’s Fair Deal) are subordinate to them”.59 The principal of “containment” was 
deployed as an expansive global interpretation with the underlying postulates that US 
interests were global, and that national security meant security of the “free world” dependent 
on US intervention to prevent states being “lost” to communism.60 The threat of 
communism was operationalized as the means to divide and suppress internal dissent within 
the US. As noted elsewhere by Von Eschen (1997), of particular importance in this regard 
was the pacifying of anti-colonial political activism in the US that linked the domestic 
struggle of black people in the US to those globally at the core of its organizing. This anti-
imperial principle was superseded by the liberal concern for political and civic “freedom” in 
the overall thrust and institutional outcome of the civil rights movement.61  
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Further insight into the postwar geopolitical context indicates that the US national 
security state was driven more so by the demand to contain the Soviet Union after the Nazi 
alliance was defeated. Daniel Yergin’s 1977 publication, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold 
War and the National Security State remains a seminal text on national security and the national 
security state in this context. In the introduction Yergin refers to the national security state as 
comprised of the “unified patterns of attitudes, policies, and institutions” geared towards the 
task of organizing the country for “perpetual confrontation” and “war”.62 He identifies the 
nation-state as the basic unit of the international postwar system,63 and in the context where 
Stalin stood as the only wartime leader left in power the “Grand Alliance” against the Nazi 
threat gave way to the Cold War standoff.64 The commanding ideas of US foreign policy in 
this period centered on anticommunism and the new doctrine of national security policies 
based on “containment, confrontation, and intervention” managed by “government 
bureaucracies and private organizations that serve in a permanent war preparedness.”65 The 
function of the national security state was to carry the wartime interventionist posture into 
the decades after WWII, and thus it was a prime catalyst for the onset of the Cold War.  
Yergin does highlight some earlier precedents of the national security state but 
confines his attention to the immediate postwar period and the workings of formal state 
agencies. A key precedent for Yergin was the Eberstadt report of September 1945, which 
was an earlier internal document that greatly influenced the outcome of the 1947 National 
Security Act. The Eberstadt report is highlighted as a major step towards overcoming the 
interagency tensions that arose during WWII by emphasizing coordination of agencies as 
opposed to integration that presupposed a loss of autonomy.66 The coordination emphasis 
bore through with the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSC, and a greater emphasis 
on intelligence systems across the board.67 This period, between mid 1947 and 1948 accords 
to the rise of the national security state according to Yergin, and is hallmarked by major 
expansion of the military establishment, integration of significant industrial and intellectual 
sectors into this establishment, and the promotion of an anticommunist alliance.68 These first 
contributions from the Cold War era rightly highlight the canonical function of the 1947 
National Security Act and the workings of the new executive-empowered state agencies 
which are the core of the national security state, set to uphold its basis in the ideological anti-
communist dogma.  
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Later studies have expanded the analysis of the national security state by providing 
important further insight into the function of influential private individuals in this process 
and the civil support that bridged the partisan divide. Michael Hogan (1998) provides a base 
reference that the National Security Act of 1947 is the “Magna Charter”69 and modern 
mechanism of the national security state.70 Hogan notes the Ivy League contributions 
towards the doctrine of national security, but emphasizes the greater prominence of figures 
from “corporate board rooms, financial institutions, and Wall Street Law firms” such that 
“nonelected experts presided over the largest and fastest growing sector of the federal 
government.”71 The expanded powers given to the NSC, CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff 
amidst a consensus of discourse regarding external and internal Soviet threats resulted in 
acceptance of a “permanent blurring” of war and peace, civil and military.72  
The contradictory role of academics with respect to the national security state is 
highlighted in the case of prominent scientists such as Oppenheimer who were incorporated 
into central spheres of the national security complex, yet were subject to McCarthyist 
interrogations. His security clearance was revoked even though it was exposed that there was 
internal manipulation of evidence to form charges against him.73 One of Hogan’s key 
concluding observations is worth quoting: “Liberal intellectuals were willing to put the 
containment of communism ahead of the welfare state while conservative intellectuals were 
prepared to give antistatism a back seat to anticommunism. This development set the stage 
not only for a policy of containment but also for a national security state that could apply 
that policy.”74 The above contributions provide a very useful starting point for locating and 
defining the parameters of a national security state, however they all situate its creation as a 
postwar phenomenon.  
More recent publications have done the work to uncover earlier precedents of the 
national security state and provide further detail on the widespread support it received from 
various spheres of civil society. Douglas Stuart produced one of the most recent major 
works on the national security state and primarily engages with details of internal domestic 
debates in the process of Creating the National Security State (2008). With respect to the 
historical context of this process there is further detail given to the central importance of the 
Acadia Conference between Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and their respective 
military advisors that took place between 22 December 1941 and 14 January 1942. In this 
meeting the US envoy was struck by their lack of cohesion in the face of the strong 
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negotiating position put forth by the British due to their articulation of a common position 
across their various agencies.75 The British model fulfilled the evident lack of a mechanism 
for unified command in the US, and thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created by executive 
order on 9 February 1942.76 
Preceding and overlapping with this process was the creation of a system for the 
coordination of intelligence, first taking form with the executive order of 11 July 1941 to 
create the office of Coordinator of Information.77 William Donovan headed this agency, and 
followed through with the reformulation of this agency under the banner of the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942.78 The OSS profile was left vague, and when formulated the 
mandate was to undertake “the planning, development, coordination, and execution of the 
military program for psychological warfare.”79 By the end of WWII the OSS had 13,000 
persons enlisted, mostly academics operating outside of the US, and Donovan had risen to 
Major General with control of an OSS budget of $57 million USD.80 This context situates 
the beginnings of some of the key institutions of the national security state in their wartime 
precedents. This is important to note for many of the ‘civil liberties’ (such as privacy) that are 
now routinely forgone in the name of national security were first demanded as a war 
measure, and thus the postwar formalization of the national security state is the creation of 
institutions to carry over those war measures into ‘peacetime’ daily life. Another underlying 
point provided by Stuart was the role of the British in this exchange, and a large part of this 
thesis focuses on the lasting importance of the Anglo-American bond.  
The major works on the national security state itself locate the formation as a wartime 
and postwar creation, but in this historical study it is important to consider earlier linkages 
through the concept of national security itself. A Genealogy of National Security (2014) by 
Andrew Preston links national security back to the “often forgotten” National Security 
League established by a Wall Street lawyer in 1914. With the support of Rockefeller, 
Carnegie, and other such foundations the League lobbied with an emphasis on “military 
preparedness” that sought to “discipline America’s wayward youth” in light of an absence of 
foreign invasion.81 Preston identifies the League as a central influence in the move to replace 
traditional references to national security as a term referring to socioeconomic security for 
individuals,82 with a formulation that was both “territorial and ideological - forming an 
integrated, indivisible whole that applied the world over”.83 US national security rested on a 
self-proclaimed monopoly over “economic opportunity, republicanism, and liberal 
! $&!
democracy” and thus the project was globally oriented to ensure preservation of a national 
“identity” rooted in a particular “Judeo-Christian tradition”.84 The power of the US to 
uphold this formulation “was enmeshed in its economic prowess and social democracy as 
well as its military power.”85 This is a distinct articulation of the core tenants of the national 
security state, not yet with its empowered NSC and CIA, but materially so in the particular 
ideological and veiled racial commitments as a fundamental base that is supported by 
powerful institutions of knowledge production. The role of organizations with similar 
functions as Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundation in bolstering the national security state is a 
particular concern and is given specific attention in the body of the thesis. 
Following precedents set in WWI, the lead up to WWII saw increased and expanded 
involvement of academics in domains of national security, and in this context a network of 
Ivy League academics produced the first formal definitions of national security.  Edward 
Mead Earle, of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study, featured prominently in this period 
as a figure with scholarly and political aspirations.86 Earle defines national security as “a state 
of affairs in which the nation’s territorial domain, political independence, rights, and vital 
interests are free from any substantial threat of aggression from abroad, or from internal 
forces operating under foreign control or influence.”87He coordinated seminars and used 
academic influence and prestige to garner general support for the interventionist position, as 
well as for specific issues such as President Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease policy that saw the US 
acquire territory in various British possessions in the Western Hemisphere for military 
bases.88 The national security doctrine was characterized by a continual “invocation” of “core 
values” and “[a]fter a couple of false starts, a fusion of geographical and ideological security 
took place during the world crisis of the late 1930s and the world war that followed. The 
results have defined US foreign policy ever since,”89 especially as national security remains 
one of the very few government formulations that receives continuous bipartisan support.90 
Trinidad was one of the key base sites in Roosevelt’s agreement with the British, which took 
place before the entry of the US into the war. It is not insignificant that figures such as 
Edward Mead Earle were important in garnering support, and already the precedent of the 
national security state connects directly to the focus of this case study on its formation in 
T&T.   
The analysis of the national security state thus far has given a broad base to begin 
formulating a critical and useful definition of the concept. The historical and geopolitical 
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context given has indicated its explicitly anti-communist foundation and posture of 
intervention to contain its spread, however none of these analyses contain an explicit critique 
of US imperialism. This is an important point to note as this section on the US precedent 
comes to a close, along with the fact that despite a lot of important historical detail the above 
works do not provide any specific definitions of the national security state. A last 
consideration of further detail on its institutional function appropriately brings the analysis 
towards the elusive question of definitions in the realm of national security. Laura 
Donohue’s Limits of National Security (2011) in the American Criminal Law Review provides a 
thorough, and useful overview and critique of US national security, although the paper does 
not fundamentally challenge the imperial position of the US. Donohue argues that national 
security is “not a creature of the twentieth century,” and despite appearing in the National 
Security Act of 1947 over one hundred times the term is never defined.91 Similarly this is 
with true national security strategies, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and 
the 2001 Patriot Act, with an overall effect that is amorphous and circular: “material is 
classified because it is interpreted by officials as being related to national security, even as 
national security data is defined as material that has been classified.”92 This is characteristic of 
the operation of power when it comes to knowledge production, and one must be suspect of 
rigid and uneven demands for definitional convention in the academy when those in power 
face no such restrictions but can instead enforce a status of integrity.  
In such a context the focus of concern is primarily the function of relations. Donohue 
sets out to “examine the evolution of U.S. national security as understood by the interests 
that national security is intended to serve”.93 In an effort to move away from discipline-
bound definitional restrictions, the examination of national security is conducted by focusing 
on “the object that is to be secured and the reason for its preservation - the purpose for 
which such object exists.”94 The examination is focused on the “executive branch as a 
whole”, situating institutional relationships, “congressional grants of authority, 
appropriations, and oversight devices,”95 thus allowing for an evaluation of tangible and 
representative indicators over time. The incorporation of the power relations embedded in 
military hierarchy and intelligence operations into other civilian channels of government has 
effectively made the largest branch of government (the Department of Defense) even larger 
in its scope of influence. The outcome of these institutional arrangements in the era where 
national security threats take their most amorphous form is an inversion of ends and means 
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such that it is “the federal government's sovereignty, which, through secret mechanisms and 
a greatly enlarged administrative capacity, is being secured as against the people.”96 In 
framing the matter on what interests are served, the analysis begins to reformulate the 
function and definition of the national security state.  
In taking that it is the executive of government being secured an emphasis must be 
maintained on the mechanisms through which the national security state sidelines any 
democratic checks on power and attempts at accountability. Thus the national security state 
has mechanisms to sideline Congress, and increasingly, the Judiciary. In the contemporary 
context the definition of security and the mechanisms of identifying security threats have 
become increasingly blurred as varied threats may stem from a single phenomenon, evident 
in the notion of “narco-terrorist” that embodies a threat across the realms of drugs, crime, 
and terrorism.97 One specific issue that demonstrates the increasing problem faced by the 
courts (apart from the obvious effects of political appointments in bodies such as the 
Supreme Court) is the case where the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 that 
established a distinction between criminal law and national security concerns has been 
removed after 9/11.98 Similarly, national security matters are exempt from the Freedom of 
Information Act. The judiciary has a fraction of the bureaucratic power and faces a general 
disparity of information with respect to the executive on national security matters, 
exaggerated by the broadening of security and recurring claims of “judicial institutional 
incompetence” or bias, made by the executive branch.99 The function of this arrangement is 
that power is consolidated and accountability is deflected and dispersed. The context and 
detail considered thus far is substantial enough for the formulation of a historically derived 
definition of the national security state.  
The institutional characteristics of the national security state are: a militarized 
government bureaucracy where an executive’s ability to define threats to national security is 
ideologically based and expansive in its limits, and the executive’s ability to respond to these 
threats through means outside the sphere of oversight is unhindered in its ability to 
circumscribe access to knowledge – intelligence – due to declared exceptional circumstances; 
all legitimated in the name of freedom. The operative theme of the national security state is 
justice unbounded by law where the centralization of power is coupled with the dispersion of 
responsibility, and externally oriented strategic concerns are prioritized over domestic 
socioeconomic needs of the population. This national security state is an integrated system 
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of bureaucratic-corporate-military power that is largely removed from public oversight, 
where the security of the government overshadows any other prerogative, and this entire 
complex is justified under the cause of individual freedom.  
Proponents of the national security state as cited above, and critics such as those in the 
volume The Bases of Empire: The Struggle Against US Military Posts (2009) edited by Catherine 
Lutz, primarily situate the material origins of the national security state as a US product of 
the post WWII era.100 Lutz’s volume does consider the Caribbean as a particular region of 
concern, however there is no critical analysis of US imperialism, or reference to continuity in 
the patterns of accumulation of wealth and power established by British colonialism and the 
history of plantation slavery.101 In my reading of this literature it seems that to varying 
degrees all of these authors believe in and contribute to the US project, despite some 
moments of sharp criticism. A particularly notable chorus of criticisms arose from those who 
now fear the wrath of a State they legitimated when that attention was elsewhere. There is a 
particularly loud silence with regards to US imperialism, as well as any detailed histories and 
foundations of the State and society in the context of slavery. Further, there is a lack of 
critical overviews that frame the national security state as the evolution of the Western 
project of global domination with origins in colonial and imperial expansion from the modes 
of accumulation pioneered in the interchange between the slave plantations of the Americas 
and the industrial revolutions that catalyzed global capitalism. 
This thesis starts off from these authors’ operative definition of the national security 
state as an integrated bureaucratic-corporate-military system, exempt from law and removed 
from public oversight, yet justified as a protector of individual freedom. In such a State, 
power is centralized but responsibility is dispersed. For such a State, security of the 
government overshadows any other prerogative, and externally-oriented strategic concerns 
trump domestic socioeconomic needs of the population. Despite moments of sharp 
criticism, none of these scholars frame the national security state as rooted in the 
accumulation of global wealth and power in plantation slavery, British colonialism, and US 
imperialism. My thesis instead seeks to extend the concept of the national security state as an 
evolution of the Western project of colonial and imperial expansion, using the Caribbean, 




A Caribbean worldview from which to begin reconsideration 
 
The concept of the national security state cannot simply be ‘imported’ onto a discussion of 
T&T. While T&T is a node in the sphere of the US national security complex it does retain 
its own particular manifestation due to its layered colonial history and subsequent context of 
independence. This engagement will utilize theory from the Caribbean that addresses some 
of the fundamental concepts at the base of national security in the context of the geography 
and history of the region. This work is situated a tradition of Caribbean political thought 
broadly identified by the New World group.102  
The group emerged in 1963 with the collective position of “economic decolonization 
as the real basis of political independence”103 and sought to cultivate “sovereignty of the 
imagination”104 in challenging the failures to change the status quo.105 The phrase sovereignty of 
the imagination is from George Lamming, a literary figure, who edited the 1966 Guyana and 
Barbados Independence Special issues of the New World Quarterly. A lengthy quote by 
Lamming, from an interview in 2000, speaks to continuity in the imperative of 
decolonization beyond a political declaration:     
This is a problem which I find myself reconsidering. Language is a source of 
control. But language is also a source of invention. And the controlling power of 
language of course depends very much on who has the power to define… this 
region that we call the Caribbean, the very early, in a way, if you like, premature 
global character of its formation, almost [is] in a way one of the earliest chapters 
in this experiment that is now called globalization, is that we were in a sense 
presented with the distinct possibility of making the abstract global, a global 
community of what [Martin] Carter would call, “valid persons.” Instead of a 
globalization of things and structures or space, the proximity that we have to 
each other, and the communality of historical cargo of burden, and survival 
from burden, that we carry, allowed us the possibility if we willed it, of giving to 
the concept of global a meaning that is not on the agenda of globalization. I am 
finding it very difficult to see how we are going to deal with that when 
definitions of our predicament by the chosen Definers - and I mean by the 
people who are economists, the people who are sociologists, the people who are 
in a variety of disciplines, and so on - the definers are mired in the language of 
their tutelage from which they have not been able to escape.106 
 
Norman Girvan complements Lamming’s centralizing of the problem of definition in a piece 
titled Power Imbalances and Development Knowledge (2007). The general North – South imbalance 
of power and a precedent of unilateral action has produced an established “framework of 
customary action for the conduct of international relations” (emphasis original) where the limits 
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of ‘appropriate’ state action “can be arbitrarily redefined by dominant powers”.107 The 
overarching “imbalances are manifested in the overwhelming preponderance of the military 
power of the North, headed by a super-power with a global military capability.”108  
Furthermore, security alliances dominated by the global North “render many Southern states 
dependent on the North for their security, with spin-offs in other areas of their external 
relations.”109  
Girvan’s thrust is to confront the “knowledge hierarchies”110 established by the power 
imbalances that reflect the “Northern dominance in knowledge construction, reproduction 
and dissemination”.111 Knowledge is understood as “the constructs, assumptions, and beliefs 
by which people understand and interpret the world around them” and the challenge in a 
system of domination is to confront the codification “as ideology, as economic or social 
theory” whereby this “knowledge serves the function of justifying hierarchal relations.”112 
Girvan links the continuity in this function where earlier “civilising mission” “doctrines were 
used to justify conquest and enslavement”, later on “colonialism”, and in the contemporary 
period “neo-liberal theory is used to justify market-led and corporate-dominated 
globalization”.113 
In considering the overlapping military, economic, and knowledge imbalances at play, 
Girvan concludes that the function of “knowledge may be the most powerful in its ability to 
condition routine behaviour without resort to physical force or material sanction” as it 
“operates at the level of internalized assumptions” with respect to people and states.114 The 
claim of “universal applicability” of the neoliberal paradigm is established by the “knowledge 
hierarchy” that is maintained by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as “global 
knowledge centres”.115 The discursive output of these institutions is coupled with their 
“policy based lending and advisory operations” which gives “tremendous prestige and 
influence amongst policy-makers of the South”,116 despite the ideological bias that is 
reinforced by the “global centralization of development research”.117  
This paradigm for global development is charted by “a highly idealized version of the 
Western experience that is largely contradicted by the historical record”,118 such that the 
analysis is that to a “significant degree international knowledge functions as ideology”.119 The 
bias upheld in the difference between appearance and reality is admitted by an official 
historian of the World Bank, where the answer is “not much” in response to the question of 
what has the Bank “done in the last half-century to build institutions in developing countries 
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that could help them think for themselves?”120 Girvan’s conclusion is appropriate in 
maintaining that as “long as the South is dependent for its development knowledge on the 
global centres of power, its own autonomy will be compromised.”121  
The New World Group confronted this dependency in principle by highlighting the 
continuities in colonial patterns of organization in the economy and the society. The 
structure of the Caribbean economy in the period after independence remained largely 
oriented toward production of raw materials for export to the metropolis where the bulk of 
refinement and value added is accrued.122 This same pattern was found in the structure of the 
discipline of economics in 1960 at the University of the West Indies; dominated by a 
minority of British economists holding senior positions and enforcing a British economic 
curriculum with the insistence that there was no need for a Caribbean specific economic 
theory.123 In this formation, which mirrors the organization of the economy itself, the 
Caribbean is the site of gathering raw data and Britain is the producer of knowledge to be 
applied and exported as universal. The New World movement refused to resign itself to 
these conditions and sought to actively contribute in the formulation of an alternative vision 
for the Caribbean.  
Continuity in the organizational pattern of state and society with respect to 
foundations in the plantation mode of production is evidenced by the initial publications in 
the 1960s and 1970s of Lloyd Best and Kari Levitt124 with their plantation theses,125 and 
George Beckford in Persistent Poverty (1972). Taken together, these works set out the 
parameters of the plantation economy and society working from social, economic, and 
political observations that the plantation remained the characteristic firm around which lay 
the basis of organization of Caribbean economies through to the independent era.126 In his 
original 1968 Plantation Economy article Best distinguishes modes of European colonization 
under hinterlands of conquest, settlement, and exploitation, where a plantation economy is a 
particular hinterland of exploitation characterized by a “merchant-pirate ethos” of short term 
planning utilizing total exploitation of labor in an open resource situation.127  
The metropolis provided military, administrative, and economic infrastructure to 
support the plantation that “admits virtually no distinction between organization and society, 
and chattel slavery” oriented towards exclusive export production.128 The plantation 
economy and society is an internalized system of exploitation and control through exceptional 
violence that exists in a political economy externalized in its service and dependence on the 
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metropolitan center of political and economic power. In this conception the plantation 
foregrounds the existence of a national security state, exhibiting justified control of a 
subordinate other in defense of a particular notion of freedom that rests on the need to 
maintain systems of accumulation and domination transnationally. 
The insistence of the New World Group was that the complex and unique history of 
the Caribbean called for a deeper approach to decolonization through a complete societal re-
evaluation of economic, political, and cultural circumstances and a concerted effort to 
cultivate independent thought and expression in the political sphere. This group was formed 
around a core of economists, however their vision and program was intimately integrated 
with artists, poets, literary figures, community organizers, and researchers and theorists not 
bound by discipline or any other such confinement of thought. This movement collectively 
recognized that decolonization was an imperative that carried beyond the attainment of 
political independence.  
The reach of the New World Group was broad, with chapters in Guyana, Jamaica, 
Trinidad, and Montreal. The New World publications flowed hand-to-hand through these 
networks such that Norman Girvan described resistance to Eurocentric thinking as the basis 
of the group, and in its program it “waged a kind of intellectual guerrilla warfare”.129 A 
headline of the group’s affiliates includes: Lloyd Best, George Beckford, James Millette, 
David deCaries, Miles Fitzpatrick, Roy Augier, Alister McIntyre, Kari Levitt, George 
Lamming, Gloria Lannaman, Norman Girvan, Owen Jefferson, Michael Witter, Sylvia 
Wynter, C.L.R. James, Edwin Carrington, Gordon Lewis, Martin Carter, and many more. 
The group’s organizing and publications spanned eleven years starting from the year after 
T&T and Jamaica attained independence, and had profound impacts across the Caribbean.  
Consistent throughout the period from the time of the New World Group to the 
present is the overarching power of US influence in the region. The function of national 
security plays into the dependency of the core-periphery pattern where the Caribbean is a 
site of specific strategic concern to US national security and thus an area from which raw 
materials (intelligence and assets) are accrued. In turn the US specializes its national security 
discourse and practice, and deploys its conventions into the international sphere. In the 
Caribbean both discourse and practice of national security are directly informed by US 
norms.130 The cycle of influence reworks itself continually in accordance with shifting threats 
and changing circumstances particular to the domestic states of the Caribbean, as well as in 
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response to, or anticipation of larger geopolitical shifts. The works above situate the imperial 
function of the national security state, detailing the active resistance to institutions of 
knowledge production that service the domination of the national security state. It was 
essential to situate the work of the NWG and its contribution to the decolonization project 
in the Caribbean. This review reinforces the call for Caribbean-specific approaches and 
provides some important historical and analytical content that supports the following 
analysis of the Crown Colony national security state that is used to derive to an appropriate 
definition for the case of T&T.  
 
Crown Colony rule as a foundation of the national security state 
 
James Millette, key member of the New World Group in Trinidad, was foundational in 
detailing the history of Crown Colony governance in Trinidad in the decades after the British 
took control of the island in 1797. The Genesis of Crown Colony Government (1970) situates and 
details the course of the “experiment” in Trinidad from the 1783 Cédula de población issued by 
the Spanish Crown as a means to incentivize French planters to populate the island in an 
attempt to increase security, focusing closely upon the period of British rule after the 1797 
capture and the first declaration of a constitution in Trinidad in 1810.131 The Cédula was 
issued as an open proclamation to Catholic persons (a direct stipulation against the British) 
to settle in Trinidad through grants, tax incentives, and access to land on behalf of the 
Spanish government. In many respects these functions of the Cédula mirror the same 
parameters of the “industrialization by invitation” program of development via the attraction 
of foreign capital that came under challenge by the NWG in the immediate post-
independence era.132 In the fifteen years between the Cédula and the British capture, Trinidad 
initiated a course towards a well prospected plantation economy, characterized by fresh soils 
for planters (both white and mulatto), a haven for revolutionaries, privateers, and runaway 
slaves, and home to the largest free colored population in the Caribbean with an overall 
French to Spanish speakers ratio of 20:1.133  
It was this combination of factors that brought Admiral Dundas to impart his specific 
concern regarding Trinidad to Major General Abercromby, leader of the British expedition 
sent to the West Indies after the defeat of General Maitland’s Royal Army expedition in Saint 
Domingue. Abercromby’s military expedition that set sail in February 1796 was the largest 
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force ever dispatched from British shores, numbering 20,000 troops.134 Also reflecting the 
unprecedented severity of the security, political, and economic crisis of the West Indian 
colonies was the fact that Abercromby was informed that his burden was that of the future 
of the British Empire in the West Indies.135 In a secret military dispatch of instruction to 
Ambercromby, Dundas stated definitively: “Trinidad, because of the ‘Principles and Persons 
which have lately been introduced there’ had become ‘a cause of just alarm and real Danger 
to several of our most valuable islands.’” 136 The main factors behind the conquest of 
Trinidad were the prospect for previously unexploited plantation prosperity heightened by 
the fact of an increasingly overt manifestation of unrestrained republican sentiments such 
that Millette makes the reference to the island before British capture as a “major threat to the 
security of the hemisphere”.137 
In noting the unique context of Trinidad, Millette poses the research question that lies 
at the center of the Crown Colony endeavor: “What sort of government is best suited to a 
West Indian colony the majority of whose citizens were foreign and colored, and the 
majority of whose inhabitants were, taken in the aggregate, slaves?”138 In response he 
presents three Colonial Office dispatches that characterize the shifting concerns regarding 
the development of a constitution in Trinidad, each noting a specific identified population 
problem as it served to justify the prolonged denial of a representative system of 
government. The first letter was sent on 16 October 1802, from the Secretary of State for 
War and the Colonies, Lord Hobart, to the Commissioners established in control of 
Trinidad, and lays out as the primary concern the low ratio of British persons to foreigners 
(mostly French and Spanish) within the white population.139 The threat of republicanism was 
made evident and heightened by the language difference and almost no immediate possibility 
of loyalty to the British Crown. The second letter is dated 27 November 1810, and was sent 
from Lord Liverpool to Governor Thomas Hislop, arguing that the principal factor in 
refusing a representative system was the large number of free coloreds that made it 
“inadvisable to enfranchise”.140 The third letter was sent by Secretary of State for War and 
the Colonies, Viscount Goderich, to governor Lewis Grant on 30 January 1832. In the 
immediate lead up to slave emancipation this letter further refused representation on the 
basis of the cost (monetary and security) in “entirely abandoning the interests of the 
slaves.”141  
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These three letters broadly outline the parameters of the State’s vision of the 
population, which is that demographic concerns determined the basis of organization of 
government with regards to securing the plantation economy upon which the colony 
depended. Starting from the split in the white population these factors were paramount in 
the denial of constitutional advance by the British government, with the removal of the 
representative option as the principal factor allowing the official experimentation with 
amelioration schemes that were to follow.142 The overall pattern, with a particular relevance 
for the concern of the foundations of national security, is expressed by Millette: if “war is the 
continuation of diplomacy by other means then the government in the island of Trinidad in 
the post-Commission period was the pursuit of faction in another guise.”143 Millette was the 
first to detail the historical significance of the Crown Colony mode of governance as it was 
formed in Trinidad in the lead up to emancipation and situates how the Crown Colony 
system was set to serve metropolitan interests at the expense of local populations. The 
primary goal of the British was to secure the plantation economy in spite of the event of 
emancipation, and that demanded the institutionalization of a centralized system of State 
management that was heavily dominated by military influence in its early formation.144 
Millette noted that the British undertook immediate measures to reorganize the police, 
establish curfews and routine patrols within the island, as well as the institutionalization of a 
program for the strict regulation of movement of people in and out of the island.145 The local 
militia was reinforced and expanded in function and power to include significant judicial and 
administrative linkages with the government.146 Two other works on this particular context 
provide further insight into the internal security functions of Crown Colony governance that 
will allow for the formulation of the Crown Colony system as the basis of a national security 
state. Claudius Fergus formulates Revolutionary Emancipation (2013) as a challenge to colonial 
pretenses of humanitarian abolition by engaging a detailed analysis of the historical political-
economy and military determinants surrounding the island of Trinidad after its capture by 
the British in 1797, in direct response to the British military defeat in Saint Domingue by the 
black forces of the Haitian revolution.147  
The British imperative was to satisfy the need for a more effective mode of colonial 
rule and social control that could carry the plantation economy through the institutional 
ordeal of emancipation. This imperative came as a response to the underlying fear of 
insurrection wrought by instances of militant slave resistance increasing in number and in 
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scale across the West Indies.148 The most important factor in this system of governance was 
to avoid what has been called The ‘Trap’ of Representation,149 which was the transfer of 
chartered rights to the plantocracy in the colony.150 The “Trap” that had been the disastrous 
lesson learned for colonial ambitions was the case of Saint Domingue where it had been 
observed that it was the success of the planters in obtaining representation that brought the 
immediate consequences of catalyzing the outbreak of the French Revolution in the colony 
and thus opening the space for slave insurrection.151  
Lord Liverpool, the Secretary for War and the Colonies during this period of interest, 
wrote to Sir Thomas Hislop, Governor of Trinidad, on 4 January 1811 to outline the 
Crown’s position on the governance of Trinidad.152 The letter notes Trinidad and Demerara 
(contemporary Guyana) as factors that could derail abolition if elected councils were 
established there. Of prime importance to Liverpool was the unique demography of 
Trinidad, with concern for the very large free-colored population (comprising 60% of the 
male population),153 as well as the cosmopolitan white population many of whom were 
considered aliens not suitable to parliamentary process.154 The retention of absolute power 
was justified as necessary in the “obligation” to abolition, and further, Crown Colony rule 
was the principal means to maintain control over any avenues for subversion by vested 
interests in parliament or the colonial legislative.155  
For Fergus, the Emancipation Act is a system of social control, evident in the detail 
considered and the simple economics that indicate a disproportion in spending allocated to 
the militia, police, magistracy, and prisons as compared to education and social restitution.156 
The immediate circumstance which produced the disenfranchisement of the newly 
emancipated population were the targeted controls over access to land with stipulations of 
large sized plots for plantation production. In 1832, what might be called an omnibus 
ordinance was passed that redefined “a wide range of offenses” in targeted clauses of 
economic, political, and administrative jurisdictions such that the scope of arbitration was 
greatly increased, the “correctional punishments” administered more severe, and a newly 
expanded class of “magistrates” with the power of the Protector of Slaves was established.157 
It is noted that these “magistrates” were slaveholders, and the British explicitly undercut any 
potential for the existence of an independent labor force with the mass importation of 
indentured laborers from India and China in the following decades.158 This was the basis of a 
divided society contained by a State with consolidated power that is actively turned inward 
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on the island’s population. 
A more domestically focused analysis of the Crown Colony’s security workings in 
Trinidad during the immediate post-emancipation era starts with the characteristics of a 
plantation economy: institutionalized monopolization of land and capital, a mass coerced 
labor force confined to cash crop production, and a political economic arrangement that 
existed for the sole export of primary plantation product.159 This system of plantation control 
has been described as “criminogenic”, where the harsh material conditions the population 
was subjected to ensured widespread desperation amidst a circumstance where the elite 
manipulated the State to broaden the scope of criminalization. This broadening of 
criminality was done in such a manner that followed the pre-existing divisions in the society, 
still based on race (socially and ideologically re-enforced as the overt barrier of slavery had 
now been abolished) and class.160 The plantation economy was in full swing after 
emancipation and by 1870 the consolidation of power in Trinidad was increasingly evident as 
the explicit project of Anglicization achieved dominance. The fracture in white solidarities 
was significantly reduced as a majority of the French Creole interests were successfully 
aligned with the power of the English planters, and government – military officials, now in 
full control of the State and the economy in its path of development.161 
The context and consequences of the disparity in criminalization in the post 
emancipation period are demonstrated in the wide range of interventions against the local 
population carried out through the Crown Colony system of government.162 The most 
significant crimes in this period are those against property, primarily small-scale praedial 
larceny for personal consumption carried out as an attempt to seek relief from harsh 
inequalities.163 Ordinance 5 of 1855 explicitly moved to further the individualization of 
punishment with the expansion of the definition of “malicious injury” as no longer limited to 
a “riotous assembly”,164 and other ordinances were enforced that gave the planters numerous 
avenues through which they refused pay and extended the contracts of laborers.165 This shift 
saw a doubling of convictions in a ten-year span, especially noted in the periods of crises 
where workers attempted to organize protest against wage cuts.  The range of measures 
passed targeted specific aspects and characteristics in the population as a means of coercion 
and control, and was not limited to the plantations. 
The specifically targeted ordinances reveal what the interests the Crown Colony system 
served, and who was a threat. The bias is obvious when considering Ordinances 6 of 1868, 
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and 5 of 1888, which specifically targeted games of chance such as whe-whe: a Chinese 
originated small-stakes game widespread among the lower classes of the population that was 
quite often used as a social fund for assisting distressed community members and for 
burials.166 These practices were targeted as “gambling”, and made a criminal offence, along 
with drumming and many features of the black and colored population’s carnival 
celebrations.167 Similarly the 1880s saw an array of ordinances in attempt to control the 
population, and thus there was an increasingly hostile environment with escalating 
antagonisms between the police and the masses. This is evident in the Carnival riots of 1881 
(known as the Canboulay riots), 1883, and 1884, as well as the Hosein riot turned massacre 
of 1884, and the Arouca drumming riot of 1891.168 
These actions did nothing to hinder those practices of gambling undertaken by the 
elite class, such as horseracing, for these were organized by the police and did not fall under 
the specific codes of criminalization declared.169 This disparity is coupled with the fact that 
white-collar crimes such as fraud, embezzlement, and forgery (as crimes restricted to the 
literate/elite of society) are grossly understated in the statistics.170 The cases that are noted 
involve persons in positions such as the Attorney General, lawyers, magistrates, and other 
senior civil servants, yet convictions were uncommon. Those very few who were convicted 
were junior civil servants and other persons without a network of connections to the 
powerful in society.171 Those who did have the means deployed their privilege of race and 
class, and especially took advantage of the “growing spirit of Creole nationalistic 
consciousness and anti-metropolitan sentiment and antagonisms” as a means to justify their 
position in the national population.172 A definition of the national security state is the goal of 
this section, and the first formulation will be derived from this analysis of the conditions of 
Crown Colony system in Trinidad leading up to and after the declaration of emancipation. 
The basis of this thesis rests upon the argument that Crown Colony governance as 
founded in Trinidad during the 1800s in the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution and 
impending emancipation constituted the essence of a national security state.173 Working from 
the above analysis, the general parameters of the national security state embedded in the 
Crown Colony system are: a centralized state characterized by (i) an exceptionally high 
degree of executive control over essential institutions that bypass most civil checks, (ii) an 
overall military and internal security emphasis resulting in a divided population and 
suppression of social organizations, (iii) policies that are asymmetrically oriented to and 
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representative of the interests of private/corporate property and capital, (iv) executive 
control over the movement of people, goods, and communications, and (v) governance of 
the State and economy in accordance with the larger strategic interests of the British Empire.   
An appropriate definition of the national security state has to explicitly link its 
foundations in the institutions of slavery and governance of a plantation economy and 
society, as it must also be situated in an international context of Western dominance 
stemming from colonial and imperial arrangements. The institutions of the state that bear 
this legacy are characterized by an exceptionally high degree of executive control of 
government, where there are institutional mechanisms through which the executive bypass 
major checks of democratic accountability, and instead there are direct channels for the 
“special interests” of the various groups of elite representation. The displacement of elected 
institutions such as a House/Congress is coupled with displacement/paralysis of the Courts 
as a functional mechanism to keep the executive in check.  
At the same time this definition of the national security state must consider the 
distorted conceptions of individualized freedom deployed as a means to socialize fear in the 
service of bolstering private executive control of the State. In the national security state, 
there is an elite cadre with access to wide reaching forms of surveillance and intelligence 
networks, integrated control of the armed forces with a posture of intervention, the 
institutional ability to displace and bypass democratic processes of government and 
accountability, and direct mass influence through media institutions as well as widespread 
integration to academic networks. The national security elite is made up of the top 
politicians, government bureaucrats, lawyers, military and security officials, and 
private/corporate interests who control the dominant affairs in the country and its regional 
network. This formation can be seen as a complex, driven by a violently defended underlying 
ideological dogma of free-market fundamentalism and materialist liberalism that has the 
ability to control and distort definitions, histories, laws, social movements, and most certainly 
individualized fears.  
The definition of the national security state used in the analysis of this thesis is: a 
nation-state with origins in colonial institutions built to contain and endure institutions of 
slavery and its aftermath, aligned with imperial international arrangements that are 
rationalized by liberals and (neo)conservatives alike, and managed by a protected upper 
hierarchy of government executives in tandem with an unelected elite that together control 
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the institutional means to bolster private/corporate capital interests through the function of 
an ideological definition of national security and a state security complex that includes: the 
use of widespread surveillance, intelligence networks, and knowledge production systems to 
serve its ideological fundamentalism; the use of state (and increasingly private) military or 
paramilitary forces to contain and dismantle any organized responses that challenge the 
unbroken conditions of discontent; the displacement of elected representation and the courts 




The first chapter of this thesis includes an introduction, sections that make up a literature 
review, above, and this outline. Four main chapters of historical analysis, with a brief 
conclusion are below. Chapter II is based mostly on established literature and is used to 
provide the geographical and historical context that sets the stage for the main engagement 
of the thesis. Chapters III through V make up the principal research contribution of this 
thesis, mostly based on archival evidence from the National Archives of the United 
Kingdom Public Records Office, and an extended interview with Kari Polanyi Levitt. The 
archival sources used in each section will be listed in the respective parts of this outline.  
The focus of the thesis is on the period from 1947 to 1978, beginning in the 
immediate postwar context with the granting of universal adult suffrage and the first general 
election that signifies the opening-up of T&T’s constitution and the move towards 
independence. In 1947 the Crown Colony system was still overtly in place, yet on the eve of 
major changes, and thus it provides a useful point from which to begin close observation of 
the sequence of changes that were made to the constitution as independence approached. 
The significant concerns are the lasting patterns in the function of national security and the 
impacts of the US base in Trinidad into the postwar period. T&T attained independence in 
1962 with the acclaimed historian Dr. Eric Williams as Prime Minister. The continuity in the 
organization and function of the national security state will be traced through the first 
decade of independence to situate the conditions in T&T when the country became a 
republic in 1976. The closing date of the analysis is 1978, an appropriate marker as it gives a 
snapshot shortly after republic status was attained. It is the peak year of the 1970s oil boom 
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in T&T, during which the country was already showing signs of an underlying crisis building-
up pressure.  
Chapter II is a highlight from the unification of T&T in 1899 until the end of WWII, 
and the 1946 elections as the first with universal adult suffrage. This early period situates the 
origins of the commercial oil industry 1910 and its increasing strategic security importance to 
British Empire. In 1925 the first elected component was introduced into government in 
T&T, a small minority in the legislature, and only 6% of the population enfranchised. The 
1937 labour riots in Trinidad centered on the oil industry, where the foreign corporations 
posted record profits and workers pay was suppressed. This circumstance demonstrates the 
function of the Crown Colony national security state in the 20th Century. The de-escalation 
of the labour riots was achieved by outright suppression through physical force and 
intervention of the Royal Navy and Marines. The onset of WWII came shortly thereafter 
along with the increasing importance of Trinidad to the US. The presence of the US is most 
noted through the impacts of its military bases on the local population in Trinidad during the 
war, with its racist imperialist occupation on display.  
The US bases were established in T&T during 1940/1941, and would remain through 
the war and for two decades after. 1942 and 1943 were highpoints of submarine attacks in 
Caribbean as they targeted the Trinidad area due to concentrated supply lines, and the 
Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (AACC) was formally established to help alleviate 
shortages of food due to record high ship losses. In actuality the key figures of the AACC 
worked to streamline the process of establishing US bases in the Caribbean, and later the 
organization functioned as an institution through which the US formally sought to determine 
the postwar policy direction of the Caribbean and promote independence as a direct means 
to push back British influence in the region. Eric Williams’ political career has its beginnings 
in this period, noted through his direct links to US security agencies and the AACC. The 
wartime period comes to close in Trinidad with the granting of universal adult suffrage in 
1945, and specific attention is given to the Crown Colony constitution that upheld the 
fundamental characteristics of the national security state.  
Archival sources used in this chapter were: The National Archives of the United 
Kingdom, Public Records Office files from the Colonial Office, Foreign Commonwealth 
Office, War Office, Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office; Government of Trinidad and 
Tobago websites, Ministry of Energy and Industries, Election and Boundaries Commission; 
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University of Florida Digital Collection; FBI Freedom of Information Request documents 
made public online via Muckrock.  
Chapter III covers the period 1947-1962 in Trinidad, during which the Crown Colony 
constitution underwent a change towards democratic principles, and the surprising reversal 
back towards centralized authority under the first local government. The focus is the 
evolution of the constitution, the organization of the economy, industrial relations and 
worker suppression, the formation of the P.N.M. and its electoral performance, and the 
extent to which Williams’ claims of ‘decolonizing’ the Crown Colony constitution can be 
substantiated. In this regard the alignment of the oil and sugar interests vision of the 
constitution with Eric Williams’ stated principles are detailed, and set in opposition to 
formulations that came from local councils and workers unions. In the opening segment the 
imperative of internal security is highlighted through the British intelligence and security 
system in place in Trinidad, along with the US bases which remained operational throughout. 
The outline of the constitution in 1955 will be situated, as it was before Eric Williams 
attained power in 1956 with the P.N.M. 
The formation of the P.N.M. and the first five years of Eric Williams’ term indicate the 
extent to which he was unwilling to break with the established interests of power, and thus 
his reliance on the Colonial Office in this early period is firm in the records. Most important 
are the executive actions Williams took to establish a strong hold on government in a case 
where he did not command mass electoral support and thus had relatively weak 
parliamentary representation. Williams relied on the British nominated component for a 
majority and attained further constitutional modifications to broaden his chances of electoral 
support, but mostly utilized a system where power was consolidated in a nominated Cabinet 
controlled by the Prime Minister. In this system of government and in the continued 
function of the economy oriented toward external interests Williams ensured the status quo 
remained. An insight into the security threat evaluation presented by Williams as he built up 
to his 1960 “march on Chaguaramas” is given through the perception of the Colonial Office 
and the US security agencies. This record reveals the limited extent of Williams’ anti-colonial 
challenges, and provides revealing insight into the conditions of T&T upon achieving 
independence in 1962, with a national security state intact.  
Archival sources used in this chapter were: The National Archives of the United 
Kingdom, Public Records Office files from the Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence, 
! &$!
Defence Office, Ministry of Power; Edited reference collection of documents on 
constitutional history of the British Empire; University of Florida Digital Collection; Edited 
collection of Eric Williams’ speeches; Government of Trinidad and Tobago websites, 
Election and Boundaries Commission, Parliament; FBI Freedom of Information Request 
Documents made public online via Muckrock.  
Chapter IV covers the first decade of independence in T&T, 1962-1972. The early 
years of independence record an anti-communist national security state headed by Dr. Eric 
Williams. Guyana in the early 1960s is an appropriate case to contrast with T&T; this is as it 
pertains to colonial/imperial interventions in support of T&T and against Guyana. In 
Trinidad the analysis situates Special Branch Intelligence reports, the 1963 Mbanefo 
Commission of Enquiry into Subversive activity, the 1965 Industrial Stabilization Act, noting 
the consistent executive action against ‘threats’ to an ideological insistency, and thus the 
various means of targeting those who thought and attempted to organize otherwise. Lloyd 
Best of the New World Group was based in Trinidad in the mid 1960s, primarily at the 
University, but was and active on the ground and did become a target of the national security 
state, along with routine targeting of labour leaders. The National Joint Action Committee 
rose out of radical student leadership and alliance with labour leaders and became the 
forefront of the Black Power challenge to the Williams government, catalyzed by the events 
of the 1968 and 1969.  
Political interference in the security services is a key feature in the 1960s, contributing 
to the volatility. This is noted primarily in the Regiment where a corrupted hierarchy fed 
grievances throughout the force, but also the police where abuses of executive power were 
not uncommon. The British High Commissioner’s analysis of the situation is used alongside 
‘intelligence’ from a US foreign correspondent to provide an analysis of the security threats 
throughout the events leading up to 1970. This episode features labour strike action, student 
protests, Black Power militancy, the ‘February Revolution’ and a Regiment uprising in an 
attempted coup d’état in April 1970. Williams responded to this situation with a call for US 
military support, and relied on executive actions that in effect compromised State legitimacy. 
The aftermath of 1970 brings the section to an end, noting the outcome of the court martial, 
and the convictions that were later overturned. The context of emergence of the National 
Union of Freedom Fighters indicates the continuity in organized dissent against the PNM 
government characterized by executive dominance and an empowered and corrupted police 
! &%!
force. These patterns set the trend and material basis for the problems faced in the purview 
of national security in contemporary T&T. 
Archival sources used in this chapter were: The National Archives of the United 
Kingdom, Public Records Office files from the Colonial Office, Defence Office, Ministry of 
Power, Foreign Commonwealth Office, Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign Office; 
Declassified US Government records on Guyana hosted online; Online Archives of the 
Institute of Current World Affairs, Frank J. McDonald newsletters; McGill University 
Archives, Kari Polanyi Levitt collection; Edited collection of Eric Williams’ speeches; 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago websites, Election and Boundaries Commission, 
Parliament; Caribbean elections online database. 
Chapter V spans the year of independence from 1962 to 1978, two years after republic 
status was attained and at the height of an oil boom. This section primarily examines the 
impact of the national security state on independent thought in the Caribbean, with T&T in 
focus. C.L.R. James and key members of the New World Group (NWG) are situated as they 
are caught and targeted by the national security state on various occasions. The impacts of 
these actions actively hindered the careers of the groups’ members, their ability to produce 
their work, and the efforts to build institutions of independent thought. This analysis links 
Guyana, T&T, Jamaica, and Canada by locating the transnational network of the NWG’s 
work and organizing, as it also reveals a security network across the same geography that was 
always ready to intervene. Further insight into the workings of the national security state 
reveals its function as a system not reliant on a strongman individual leader, but operational 
through the organization of institutions and the active targeting of dissident voices through 
bureaucratic mechanisms. The widespread and active network of a “Western Intelligence 
Community” is situated in contrast to members of the New World Group, such as Lloyd 
Best, George Beckford, and Kari Levitt, a professor and one-time economist for the T&T 
government that was repeatedly targeted by the national security state.  
As Kari Levitt was pushed out of Trinidad as Williams’ fortunes in government 
changed with the onset of an oil and natural gas boom, which alleviated immediate pressure 
and allowed public expenditure to pacify some of the population’s material concerns. Eric 
Williams further consolidated power in this period, taking actions that seriously 
compromised the functioning of the civil service in a move to empower appointed 
Ministerial portfolios even further. Despite claims of ‘nationalization’ and ‘diversification’ the 
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substance reveals that foreign interests continue to maintain strategic control of the economy 
that primarily relies on the export-oriented petroleum sector. The outcome of the 1970s oil 
boom was an import-oriented materialist consumer society in T&T with obvious inequality 
and underlying social cleavages intact. Thus this chapter concludes with the endurance of the 
national security state on the eve of the neoliberal counter-revolution.   
Archival sources used in this chapter were: The National Archives of the United 
Kingdom, Public Records Office files from the Colonial Office, Defence Office, Ministry of 
Power, Foreign Commonwealth Office, Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign Office; 
Declassified US Government records on Guyana hosted online; Online Archives of the 
Institute of Current World Affairs, Frank J. McDonald newsletters; McGill University 
Archives, Kari Polanyi Levitt collection; Edited collection of Eric Williams’ speeches; British 
Library of the United Kingdom online collection; New World Quarterly online archive; 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago websites, Election and Boundaries Commission, 
Parliament, Ministry of Legal Affairs; US Department of Defense online archive; Author 
interview with Kari Polanyi Levitt; University of Florida Digital Collection. 
The conclusion gives attention to some of the key contemporary problems of national 
security in T&T, where the historical analysis provided in this thesis is used to counter the 
distorted understandings in contemporary discourses. This is done by highlighting a single 
study that compliments the work of this thesis in confronting the systems that uphold and 
work for the national security state, and in effect serve to bolster its power by producing 
knowledge that serves to justify the government’s displays of power and criminalization of 
traditions of resistance to colonialism and anti-Black racism that go back to the 1960s. It is 
argued that an important antidote to such distorted self-serving discourses is a strong 
analysis based from the historical context which brought T&T to these contemporary 
circumstances; i.e. an analysis that details the suspension of the decolonization process and 
the endurance of the national security state in T&T, noting the unbroken continuities in the 
patterns of who hold impunity in office, what interests retain most profits from the 
economy, who is protected by the states forces, and who remains disposable.  
In conclusion the case of Walter Rodney brings this analysis to a close, noting the 
context of his grounded, sharp and unwavering commitment to decolonization, never to 
back down from the security state, but most devastatingly impacted. Walter Rodney is a 
classic case of how the national security state endures, and the function of its violent 
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interventions against independent thought. Nevertheless, even as the national security state 
remains prominent in everyday life, there is always space for an undertone of resurgence and 
it only needs resonance and consequent amplification to become an orchestra. 
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Chapter II, 1899-1946 
Situating the geopolitical importance of the national security state of Crown Colony T&T  
 
Image 1. A prison of open water 
 
 
Pictured above is Nelson Island, titled “Quarantine Island” as it historically had 
been by the British when it was used to process incoming slaves, and indentured 
laborers up to the early 1900s. Union leader Uriah Buzz Butler was detained on 
this island after being arrested in the 1937 labour disturbances, as were the Black 
Power leaders in 1970. The island is very symbolic, a clear “natural” unit of 
containment, and serves to highlight the geographic basis of this study on the 
national security state, in these southern Caribbean islands. Prince Emmanuel, a 
rastafari Bobo Shanti leader, described a Caribbean island as “an open prison, 
surrounded by water”,174 poetically exposing the institutions which govern life in 
these “ghetto paradise” islands.175 Not far from this prison island are some other 
small islands where the elite’s holiday houses are located. 
 
The function of the national security state in these small Southern Caribbean islands needs 
to be to situated as part of a wider system of global colonial and imperial interests. From the 
beginning of the twentieth century and increasing in decades thereafter, the interchange 
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between the British Empire and the US as the top superpower is demonstrated in the 
Caribbean. Trinidad provides a small ‘stage’ from which to observe this interchange at an 
awkward but important period in the histories of these empires; challenges to the Western 
global order by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and the growing movements for 
decolonization. Nevertheless the consequence is that prime attention was given to T&T’s oil 
industry, and hence a heavy emphasis on internal security most notably manifested in the 
suppression of worker organization. In T&T the Crown Colony system of government 
ensured that the private/corporate interests were principally served. This was manifested in 
strong institutions to protect and uphold the profitable export industries that grew alongside 
a noted absence of institutions that protect workers, foster social uplift and integration, or, 
on a most basic level, secure local livelihoods with food production. 
The Governor was the centralized authority of the local government and actively used 
the armed forces, local police and intervention by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, to 
subdue worker mobilization in the oil industry. At this point less than 6% of the population 
could vote, and there was the first introduction of a small minority of elected members in 
the Legislative Council. The population was also forced to confront the impacts of US Naval 
and US Army/Air Force bases established on the island as a means to secure essential supply 
lines of oil and bauxite. Perhaps unsurprisingly both the US military bases and the executive 
dominated Crown Colony system remained in place long after the war ended.  
The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (AACC) played an important role in 
mediating and securing the transition to the postwar order in the British Caribbean. The 
AACC was established by US initiative as an institutional means to counter British political 
influence in the region by obtaining a direct channel into research and policy formation 
influence in British colonies. Eric Williams worked for the AACC for twelve years, and 
despite being hailed and an anti-colonial and anti-racist scholar he spent time among US 
intelligence circles in Washington. The context and function of the AACC is most significant 
in framing the later analysis of this thesis where the concern is the continuity of the Crown 
Colony constitution and the national security state beyond the declaration of independence. 
Eric Williams was T&T’s first, and longest-ever serving, Prime Minister. This chapter sets 
the stage for that engagement by locating the work of the AACC and Eric Williams within 
the networks of the US national security state that was firstly concerned with establishing 
unquestioned US influence in the Western Hemisphere.  
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The Trinidad oil industry at the basis of the imperial strategy 
 
The beginnings of Trinidad and Tobago as a unified political entity correspond with the 
emergence of the US as the world’s leading military and economic superpower. US primacy 
was most evident in the Caribbean where the US increasingly dictated security arrangements. 
The 1899 unification of Trinidad and Tobago coincides with the founding of the 
Organization of American States during The First International Conference of American 
States,176 and a report by the director of Naval Intelligence for the Royal Navy that the US 
had completely outclassed the British in the West Indies.177 The 1901 agreement to give the 
US complete military control of the Panama Canal, the 1902 establishment of the Caribbean 
Division of the US North Atlantic Squadron, and the formal recognition of the Monroe 
Doctrine by the British are indications of a key shift in a determined Anglo-American 
alliance of imperial continuity.178 The decision to disband the West Indies Squadron of the 
Royal Navy in 1904, and the strategic withdrawal of the Royal Navy itself in 1905 represents 
the formal ascension of the US as the unquestioned imperial power in the Western 
Hemisphere.179  
The interventionist position of the US’s early national security strategy took material 
form in the Caribbean.  In the decade between 1903 and 1913 the US Navy was sent to the 
Caribbean more than 20 times to control political turmoil, notably through multiple 
interventions into Haiti, Cuba, Panama, Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Nicaragua.180 
The recurring concerns in the posture of the US towards the Caribbean are two-fold: the 
protection of the imperial sphere of influence from external threats by major powers and the 
policing involved in maintaining internal security of the various units to ensure the stability of 
empire.181 War Plan Black of 1913 put the Caribbean at the center of focus in a projection of 
German aggression.182 The first US Navy vessel to cross the Panama Canal was in 1914. This 
marked an important beginning in the shift in US national security strategy towards a more 
global posture,183 with the Caribbean as the single most important area in the US Navy’s 
planning throughout the period 1913–1917.184 Although the US underscored the regional 
security influence, Britain still had a firm hold on its colonies and Trinidad was of particular 
interest. 
Petroleum became a key defining strategic feature of globally oriented national security 
agendas in the early twentieth century, and it has been noted that the first oil well sunk in 
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Trinidad was in 1857 at a depth of 55 meters, though its significance has not been fully 
considered. According to a British Official, “the credit for one of the first successful oil wells 
in the world might fairly be claimed by Trinidad.”185 It was a US company that drilled this 
first well, and there has been persistent attention on Trinidad ever since. By 1910 commercial 
oil production was established in the country with the first crude oil export to England, and 
some 60 foreign companies established between 1909 and 1912.186 Winston Churchill 
appointed a Royal Commission under the Navy in 1912 to conduct an investigation across 
the British Empire to evaluate politically stable sources of oil necessary for the functioning 
of the navy.187 The strategic importance of oil took a heightened note with the finding that 
Trinidad was the only site of proven oil reserves in the British Empire at the time.188  
The security importance of oil supplies not only resulted in the heightened strategic 
importance on Trinidad, but also affected the development of the petroleum industry itself. 
Coinciding with the emergence of the commercial oil industry in Trinidad was the fact that 
the Royal Navy recognized the superiority of oil as a fuel and made the decision to begin 
replacing its coal powered fleet. 189 Less than 1% of Britain’s energy requirements were met 
by petroleum products in 1900,190 however by 1912 the Royal Navy had fully committed to 
the new fuel and commissioned the Elizabeth Class as its first fleet of vessels that operated 
solely on petroleum combustion.191 The Royal Navy was essential for the existence of the 
British Empire, and because it was the primary agent pushing government commitment to 
petroleum the approach taken towards the overall development of oil policy reflected the 
specific concerns of naval supply line planning within a framework of national security.192  
The security agenda that determined this process was most concerned with power-
parity and thus developments in petroleum technology became a type of arms race. At the 
beginning of the century the Royal Navy held a strategic advantage because it was unequalled 
in size,193 however its planners understood the need to at least match the technological 
advances being made by the Italian, French, Russian, and US navies as they pioneered the 
use of petroleum.194 After taking into consideration the US Navy’s 1916 and 1919 ship 
building programs the Royal Navy confirmed that it was going to be eclipsed by the US in 
terms of naval power.195 In light of such a circumstance and with reliance on the US as the 
single largest oil supply of the British Empire, the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee and 
the British War Mission both recognized the strategic weakness of this position in 1918 and 
placed utmost importance on the need to bolster sources within the empire. 196 In both 
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application and control of sources of oil the progression of the twentieth century evidenced 
US superiority of power.  
The vulnerability of the British with respect to the US is evident in the 1917 
breakdown of sources of oil for the Royal Navy: US 71.5%, Persia 10%, Mexico 8%, 
Domestic 7.5%, Trinidad 2%, and Borneo 1%.197 New discoveries in Trinidad and Venezuela 
in 1918 provided some relief to strategic planning efforts,198 and Trinidad’s rise to 
prominence as a source of oil for the British Empire increased from then onwards, rising to 
50.3% of the Royal Navy’s supplies by 1932.199 In 1937 the Oil Board of the Imperial 
Defence Committee reported that Trinidad accounted for 62.8% of total oil production in 
the British Empire,200 and was expected to supply the Royal Air Force with 25% of its 
wartime needs.201  
The world’s most advanced aviation fuel plant at the time began operations in south 
Trinidad in 1938.202 This source of fuel supply was directly attributed to the success of the 
Royal Air Force in the “Battle of Britain”, without which the Oil Control Board admitted 
that Britain would have probably lost, and the Petroleum Times specifically highlighted 
Trinidad Leasehold Ltd. as a proportionately unmatched contributor to the war effort.203 The 
British endured its relative decline in part by strategic control of places and resources such as 
that represented by Trinidad. This heightened security emphasis had contradictory 
consequences for the local population, where there was a marked emphasis on investment in 
infrastructure for industry as opposed to institutions for social development and democratic 
governance. Many elements of the local population would become outright targets of 
internal security, unabated despite the progression toward internal self-government.  
 
Crown Colony Trinidad in the 1930s, profits for the few and discontent for the many 
 
The cruelties of property and privilege are always more ferocious than the 
revenges of poverty and oppression. For the one aims at perpetuating resented 
injustice, the other is merely a momentary passion soon appeased.  
(C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins, 1938) 
 
The engrained domestic disparities in Trinidad can hardly be hidden in the circumstances 
from which the widespread discontent of the 1930s flared up across the Caribbean in the 
lead up to WWII. In 1937 Trinidad Leasehold Ltd. and Apex (later BP) posted large profits 
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and declared 30% and 45% dividend returns to shareholders respectively. 204 In the same year 
the Petroleum Association in Trinidad internally reported that local living expenses had 
increased by 17% in the previous two years, yet wages were below their pre-depression 
levels. The infrastructural costs of developing the industry were placed on the local 
government while private companies were given preferential tax rates and exclusive access to 
extensive tracts of crown lands in south Trinidad from which local peasants were 
excluded.205 At this point the petroleum industry employed about 14,000 people, with the 
sugar and cocoa industries employing about 40,000 and 17,000 people respectively.206 After 
decades of expansion and high profitability catalyzed by state subsidies and loans to 
employers the sugar industry was in relative decline despite the “extravagant use of low-paid 
labour” as reported by the West Indian Sugar Commission in 1930.207  
The agriculture industry employed the largest amount of people, and the conditions of 
those who labored for its profits are a good indicator of the harsh realities faced by most on 
the island of Trinidad.  Cocoa surpassed sugar as Trinidad’s leading agricultural crop at the 
turn of the century, however the cocoa economy experienced a significant downturn as early 
as 1921 with the consequence of a 50% reduction in disbursements to laborers between 1929 
and 1936.208 This statistic was highlighted in a 1936 report of the Wages and Advisory Board 
as they expressed concern for the already high and increasing unemployment and 
underemployment levels in a context where few laborers owned food gardens.209 The 
exploitation of workers was even further compounded by practices of payment through 
tokens or credit notes that maintained a system of laborer indebtedness to local shopkeepers 
without the planters ever having to disburse cash.210 Such practices of merciless usury were 
so engrained that in 1918 a local planter admitted to the Legislative Council (LegCo) that it 
was “unfortunately, only too true” that this system was “the basis on which the agricultural 
industry in the Colony has been built up.”211  
The official neglect of the population at the expense of servicing the interests of 
foreign capital is evident thus far, and in this context it is noted by the lack of any minimum 
wage legislation before 1935 despite being formally tabled since 1920.212 Similarly an initial 
trade union law was passed in 1932, however it granted no right to peaceful picketing or any 
protections from action in tort.213 This was not for any lack of social agitation on behalf of 
the population, for mobilization towards elected representation in government persisted up 
to the 1925 modification of the constitution to permit the first elected members to the 
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LegCo,214 and only increased in energy thereafter. The return of thousands of veterans from 
WWI and workers from construction on the Panama Canal occurred amidst a general rise in 
race and working class organizing catalyzed by an increased circulation of Garveyite and 
socialist literature across the Caribbean.215 These networks were important catalysts of an 
increasingly international struggle against the European colonial regimes that had used and 
abused the world over. 
The channels of information of those involved in liberation struggles in the Western 
Hemisphere were particularly vibrant in the 1930s, fed by the material discontent and the 
increased distribution of information on world events.  In the Caribbean, anti-colonial, anti-
imperial, and anti-fascist movements heightened considerably with the coronation of the 
Haile Selassie in Ethiopia in 1930 and the subsequent Italian invasion in 1935.216 Gordon 
Rohlehr emphasizes the role of calypso as a key medium of disseminating information in this 
period, as it publicly challenged and portrayed “the context of hunger, unemployment, 
economic depression, worker militancy, desperation, struggle and sheer survivalism” in the 
face of official indifference to petitions, hunger strikes, and mass demonstrations.217 In 1937 
Trinidad was ripe for conflict with the mass of the black and brown population laboring 
under a small white elite in control of industry, and only 6% of the population enfranchised 
under direct rule by the a British Governor on the island and the Secretary of State in the 
metropolis.218 The eruption of mass discontent could hardly have been unexpected. The 
regime’s response was not unexpected, for it only revealed the function of the national 
security state as an agent of targeted physical suppression. 
When strikes broke out in the oil sector in south Trinidad on 19 June 1937 the primary 
response on behalf of the state was to contain and subdue workers, done by targeting the 
leaders and deploying the full brunt of the police force.219 In the following days the strike 
spread to agricultural sectors, workers around Port of Spain, and even government workers, 
all met in response by the arrival of two Royal Navy ships with Royal Marines to ensure 
control and restore confidence to the elite.220 The intervening forces were deployed in 
strategic areas across the island, allowing the Police to begin targeting labour leaders and 
subdue the unrest. A series of intimidation demonstration flights were conducted over the 
oilfield areas and thousands of pamphlets containing official notices to desist were dropped 
over T&T.221 By 2 July attempts at negotiations broke down and in response to a message of 
public defiance from union leader Uriah Buzz Butler (a WWI veteran) the Governor 
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“immediately authorized offensive action against Fyzabad village which was known to 
contain many of the ringleaders” and “gave orders for arrest of Butler”. The Royal Marines 
and the Trinidad Police conducted a surprise raid at 6am, “a cordon was thrown around the 
village” and the force “commenced a house to house search, arresting 22 men and 
women”.222  
Token offers were made to the workers in a move by company directors along with 
local and metropolitan government officials to frame the issue around “industrial” aspects of 
the dispute in order to depoliticize the problem.223 The simultaneous reality was that police 
platoons conducted targeted searches, seizures, and arrests such that by 5 July the strikes 
were broken.224 On 3 July the Secretary of State for the Colonies met with a delegation from 
the West India Committee representing oil, cocoa, sugar, asphalt, shipping, and commerce 
interests in Trinidad. The group referred to the calls for wage increases as “preposterous” 
and threatened to move assets to more secure locations, while making demands for 
permanent naval and air bases on the island.225 It is here that the Secretary of State decided it 
necessary to formally institute trade unions in Trinidad as a means to control the militancy of 
working class.226 Direct channels for special interests are always a key function.  
The Forster Commission was established in October 1937 as an “impartial” vehicle 
through which the British sought to satisfy public discontent by demonstrating its effort to 
address the issues and formulate recommendations.227 In reality the Commission was 
controlled by the British, paid for by the colony, and primarily gave attention to the interests 
of the elite during the course of its six weeks of enquiry on the island.228 The Commission 
offered nothing of substance to the workers, and the elite was aware of this in their call for 
the publication of the report to be delayed until troops were stationed on the island.229 In fact 
the report even saw “weakness” in the governor’s actions such to the extent that he was 
forced to use ill health as a reason to resign by the years end.230 A Naval vessel and some of 
the troops dispatched to Trinidad, remained until March 1938, and the overall outcome of 
the 1937 riots was the creation of “constitutional channels” for mediating labor disputes and 
an admission by the outgoing governor that no real concessions were made to the workers, 
because “in terms of cash”, 1938 found them “far worse off than they were in 1928.”231  
The baseline ideological concern was in place prior the onset of WWII, and before the 
formalization of the postwar national security state. In June 1938 Colonel Sir Vernon Kell 
followed up on a report titled “Communism and the West Indian Labour Disturbances”, 
! '&!
produced using M.I.5 intelligence.232 Colonel Kell’s action was to distribute the report to 
relevant persons and begin to field another round of intelligence gathering, with a direct 
request for informants to “send us the names and descriptions of agitators who have been 
conspicuous during recent disturbances.” The analysis admitted that there was “no direct 
evidence to show that the Moscow Comintern has been deliberately fostering labour unrest 
in the West Indies. On the other hand there are communist organisations in this country 
which exist to inspire and support negro movements.”233 A few organizations of concern 
were listed, but most important in the M.I.5’s intelligence was the International African 
Service Bureau, to which Malcom Ivan Nurse (known as George Padmore) and C.L.R. 
James, both born in Trinidad, were closely connected. The M.I.5’s claim that the London-
based organization was key in coordinating mobilizing efforts in Trinidad proved to be an 
exaggeration in the later analysis,234 but ‘threats’ of communist infiltration organizing 
remained the underlying concern to the British security officials. The Anglo-American 
commitment was firmly in place and set to ensure the status quo continuation of interests in 
the Caribbean.   
The colonial state with support from the Royal Navy intervened to maintain the 
political and economic status quo across the islands of the British Caribbean throughout the 
decade of depression and unrest of the 1930s.235 The wider Caribbean remained under the 
sphere of influence of the US such that the Special Services Squadron was created in 1920 to 
“promote friendly relations” and “better understanding between the United States and other 
republics in the Western Hemisphere.”236 This “better understanding” was actually based on 
the protection of US citizens, corporate interests, and any overarching strategic security 
concerns, evidenced by 51 occasions between 1920-1934 where the State Department 
requested the squadron to intervene in response to political unrest.237 Anglo-American 
security dominance was well in place leading up to WWII, though increasingly reliant on US 
imperial underpinning.   
 
Trinidad in World War II - interchange in imperial security 
 
In noting the particular importance of the Anglo-American special relationship it is also 
important to situate the synergy that existed between the differences in position of the two 
empires. A detailed report from the Governor of T&T to the Colonial Office in September 
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1942 gives an extraordinary insight into the interchange between the British and the US with 
respect to differences between colonial and imperial empires, and the enduring Anglo-
American bond that would come to heavily shape the outcome of the postwar international 
order. The Governor’s first note was a point of concern regarding the US proposition “to 
grant full self-government to Puerto Rico in 1944” which had set an example and stimulated 
“popular reform movements in the British West Indian Colonies.”238 The Trinidad Governor 
met with his counter part in Puerto Rico, Governor Tugwell, who was a key US figure in the 
Anglo American Caribbean Commission, and also a member of the “Roosevelt Brain Trust”. 
The report was that, “Mr. Tugwell sees in Puerto Rico nothing but a perpetual drain on the 
United States Treasury,” and “[i]n spite of all the United States has done … he sees little 
hope of substantial improvement in the condition of the masses even under United States 
rule, and nothing but catastrophe under an autonomous government.”239 
The imperial powers had come to the realization that maintaining the responsibilities 
of governance in a colony was no longer profitable, or necessary to ensure the political-
economic alignment of these areas in the context where international alliances amongst 
Western powers increasingly ensured the status quo. For Governor Tugwell in Puerto Rico, 
“his advice to Washington would be to get out as decently, as completely and as quickly as 
possible.” 240 In stating this position Tugwell was certain that if independence was granted in 
Puerto Rico, the US would retain a portion of the harbor and the airfield “in either 
permanent sovereignty or on long lease.” The ‘anti-colonialism’ the US stood for in this 
period was hardly a program of liberation for oppressed peoples, but was more so an 
effective discourse and strategic maneuver that advanced its imperial interests.  
The agenda of US imperialism is evidenced in the Caribbean, and given an apt 
description by a uniquely placed source in 1942. The British Governor’s analysis of US 
strategic interests in the region highlighted the Panama Canal as most telling, because it was 
“as important to the United States as the jugular vein” or “the ‘Colon’ is to a man”, and thus 
“in Panama we have the genesis of United States Colonial Policy.”241 The defence of Panama 
as a site of key strategic importance depended “on such outlying places as San Juan, 
Trinidad, Galapagos, etc.” As the US influence was primarily upheld by its network of bases 
the Governor concluded that there was “a certain uniformity and sequence in United States 
policy” that suggested its empire was “mainly concerned with strategy and 
communications”.242 The Governor admitted a certain disadvantage with the British position 
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vis-à-vis the US, where in addressing the operation of US bases he noted that “Unites States 
leases are maintained more cheaply in British than in American territory” because of legal 
mechanisms surrounding customs agreements.  Beyond the continual economic advantage 
that the US always sought to ensure the US bases were essentially “sovereign areas from 
which the local population, with all the liabilities its presence entails, has been conveniently 
expelled.” 243  
In sum, the problem for the Governor was that “the ‘tyranny’ of the British system 
can be compared unfavourably with the ‘liberality’ of the United States in granting full self-
government to Puerto Rico etc.” He did consider self-government in the British West Indies 
and but was struck by the liabilities involved: 
The grant of Dominion status has worked fairly well with our own people, but 
we have yet to find out whether it will work with other races in India, Africa or 
the Colonies. Partial trials in Ceylon and Jamaica have not been encouraging. 
Even to try it out in Trinidad means that we leave ourselves at a strategical and 
commercial disadvantage to the United States of America with its sovereign base 
and no political responsibilities. If the local autonomous government proved 
unstable, there would be every justification or excuse for using the military bases 
for commercial purposes which would place the Colony in financial 
difficulties.244 
 
The disadvantage that the British faced with respect to the US did not deter the fundamental 
realization as to what was needed for the British to secure their own interests in this 
changing geopolitical context. The importance of Anglo-American bond was definitive in the 
Trinidad Governor’s bottom line sentiment: “I am one of those who believe that the United 
States and the British Empire must stand together or fall. And, for that reason, it is essential 
that all causes of friction present, potential and future should be removed or corrected in 
advance.”245 
On the eve of WWII circumstances were such that Britain was in a weak position 
relative to the US, and thus the Caribbean was marked by a colonial powers in decline and an 
a singular imperial power on the rise. In 1918 Britain had over 400 destroyers in the Royal 
Navy, but only 153 upon entry into the war in 1939 and suffered heavy losses in the first 
years of battle.246 As early as 1939 a secret agreement was signed where Britain granted the 
US seaplane base allocations in Trinidad, Bermuda, and St. Lucia.247 In September 1939 the 
Pan-American Security Zone was established along with the Atlantic Squadron Neutrality 
Patrol to counter German U-boat entry into the Caribbean and Panama Canal Zone.248 
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These moves were led by the US as part of an active plan to integrate the countries of the 
hemisphere into a security framework through which it could ensure its influence. The 
Havana Conference of American Foreign Ministers in mid 1940 declared a unity of action in 
the Americas on matters of security, thus was a key institutional outcome in response to US 
concerns for the consequences of the collapse of European Allies on the political stability of 
countries in the Caribbean.249  
As the survival of Western Europe was put into question in the early direction of 
WWII, the prime interest of the US was to secure its hemisphere. May 1940 saw the fall of 
France, the retreat of the British at Dunkirk, and the first Nazi U-boat attacks in the 
Caribbean targeting the oil tankers and the world’s largest refinery in Curacao.250 This 
circumstance registered with US war planners as a worst-case scenario, while the US 
population’s sentiments increasingly fell into line with the official disposition. This is noted 
by a Gallup poll in June 1940 that recorded a response of 81% in favor of the US acquiring 
valued European possessions in the Caribbean. The poll results corresponded with outright 
calls by a US diplomat in the region for annexation of the oil rich islands of Trinidad, 
Curacao, and Aruba using national security rhetoric, with a qualification to filter those islands 
seen as a liability.251 Also in June came the initial recommendation by the War Plans Division 
to acquire territory for naval bases in the Caribbean, and the largely unopposed passage 
through Congress of the Two Ocean Navy Act that slated a 70% increase in naval 
tonnage.252 Beyond recognizing the need to hold its perimeter the US administration 
anticipated entry into the European conflict.  
Winston Churchill was formally appealing to Franklin Roosevelt for the transfer of 
destroyers by May 1940, placing less emphasis on the destroyers themselves than on the 
inevitable entry of the US into the war.253 Roosevelt resisted these requests publicly while 
attempts were made to utilize loopholes in the Neutrality Act to transfer military assets to 
Britain,254 and once the case for the “executive supremacy in foreign policy” was sound 
Roosevelt announced the bases-for-destroyers deal on 3 September 1940.255 The deal was 
instated via executive decree as it did not require Congressional appropriation of funds, and 
the announcement came with this emphasis by the President: “The value [to] the Western 
Hemisphere of these outposts of security is beyond calculation. Their need has long been 
recognized by our country and especially by those primarily charged with the duty of 
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charting and organizing our own naval and military defense.”256 Roosevelt considered this 
deal the most important action to reinforce national defense since the Louisiana Purchase.257  
In the exchange Britain received 50 aged destroyers, and a commitment by the US to 
support the war effort while the US obtained 99-year leases on territory for major bases in 
Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad as well as for smaller outposts in Antigua, St. Lucia, 
Jamaica, Bahamas, and Guyana.258 Rear Admiral John Greenslade headed the Board of 
Experts that was tasked with selecting the sites and overseeing establishment of the bases,259 
and highlighted Trinidad as the “southern keystone” of hemispheric defense.260 Trinidad was 
vital to US strategists because its geographic location served as an access control point that 
covered the southern and eastern approaches of Atlantic entry to the Panama Canal.  The 
island’s position also ensured it was a key node in the supply lines of oil and bauxite 
shipments from Venezuela, Trinidad, and Guyana to both the US and Britain.261  
The Governor of T&T reported in October 1940 that he had been reliably informed 
that in Washington’s evaluation Trinidad represented forty of the fifty destroyers as it would 
be able to “serve, if necessary, as a jumping-off ground for operations by the U.S. Army in 
South America.”262 Similarly, on 6 November, the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 
reported that dredging operations had failed in Guyana, and because Trinidad was in close 
proximity and had a naturally protected deep-water harbor the island would be the 
transshipment point for Guyanese bauxite.263  
By the end of 1940, and continuing into the first quarter of 1941, British, Allied, and 
Neutral ship losses averaged 400,000 tons per month,264 while US war plans indicated that 
the overarching framework of entry into the war centered on “the paramount territorial 
interests of the United States”.265 To this regard Britain was left with the responsibility of 
securing the North and South Atlantic,266 while the US instituted an Atlantic-Caribbean Sea 
Frontier within which lay the Caribbean Coastal Frontier that was divided into three zones 
(Puerto Rico, Guantanamo, Trinidad).267 According to the Greenslade Board, the Caribbean 
frontier existed to ensure “complete control of the Caribbean area fundamental to our 
national defense.”268 The first order was to ensure a US military perimeter.  
Coupled with the declaration of an imperial zone of influence was the concern for 
internal security in the region, seen to be a direct function of social, political, and economic 
conditions in situ. Charles W. Taussig, a former president of his family-owned American 
Molasses Company (sugar interests based in Puerto Rico), was one of Roosevelt’s “Brain 
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Trust” advisors closely involved with the New Deal and led the initiative for what was later 
to become the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (AACC).269 In the fall of 1940 he 
reported back from investigations into the background and consequences of the 1930s labor 
unrest in the Caribbean. Taussig made an immediate appeal to Roosevelt citing fears of 
“well!organized seditious activities, such as might originate in Europe” that posed a serious 
concern with respect to the ability of the British to maintain control and ensure security both 
in the immediate and long term circumstance.270. A solid base of information was seen to be 
necessary for the initiation of a program to establish integrated economic and political 
control of the region. It is very important to trace the beginnings of what became the AACC, 
and whose interests and concerns were being secured 
The Moyne Commission was Britain’s formal response to the labor unrest of the 
1930s, and took an overall position that separated political and economic reform, concluding 
in the end that economic diversification was riskier than commitment to the sugar 
industry.271 This fit into the overall position of the British Empire in decline, noted by the 
default on WWI debt and the formal turn from unrestrained economic liberalism in 1932 to 
favor the system of Imperial Preferences it relied upon to endure the depression.272 The US 
was hit hard by the depression without the buffer of colonial dependencies that the British 
had. This further pushed US free trade interests as it became the world’s largest creditor and 
undisputed industrial and financial power. The challenge the US faced was to breakdown the 
system of Imperial Preferences in the interests of its commodity exports and foreign capital 
investments, while acknowledging that Britain remained a key factor in stabilizing the world 
system and a necessary counterpart in the effort to rework and re-establish a global political 
and financial system according to its dictates.273  
Taussig led the US effort that used the leverage of the bases-for-destroyers deal to 
counter the British hold on its Western colonies, utilizing the underlying security framework 
to lobby for a position that called for an integrated approach to political and economic 
change in a trajectory towards self-determination.274 In reality the initial report by Taussig 
and other formal channels gave an overall evaluation that admitted a dearth of intelligence 
on the Caribbean.275 Thus the administration committed to dispatch another Commission to 
the Caribbean in late 1940 as an initiative that was a counterpart to the Greenslade Board,276 
focused on local political, economic, and social dynamics on the ground in the British 
Caribbean islands.277 Prior to departure Taussig consulted with members of the black 
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intelligentsia in New York, Washington, and Atlanta, meeting persons such as Walter White 
who provided important endorsements that allowed greater access to black political figures 
in the Caribbean.278  
Taussig’s overall effort was to plan for a process of smooth base construction and 
operation, with particular concern for the dynamics of race and jurisdiction that could lead to 
security problems in the Caribbean and political issues at home in the US.279 On 19 March 
1941 Roosevelt issued an instruction to Navy and War Secretaries in the region where he 
highlighted that “in acquiring bases” in the British Caribbean the US was forced to face 
“situations” which many “refer to as the ‘color line’,” and that in this circumstance “Officers 
on duty in these [islands] must conform with the practice” in situ by utilizing “tact and 
discretion.”280 Despite some formal overtures that suggested otherwise, in both key elements 
of institutional regulation of the US bases and in common practices of US servicemen, 
certain manifestations of Jim Crow remained in force.281 Despite its efforts to counter British 
colonialism there is no doubt that the US only represented domination of another kind.  
It is also interesting that in the Caribbean there is material evidence of the US war 
posture despite its rhetoric of neutrality in the first years of the war. On 11 March 1941 
Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act that formalized and expanded the program of 
supplying aid to the Allied war effort, in a move that discarded any semblance of neutrality.282 
The first Congressional appropriation under this Act took place on 27 March, corresponding 
with the finalization of the coalition between US and Britain in the form of the ABC-1 plan 
for global war against the Axis.283 One of the primary rounds of negotiations between the 
British and the US to determine the framework that governed the leased bases took place 
during the same period, contending over responsibility and control across many spheres: 
legal, administrative, security, jurisdiction, port fees, surveys, postal service, health measures, 
customs, and duties.284 All the way through, the special relationship between US and Britain 
is a key function of the national security state. 
The Anglo-American bond was firm in the commonality of greater strategic interests, 
but there were persistent differences to be negotiated in person. This process was tedious 
and discussions almost ruptured on different occasions as British officials were dismayed by 
the inability of the US delegation to make effective decisions, and expressed great frustration 
with the need to revisit previously agreed upon terms because the US envoy had to have 
everything approved by Washington.285 The final agreement only came about with 
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concessions made by Churchill on matters of jurisdiction and customs duties, as the US 
obtained exemptions from tax and service fees.286 The US insisted on maintaining sole 
jurisdictional control within the leased zones, and only accepted concurrent jurisdiction 
outside the zone after obtaining an exception for instances that were of “military nature”.287 
The ambiguity of this term in a context of criminal jurisdiction demonstrates the use of 
national security devices to systemically displace the statutes of law. The actual effect of the 
legal device comes forth when focusing on the US’ response to serious incidents that 
occurred in relation to the base. The evidence reveals the persistence of the underlying 
agenda of domination. 
 
The Caribbean in WWII, setting the stage for postwar continuities 
 
The dominant power of the US was evident in the legal arrangements as well as in the 
process of physically establishing bases in the region. The Greenslade Board initially selected 
five sites in Trinidad, with prime attention being given to the Chaguaramas-Tucker valley 
naval base on the northwestern peninsular.288 The other four sites comprised of an Army and 
Air Force base in the Cumuto-Valencia-Guaico region, an airfield near Longdenville, an 
Atlantic-facing naval outpost at Saline Bay, and a section of the wharf in Port of Spain.289 
The governor of Trinidad at the time, Sir Herbert Young, was the only senior British official 
to formally oppose the Greenslade Board on both the selection of sites and the question of 
jurisdiction.290 Young cited concerns of local residents’ access to public lands and his 
suggestion of the Caroni swamp as an alternative to Chaguaramas was not met well by US 
officials who cited obstructionism.291 The British governor was soon forced to resign citing 
medical issues under pressure that came from Rear Admiral Hoover of the US Navy.292  
On 1 August 1941 the US commissioned the Chaguaramas naval base, and the Waller 
Field and Carsen Field air bases.293 The leased areas in Trinidad are shown on Map 1. The 
actual provisions to Trinidad were beyond what was recommended by the Greenslade 
Board, to further include blimp facilities, an escort vessel repair base with three dry docks 
capable of repairing ships and destroyers, a 150-bed hospital, additional radio stations and 
ammunition bunkers.294 30 August saw the finalization of negotiations that governed the 
bases, only forced to a conclusion by the actual commissioning of the bases. 295  The 
document was titled United States Leased Bases: Agreement Between the United States and the United 
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Kingdom Regarding Local Defenses, or ABC-3, and was ratified by both governments by mid 
December. The agreement was ingenious as it gave the British a nominal role in the 
organization of local defense while it guaranteed that the US dominated the command 
system, and its success made it a template for application to the French and Dutch 
Caribbean between 1942-1943.296 
 
Map 1. Trinidad: Leased Bases Areas 
 
 
Source: Fitzroy A. Baptiste, War, Cooperation, and Conflict: The European Possessions in the Caribbean, 
1939-1945 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), Map 5, Trinidad: Leased Bases Areas. 
 
The US announced its entry into the war in December 1941 and immediately assumed 
formal responsibility for defense of the Caribbean. In February 1942 the Caribbean Sea 
Frontier was established, retaining the three organizational sectors of Guantanamo, Puerto 
Rico, and Trinidad. A Joint Operations Centre was situated in Guantanamo “to function as a 
clearing-house and source of information on all Sector operations and as a coordinating 
centre for planning and initiating air and surface operations.”297 The first major U-boat 
offensive in the Caribbean also began in February 1942 under operation Neuland first 
targeting British vessels near Aruba, sinking 17 ships (mostly tankers) in two weeks.298 The 
May offensive involved 37 U-boats, again targeting supply lines with each U-boat sinking 
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between 6-8 ships to the effect that the Caribbean oil refineries were forced to produce at 
approximately 30% less capacity.299 The dire circumstances on the ground brought the need 
for a full range of measures to secure greater strategic interests for the imperial powers.  
In this period where Axis submarine raids struck with devastating impacts the 
Operations Commander in Trinidad reworked the details of defence plans in a projected case 
of invasion.300 A problem existed for the British in bolstering their local forces, for “while 
the right type of man might exist in a Colony, not many of this type were in the local forces.” 
The hope then was that “the sinkings have brought home to the young whites that the war is 
all around them and induced them to think about applying for a commission.”301 Despite an 
evident racial bias as to what demographic was suitable for upholding the defence of the 
Colony, overall British strategic interests were paramount and the general wellbeing of 
Trinidad itself was ready to be sacrificed. This is revealed in the records where the British 
were prepared to implement a “scorched earth policy” which involved the use of “military 
explosives” to be “employed in the destruction of oilfields and refineries”.302 The 
environmental, social, and economic impacts would have been devastating for all in the 
immediate impact, and inter-generationally, though disproportionately along lines of race and 
class. 
The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was formed during the period of the war 
when the Caribbean was most negatively impacted. Most immediately, the AACC was forced 
into being in March 1942 as a measure to counter the destabilizing effects of the U-boat war 
on the population of the Caribbean.303 Taussig’s report was submitted in January 1942 with 
the primary concluding recommendation that a joint US-British commission be created to 
address common problems in the region.304 The German offensive seriously disrupted supply 
lines in the area, with the shipping interruptions resulting in sharp price increases, 
accompanied food shortages, and resulting malnutrition.305 This is the first instance where 
the local government in the Caribbean formally began to encourage and make attempts to 
support agricultural food production for local consumption.306 The underlying concern was 
for the consequences of the economic destabilization on the islands with respect to internal 
security and the political orientation of the population. Thus the AACC was created to 
maintain social stability as a means of safeguarding the US security perimeter, pushed by the 
US with the underlying premise that hemispheric security was the foundation for its longer-
! (&!
term ambition to ensure political alignment and commercial openness in the British 
Caribbean.307  
 The British Navy institutionalized the convoy system since the beginning of the war in 
1939, and had developed considerable experience in the effective coordination of supply and 
protection vessels, which they shared with their US counterpart.308 For years the US resisted 
the British system in favor of designated area patrols; a point that proved to be a major 
source of tension as the US completely neglected established principles of submarine 
warfare. By April 1942 the US gave way and agreed to institute the convoy system, dismayed 
by their evident inability to prevent the increasingly high number of ship losses in the 
Caribbean.309 The system of convoys that was then established centered around 
Guantanamo-Aruba-Trinidad (GAT-TAG) as the main Caribbean feeder, where Trinidad 
was the foundation as it housed the Escort Vessel Administration operational center that 
coordinated air patrols by day and surface patrols with radar equipped vessels by night.310 
The convoy system was operationalized in September and a month later an additional 
southern leg was added to the GAT-TAG route after heavy losses were recorded in bauxite 
supply lines from Brazil and the Guyanas.311  
In May 1942 British Escort Group 5 arrived in the Trinidad sector with two destroyers 
and six corvettes. The British team did a review of Trinidad’s security perimeter and exposed 
major weaknesses in minefields and other submarine defenses put in place by the US.312 The 
British also set up a high frequency radio distribution finder on Chacachacare island off 
northwest Trinidad to intercept U-boat communications. A Royal Air Force squadron 
arrived in August. By the end of 1942 Allied bauxite supply was struggling to meet demands 
for the aircraft production programs underway, and Britain was down to two months oil 
supply reserves.313 A special convoy was immediately instituted to ensure continued supply to 
Britain,314 and a US State Department report at the time expressed serious concern for the 
consequences of the U-boats targeting the supply lines from the Caribbean, which remained 
a “vital source of a number of strategic materials.”315 The most prominent were petroleum 
and bauxite, however the region was also either a producer or transit zone (bottleneck) for 
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A small island in Trinidad’s Gulf of Paria became an important transshipment point 
for iron ore,317 however the threat loomed large as 137 vessels were sunk in the Gulf of Paria 
area between February 1942 and December 1943.318 Furthermore in January 1943 when U-
boats sunk seven out of nine tankers of a Trinidad-Gibraltar “Oil Torch” convoy.319 
Historian Fitzroy Baptiste’s research shows that between “1942-1943 a 150-mile strip around 
Trinidad suffered the greatest concentration of shipping losses experienced anywhere during 
World War II.”320 Despite these record losses, visualized in Map 2, the average number of 
vessel entries and exits for the Gulf of Paria area in 1943 was approximately 3,500 Merchant 
Marine vessels and 1,000 warships.321 The above description is a highlight of the brief, but 
critical, ‘Battle for the Caribbean’. Trinidad’s strategic importance was most certainly not lost 
on any US war planners.  
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By mid to late 1943 the U-boat threat in the Caribbean was largely removed, after 
which troop allocations began to reduce and in the latter part of 1944 most facilities were 
downgraded except those in Trinidad, Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal.322 
In US defense plans the Panama Canal was arguably the most important location external to 
the US for the Navy,323 and despite not being attacked it was without question a vital asset in 
the overall Allied war effort.324 The pattern is the same for the wider Caribbean, where the 
importance of the region is not assessed on the amount of combat but on the volume of 
trade, and the evaluation is that the Caribbean remained extremely significant to the US 
maritime empire that maintained a system of imperial security based upon external defense 
and internal control.325 
The security frameworks institutionalized in the Caribbean during WWII by the US are 
the prototypical formulations of the template for the postwar global national security strategy 
of the US.326 The British Caribbean in this particular circumstance can been seen to function 
as both core and periphery, where the islands were “core in geostrategic and symbolic terms, 
but peripheral in population and economic importance.”327 The CIA referred to the region as 
a unique form of military frontier that was physically removed from the enemy frontline, 
thus the importance of the “belt of bases” was the projection of power beyond the 
foundational concern of safeguarding the underbelly of the US.328 Trinidad was named by the 
CIA as a key site in its network of global military transport indispensable to US national 
security strategy.329 The geopolitical security of Trinidad with US bases in place and U-boat 
fleets driven out, but for the local population the negative impacts were much longer lasting.  
 
The US base occupation in practice 
 
The racist imperialism the US embodied could hardly be hidden when examining the 
function of the bases-for-destroyers agreement in its different locations. Newfoundland was 
the only site within the scope of the bases-for-destroyers deal whereby the local population 
was white by a large majority. In this case the US constructed on-site accommodations for 
local whites employed at the base.330 In contrast, over 8,000 base-workers in Trinidad were 
forced to make long commutes on trains that were dangerously overcrowded. There were 
numerous occasions of persons dying after falling off a train. This was a constant source of 
conflict especially after the authorities imposed measures to control and punish “disorderly 
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behavior”.331 These punitive measures came without any amends to provide more adequate 
transportation, or any consideration of providing housing on site. The liabilities were 
routinely posted on the side of the local coloured populations.  
In the Caribbean, and in the US practice there, de facto segregation reigned 
supreme.332 The function of jurisdiction and race followed a similar pattern, where US 
servicemen were regularly subject to the full scope of law before the all-white judges and 
juries of Newfoundland.333 In none of the other territories were US personnel subject to the 
jurisdiction of the colonial authorities for matters of serious crime, for the only noted cases 
were of minor crimes such as traffic violations.334 The national security state bridges the 
common function of exclusion in the routine operations of the bases and in the courts of 
law. 
In negotiations with the British the US made it clear that they were unwilling to have 
white personnel tried by “colored” judges or even arrested by “native” police officers.335 The 
British had no principled position to suggest otherwise, for in their actions they defended the 
capability of the judges (mostly white) but not the juries (mostly non-white). The British 
dismissed the jury system as “lenient” and “unreliable” as they expressed concern for a 
“perverse” verdict by a colored jury.336 The British system of juries had been established in 
the colonies during the period where those eligible to form juries were whites only.337 In this 
circumstance when it was more than likely a jury would be colored the British actually 
considered implementing the US system whereby there was an informal process to ensure a 
predominantly white jury.338 
Within months of the US bases in Trinidad being operationalized the first incident of 
murder of a local Trinidadian by a US serviceman took place. The Governor noted that the 
“circumstances appear to be precisely the same as those in [the] recent Antigua Case.” 339  A 
US court martial was quickly organized and took place a month later where the US soldier 
faced charges of murder.340 The result of the hearing was an acquittal of charges, despite the 
fact that the soldier made no statement of his own, and the intelligence that came to the 
Governor had him first report that the circumstances “point conclusively to the fact that an 
American soldier stationed at Cumuto was the murderer.”341 A member of the Bar Council in 
Trinidad took the position that the verdict was wrong, if not perverse. The Governor 
relayed, the “impression had been created that the court martial was so staged that there was 
never any possibility of conviction.”342  
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Similarly, the Trinidad Attorney General noted that the US Commanding General 
undertook “great trouble” “to secure as satisfactory a composition as possible of the 
Court.”343 He commented on the fact that there was no action taken to discipline the solider 
even though the court proceedings proved that on the same night he had threatened a 
civilian and was illegally carrying a loaded weapon with him at the time.344 Although the 
Attorney General was sure that a conviction would have been the result in local courts the 
conclusion was that a new trial would not be undertaken, despite public protest. Within the 
week of the court martial the Governor reported another incident where “a United States 
military policeman had fired shots under the influence of drink, (mercifully with no ill 
effects)”.345 In November 1942 the Colonial Office reported on inquires into repeated 
incidents where US soldiers outside of the base territory “have been given directions by the 
Trinidad police” and instead of complying, “the American soldiers concerned have engaged 
in arguments and offensive language culminating with the commission of acts of violence 
against the persons of the members of the Trinidad police force.”346 The only follow-up on 
this matter in the records was a note where the US claimed their personnel were provoked,347 
and a subsequent agreement by both sides to “promote and keep up the good feeling as 
regard the U.S. Armed Forces” in situ.348  
A March 1943 case of the shooting of an unarmed local by a US serviceman did bring 
a five-year conviction for murder by a US court martial.349 The US was sure to exercise sole 
jurisdiction in this circumstance as the incident had taken place on the US base, and despite a 
very light sentence for a murder case the fact that a conviction was at all obtained is possibly 
due to the circumstance that both the accused and the victim were employed by the US 
military police on the island.350 In September 1943 a member of the US Navy assaulted a 
tram conductor when it was demanded that he pay the fare, and even though two Trinidad 
Police officers were able to de-escalate the situation there was no formal reprimand on the 
matter.351 Further in this pattern was the incident of a US civilian who was charged in the 
Trinidad courts for assault on a local man in April 1944. The outcome was a formal 
objection and demand to cease proceedings by US authorities, and a later report that the US 
civilian had left the colony.352 The US ensured de facto impunity through a complex 
bureaucracy and a military backing. 
In the highlights of these incidents of violence on behalf of US persons it is shown 
that the US operated in Trinidad with a functional system of impunity, as there were 
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bureaucratic and legal mechanisms in place to deflect any attempts to ensure accountability. 
The legal operation of the bases in Trinidad during this period utilized many of the 
mechanisms by which the contemporary US Status of Forces Agreement function, 
principally giving US visiting forces all the access and rights of movement in a given territory 
while ensuring that these forces are jurisdictionally protected from any due process in T&T’s 
legal sphere.353 These Status of Forces agreements are specific to each place and time and can 
be wide in scope or very specific; the one currently in operation in Trinidad was singed for a 
period of two years,354 but has been routinely updated to the present.355 The bases-for-
destroyers agreement gave an original 99-year lease, and covered a wide scope of affairs, but 
similarly its operational function was specific to the place and context in which US forces 
were operationalized, as noted by the difference of treatment in Newfoundland and 
Trinidad. 
The construction of the bases required the displacement of about 2,000 local residents, 
with several villages being erased.356 In Newfoundland the British authorities made strong 
formal complaints against the displacement of residents, whereas there was no such effort in 
Trinidad. At the peak of base construction in Trinidad about 23,000 “native labourers” were 
employed.357 The British advised the US to observe the “prevailing” local wage standards as a 
ceiling, and when the US later decided to raise the wages the British requested a delay, 
expressing concern for the US driving up wage rates that would put an uncomfortable 
pressure on the local government and the oil industry to follow suit.358 However by 1942 
base workers received double the wage of government workers.359 The US bases did result in 
a wartime economy boom in Trinidad, but the overall consequence was high inflation due to 
sectoral imbalances and uneven employment opportunities. There was overall instability in 
the society due to the combination of high liquidity, declining agriculture, and a scarcity of 
imported food and consumer items accompanied by forced rationing.360  
The broad powers accorded to the US allowed for prolonged invasions of ordering 
and control, such as the ability to directly affect health measures in a number of ways.361 Key 
in this was the “war” declared on the anopheles mosquito, unsanitary conditions, and 
venereal disease, all inevitably linked to residents by US planners. In the Cumuto residential 
area near the Wallerfield airbase in Trinidad, the US Corps of Engineers conducted a survey 
of “native” residents and responded with a program to construct a “sanitized zone” as a 
means to address mosquito control and unsanitary conditions.362 The US lobbied successfully 
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to have various colonial laws amended, including provisions for the US to enforce 
quarantines as necessary. This accompanied the routine inspections of US servicemen to 
control the consequences of “exposure” to local women that was claimed to be the source of 
the venereal disease problem.363  
The cycles of hierarchy and power constantly reproduce themselves, in both discourse 
and practice, distorting who receives the disproportionate consequences of liability and 
who/what is positively secured. A popular calypso from the period provokes the illusion of 
what the US really stood for in ‘the good war’:   
They buy rum and coca-cola 
Go down Point Cumana 
Both mother and daughter 
Working for the Yankee dollar.364 
 
Point Cumana in Trinidad is one of the nearest villages to the Chaguaramas naval base and 
thus was a point of significant interaction between the local population and US servicemen. 
The Andrews Sisters made the record famous in 1945 when it topped the US Billboard 
charts. However the song was stolen from a local calypsonian whose original copyrighted 
version was overtly anti-imperial, and was only able to obtain some financial settlement (not 
full copyright) through the courts in 2006.365 The disposability of the local population is 
reproduced incessantly, showing the interests of national security in this period where it is 
the US being secured while those within its security zone external to its (white) nation are 
constantly pushed into precarity.  
Wartime communications were strictly controlled and limited by the overt censorship 
programs set in place by the British and the US. In Trinidad while the US carried the 
principal responsibilities of defence once it entered the war, the British were the ones 
physically coordinating most of Trinidad’s communications and thus maintained the system 
of censorship on the island. In 1941 the Attorney General requested “immediate action” 
against a New Dawn publication that was “dangerously subversive” because it promoted “anti 
British” views.366 The British Ministry of Defence file for censorship in Trinidad, Jamaica 
and Bermuda contains reports on the system in place for the duration of the war, detailing 
the establishment of the various offices and procedures to attain the goal of 100% outward 
censorship on the islands, for this was the control point.367  
100% outward censorship was achieved,368 though not without difficulty, and the file 
also contains many pamphlets and information briefs for the public regarding the laws and 
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requirements to be followed, always with bold emphasis on the dangers of loose information 
in the context of war.369 Within this system there was the function of select high-level 
committees to handle “most secret material connected with counter-espionage activities 
other than routine examination”,370 and there was also an integration of the censorship 
system into the customs and immigrations departments as travelers had to obtain security 
clearances where any documents travelling had to be reviewed.371 After the cease-fire was 
declared in Europe in 1944 the Imperial Censorship program in the Caribbean region was 
still set to “continue full examination of mails to and from neutral countries and some, if not 
all, South American countries.”372 The primary reason noted in this regard was the 
apprehension for the wider area in which the Caribbean countries were situated, and 
although South America remained a concern the immediate factor noted was the Panama 
Canal,373 as a strategic point that was somewhat exposed but understood to be under US 
protection.  
Thus in practice the US functioned with impunity despite incidents of violence 
directed at the local population, and the system of censorship in place curtailed the local 
populations communications, all fundamentally set to maintain the Anglo-American sphere 
of influence. The population was repeatedly burdened in the restrictions on their daily life 
supposedly for their safety in only these wartime conditions. A systematic analysis reveals 
that it was power and capital being secured while the local population was made dispensable, 
and disregarded as these wartime ‘extraordinary’ measures soon became routine facts of daily 
life under the independent national security state.  
A 1943 “Report on General Conditions and Terminal Censorship in Trinidad” gives 
substance to the disparities between the elite and the wider population, revealed here 
through the control of communications, with both political and economic intentions. The 
report opened by noting that “Industrial depression on the island is acute”, the “food 
situation is bad” (exaggerated by a customs dispute), and for the local population overall 
conditions could “scarcely be worse”.374 The censorship program was functioning well, 
though only under stress with some inability to retain personnel as “Trinidad is a most trying 
place to live in” with its tough work conditions and awkward social context. It was noted 
that the “only social life is enjoyed by the younger girls who are invited to parties and dances 
given by the Americans. For the rest of the staff there is nothing.”375 Here the British were 
cautious of the gendered impacts of a US military base with regards to the British staff that 
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could and did simply leave when they were fed up. The reality was that the local population 
was subject to significantly more volatile gendered and non-gendered impacts of the US 
base, and did not have any such mobility to simply relocate.  
The conditions for the local population were harsh, and sometimes critical as medical 
attention was almost unavailable, and when it was, the quality was poor, and often 
prohibitively expensive for the working person.376 The local elite however had the means not 
only to relocate bodies and assets when needed, but in some contexts even had the ability to 
completely disregard the regulations for their own interests of control and profit, without 
any reprimand, while the ordinary person had no choice but to live within the confines of 
the national security state and its persistent interventions. This is noted by the report on 
censorship where, “[a]s usual, in this colony there are a few families who own and control 
everything and ‘business first’ is their slogan.”377 These interests were linked to the Financial 
Secretary, who was bold enough to publicly claim that he was the “financial dictator of the 
colony”. The report stated there was “ample proof that the regulations are being 
contravened with appalling regularity”, and only minor cases “have been dealt with”.378 In 
line with these executive abuses was the uncovering of a scheme for a radiotelephone system 
that violated the censorship regulations in what could only be described as “a commercial 
racket” conducted by a US company and sponsored by the local government. The 
conclusion of the report with respect to censorship was that “Trinidad has now become one 
of the most important Transit stations in this Hemisphere and its importance is slowly 
increasing”, thus the final recommendation was a call to more than double the number of 
active staff.379 Always, the underlying theme was the US being secured, while the Caribbean 
remained a region to extract from.  
 
The AACC and the beginnings of Caribbean independence  
 
The Caribbean is perhaps the only area in the world where it is possible during 
the war to give a preview of what the post-war world may look like. Within this 
area is represented independent republics, colonies of three European powers, 
and possessions of the United States. Major problems of regional, hemispheric, 
and world trade are involved. Political aspirations of subject peoples are being 
pressed. Racial problems exist in an aggravated form. Substantially all the 
problems of a post-war world exist in this gulf between North and South 
America. 
                                                             (Charles W. Taussig, 22 June 1942) 
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The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was announced on 9 March 1942 by President 
Roosevelt: “For the purpose of encouraging and strengthening social and economic 
cooperation between the United States of America and its possessions and bases in the area 
known geographically and politically as the Caribbean, and the United Kingdom and the 
British colonies in the same area, and to avoid unnecessary duplication of research in these 
fields”.380 The AACC was formally inaugurated in February 1943 in collaboration with the 
US Office of War Information.381 This wartime agency carried through its function beyond 
the end of the WWII, reformulating itself as the Caribbean Commission in October 1946 
when France and the Netherlands were incorporated. The Commission then became a  
“consultative and advisory body” in name, supported in a “legal capacity” to “concern itself” 
with “measures, programs and policies with respect to social and economic problems 
designed to contribute to the well-being of the Caribbean area.”382 
The report of the Moyne Commission was suppressed for the duration of the war,383 
and stood as an effectual announcement to the Caribbean populations that economic 
diversification away from raw material production was not an option in an era when Britain 
relied on the system of Imperial Preferences to re-establish postwar political and economic 
stability.384 The Moyne report did however include a recommendation for a move towards 
“representative government” in the Caribbean,385 and the formal proposition for 
independence in the Caribbean came from the British in the form of a West Indies 
Federation.386 Trinidad endorsed the Federation as early as 1945, with de-facto support being 
given by the US, and this expression by the US Consul in Trinidad in the same year: “The 
Colonial Government hopes to delay more active agitation for increased local participation 
in the government of this colony by directing thoughts and energies of the local population 
towards the eventual Federation.”387 The AACC was a US creation, and was supported by 
the British as each sought to make it work for their respective interests and priorities. In the 
lasting outcome of the AACC’s work the needs of the region’s population were surely 
secondary.  
In a 1946 issue of Foreign Affairs, Taussig published a brief titled A Four-Power Program 
in the Caribbbean, and the section on the actual affairs of the AACC during the war quickly 
reveals the bottom line as to whose interests were being served by the Commission: 
The Commission took the lead in organizing a coordinated program for keeping 
the area supplied with food and other necessities. It helped to establish a system 
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of bulk purchasing. It organized a schooner pool. When the spread of venereal 
disease in Trinidad threatened our armed forces, the Commission united with 
the local government and several American agencies in establishing a Caribbean 
Medical Center which developed effective methods of control.388  
 
Taussig’s initial research board in the Caribbean was firstly concerned with dynamics of the 
US troops there, and this tenant persisted in the organization,389 ready to ready organize a 
clinical intervention to assist US troops. Although some local food production programs 
were indeed activated in the immediate wartime context of food shortages,390 this principle 
did not become a lasting policy thrust of the AACC, nor would it produce any substantial 
fruits in the initial regard. One of the most active components of the AACC’s actions was its 
program of radio broadcasts that sought to counter Nazi propaganda in the sphere of 
“psychological warfare”.391 Knowledge production on its terms is always an essential 
function of the national security state, and the AACC served this role most effectively.  
The most popularly known aspect of the AACC was its Research Council, where there 
was space for Caribbean participation, however it was established from the outset that this 
aspect of the program would be purely “advisory”.392 Figures such as Eric Williams and 
Arthur Lewis worked for the AACC in the early parts of their careers, during which time 
they both established themselves as major Caribbean intellectual figures. The long-term 
features of the Commission outlined a basic ‘charitable’ program of development that saw a 
significant degree of US involvement in various affairs, generally recommending economic 
liberalization. The platitudes regarding food production, housing, and education, along with 
the proclamations that Caribbean participation was important, were betrayed by the 
bootstrap logic of what has been described as the burdened individuality of freedom393: 
With fairness it can be held that its present condition is partly the fault of 
nations who dominated it politically and economically; but it cannot evade some 
share of responsibility itself. Selfishness and narrow insularity here and there 
within the Caribbean have contributed to its social and economic problems.394 
 
Again in true form of representing its interests the Commissions report goes on from this 
admonition to highlight that “the Caribbean has become a major source of strategic metals” 
with a list of 34 materials. The report prominently notes a Defense Plant Corporation nickel 
facility in Cuba, valued at $30 million USD, major oil refineries in Aruba, Curacao, and 
Trinidad, and bauxite from Guyana which was the only available source for the US and 
Canada at the time.395  
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A March 1945 meeting between Charles Taussig and Nelson Rockefeller deliberated 
on the new “advisory role” the AACC was set to take. Both agreed the organization would 
still be useful in countering any action that might follow from the openly expressed interests 
of greater Latin America-Caribbean political integration at the recently completed Inter-
American conference in Chapultepec, Mexico.396 Within this geopolitical area that was now 
being defined by a steady thrust of anti-communism, led by the US, Rockefeller’s position 
also aligned with the State Department in the continued refusal of Member-status 
representation for Caribbean countries on the AACC. The concern behind this refusal was 
the establishment of “a Caribbean block [sic] which would be a menace to the solidarity of 
the Pan American System.”397 The AACC was a vehicle for ensuring US influence in British 
territories in the Caribbean and maintaining internal security as it worked to compile a large 
database of information to influence US government programming in the region.  The 
AACC, like the OSS, which it was surely overlapped with, depended on people proficient in 
compiling information in a political context. In the US it was increasingly common for 
academics to uptake such functions, in service of their nation and their belief in its 
proclaimed freedoms. 
Ralph Bunche was the head of the Political Science department at Howard University 
and took up a post between the State Department and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
in 1942/1943, working as a Senior Research Analyst and an area specialist for Africa and 
dependent territories.398 Bunche also was a longtime member of the AACC, and thus there is 
no doubt about the organization’s overlaps with US security agencies. After completing his 
PhD in 1938 Eric Williams took up a teaching position at Howard University in 1939, and by 
1942 evidence shows that he was actively seeking work in the realm of security-intelligence 
research.  
Williams’ own efforts in this regard are documented in records of correspondence 
records between himself and various high ranking British and US officials as he sought a 
wartime research job position. Initial requests were made through contacts in the British 
Ministry of Information, and on 7 September 1942 Williams wrote to a colleague expressing 
his disappointment at being denied an opportunity “in the Office of the Coordinator of 
Information under Col. [William J.] Donovan, now the Office of Strategic Services under the 
[Joint] Chiefs of Staff.”399 In this letter Williams further notes that “I was considered suitable 
except for one thing – I was not a citizen of the U. S. A.”400 The OSS was the primary 
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intelligence agency of the US during WWII, and specialized in the recruitment of academics 
for purposes of national security; it was also the predecessor of the CIA. 
The result of Williams’ persistence was an advisory position in the Research and 
Analysis Unit of the Office of Coordinator of Information “for advice on matters relative to 
the Caribbean”.401 In a speech on the AACC Williams stated unambiguously that he was 
informed by “the Office of Strategic Services, that I had been appointed a consultant to 
prepare a brochure on the Caribbean for the use of United States troops to be sent there”.402 
In March 1943 he took a major step in his career by obtaining a part-time position on the 
AACC. Williams credited Charles Taussig with giving the approval that led to his 
appointment, however he was not content until he was given an established full-time 
position. 403   
In this struggle Williams formulated a pamphlet with sharp criticisms of the AACC on 
the point of continued denial of Caribbean representation, using the threat of its publication 
as a means to leverage his position as someone with a proficient set of research skills and a 
will to challenge those who obstructed his goals. In June 1943 during an AACC conference 
at Howard University Williams presented a challenge to colonialism in his paper on The 
Economic Development of the Caribbean up to the Present,404 however he made a careful note to 
praise the Moyne report and Sir Frank Stockdale, the British co-chair of the AACC and 
Comptroller of Development and Welfare in the West Indies.405 These moves are important 
to trace, as it is very difficult to come to terms with and make sense of the evident separation 
that was Eric Williams the anti-colonial scholar,406 and Eric Williams the Aspiring Imperial 
Bureaucrat.407 
During and after the Howard conference there were increasing protests regarding the 
lack of any Caribbean persons in positions of power on the AACC, and in the following 
months a consensus emerged between British representatives and US officials in the State 
Department.408 Their concern was that repeated denials of Caribbean representation would 
further inflame opinions in the region, and this was something that could not be risked 
amidst the extensive geopolitical uncertainty. Williams was soon informed of his impending 
victory to obtain an established position, and made the decision in October 1943 to 
withdraw his pamphlet criticizing the AACC because its publication would be problematic 
considering his “present position”.409 In November, Sir Frank Stockdale formally 
recommended Eric Williams to a fulltime position on the Caribbean Research Council of the 
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AACC, to be effective March 1943 and Williams stated clearly “my salary [was] being paid 
jointly by the British Colonial Office and the State Department of the United States.”410  
In his own account Williams highlighted the laborious efforts he was forced to make 
to proclaim himself suitable for work with the Caribbean Commission, noting repeated 
investigations by the FBI, both of which found nothing and “cleared me of all suspicion” of 
any charges of communism.411 A FBI memorandum dated 11 October 1941 written by none 
other than its Director, J. Edgar Hoover, noted one of these background checks on Williams 
and concluded decisively that “there is nothing to indicate that [Williams] is engaged in any 
activities inimical to the best interests of the United States Government.”412 The FBI stated 
flatly Williams was not a communist, and there was no further investigation needed.   
Williams committed twelve years to the AACC, half of the length of time he spent as 
head of government in T&T. This fact indicates that from the beginning of his political 
career Eric Williams was not in any way prepared to break with Anglo-American power 
structures, despite his voluminous rhetoric that suggests otherwise. This is most evident in 
Williams’ vision of an independent constitution for T&T, which in no way set out to 
fundamentally decolonize the Crown Colony principals embedded in T&T’s constitution. 
This is the focus of the next chapter as Williams’ outlined his platform in political speeches. 
In the immediate context the analysis begins to shift to independent T&T by reviewing the 
Crown Colony formation leading up to the initial opening up of self-government in T&T.  
In 1897 a Trinidadian planter had no reservations in making open appeals to a Royal 
Commission for the importation of more “coolies” into the colony with specific emphasis 
on the strategic outcome of countering any uprisings by the black population.413 Similarly in 
1919, George Huggins, a powerful white merchant in Trinidad, led a petition to the Crown 
protesting the end of Indian indentureship. He argued that this would result in a loss of 
opportunity to leverage the size of the Indian population against the Black demographic, and 
expressed a specific concern for any circumstance where these two groups found organized 
unity.414 Indentureship was ended in 1920, followed almost immediately by labor 
disturbances in 1921, and the subsequent establishment of the Commission on constitutional 
reform in T&T.415  
The report of the Wood Commission was the basis for the changes made in 1924 that 
brought the first elected positions to the Legislative Council (LegCo). In this instance the 
LegCo was now composed of seven elected and six nominated “unofficial members”, with 
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twelve “official members” that were British appointments. 416  The governor held two votes 
and the “official” or (British) majority was ensured. The property requirements in place for 
voter eligibility were restrictive to the extent that less than 6% of the population was able to 
participate in the 1925 elections.417 Although these modifications did include the first move 
to restore some semblance of representation to Tobago,418 the overall outcome was that the 
Crown Colony system of control by an unelected executive was held firmly in place. In 1926, 
the first year of the LegCo with elected members, Captain Cipriani pushed the Council to 
debate a formal report that advocated instituting fixed hours for labor in the industries. 
Cipriani along with the other elected members supported the report’s recommendation, 
however when the vote took place the elected members were forced to vote against the 
report.419  
In 1941 the number of elected members was increased to nine while the “official” 
members were reduced from twelve to three.420 The nominated element remained at six and 
this gave the non-elected members a majority inclusive of the governor, who retained a 
“power of certification” that provided him the means to force any law into being that was 
rejected by the LegCo, in the interests of maintaining order.421 Universal adult suffrage was 
first introduced in T&T in August 1945, slightly reformulated under the Legislative Council 
(Elections) Ordinance in April 1946, and the first election under these conditions took place 
on 1 July the same year.422 In the lead up to the 1946 election certain elements of the elite 
made attempts to block the removal of literacy restrictions on voting and property 
qualifications for contending representatives in an effort to bar large segments of the non-
white populations from participating. Their lobby was only shut down by intervention of the 
Secretary of State.423 Even though voter participation increased substantially to 50% of the 
population,424 the reality is that the dominance of the Crown Colony system remained in 
place with the unelected “official” majority remaining intact and no formal mechanisms in 
place for the executive to be held accountable.  
Persistent “Industrial Trouble” was also a feature of Trinidad in 1946.425 In February 
1946 the Colonial Office expressed relief that “the dangerous situation which led the 
Governor to dispatch No. 1 has now been averted”,426 but as the year came to an end the 
Trinidad Governor again reported that the “situation in the oil fields has deteriorated” as 
strikes threatened a shutdown due to effective marches and coordinated work stoppages, 
supposedly enforced by “mass intimidation”.427 The Governor’s fear was that “the possibility 
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of recurrence of the riots which took place in 1937 is ever present” and thus his claim of 
intimidation was used to enforce a “proclamation declaring processions and assemblies” in 
the affected areas “to be illegal for 14 days” with possibility for extension. He further noted 
that it was “already increasingly difficult to disperse the crowds with gas-bombs and several 
arrests of ringleaders have been effected.”428 A Crown Colony constitution that foreclosed 
any democratic possibility, a US base occupation in-situ, active censorship programs in place, 
and the targeted suppression of workers by the armed forces are the features of the national 
security state in T&T at the end of WWII.  
This chapter situated the oil industry in T&T as an asset of particular importance to 
the British Empire in the first half of the twentieth century, and the consequent relationship 
where the Crown Colony state forcibly upheld corporate interests against those of the local 
population. The layer of impact the US had once Trinidad became a site of strategic 
importance and established bases there, was similarly a case where the population is 
secondary and seemingly disposable as compared to foreign interests of power taking 
advantage of local resources. The chapter closes with the US occupation still in place, the oil 
industry secured, and the slow bureaucratic march toward self-government under way with 
the first election under universal adult suffrage. 
Despite this trajectory the Governor remained a powerful centralized figure that 
commanded the government, with little checks on accountability. Democratic political 
representation was still a far off ideal to be attained. The government primary function was 
to uphold private/corporate capital (mostly of foreign interests) invested in the country’s oil 
industry, and still, the plantation economy. Thus the Crown Colony mode of governance 
was intact, backed by imperial military forces in situ, and with a police force ready to break 
up worker mobilization upon command. The following section engages the period that was 
the move towards self-government, and the purpose of that chapter is to show that the 
formation described above remained intact and active in service of the same interests, 
despite the achievement of independence.
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Chapter III, 1947-1962 
The formation of the national security state of independent Trinidad and Tobago  
 
This chapter covers postwar period in T&T up to the year of political independence, 
delineating the progression from a non-elected majority in the Legislative Council (LegCo) to 
a fully elected House of Representatives under a new national government. In this period the 
T&T constitution was changed the most in its history, and the argument shows that despite 
these changes the principles of the Crown Colony mode of governance remained 
fundamentally intact and the national security state active in its function of internal security 
and suppression of organizing. Despite the declaration of political independence the 
continuity of the national security state is traced through four themes: (i) a constitution with 
a high degree of executive control that persists at the expense of an empowered elected 
legislature, (ii) predominant organization of the economy towards international dominance, 
(iii) the persistence of labour unrest and the security state’s targeting of worker organization 
and (iv) the formation of a political party that was able to form a government and maintain 
the existing conditions despite a progression towards independence. 
The context of the formation of the People’s National Movement (P.N.M.) as the 
first political party to form a national government and its relation to the population are 
situated via an analysis of the P.N.M.’s electoral performance during this period. Eric 
Williams was the political leader and unquestioned authority in the P.N.M. party, especially 
as he was the head of the T&T government from 1956 right through to his death in 1981. 
Williams is most significant due to the tension between his academic reputation as an anti-
colonial and possibly anti-capitalist historian and his political commitment to the West and 
its capitalist project despite his various performances of defiance. This analysis evaluates 
what the local conditions were before he assumed power with the P.N.M. In doing so, the 
formative changes that the P.N.M. government made and those it omitted on the trajectory 
towards independence are distinguished.  These material shifts in the organization of state 
power are important to trace for they hold the substance against which William’s 
commitment to decolonization in Trinidad and Tobago are to be measured.  
The record in unmistakable in the fact that Eric Williams did not remove the 
fundamental Crown Colony features of government, thus his proposed constitution 
maintained the disproportionate degree of executive control. The continuity in an executive 
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dominated government is coupled with an economy that remained primarily oriented toward 
serving international capital by policy. This continuity was accompanied by unbroken 
patterns of social and economic discontent and a context where Williams’ P.N.M. resorted to 
further executive action in order to establish electoral power. Consequently, the national 
security state remained intact in 1962, and perhaps with distinct vigor as the newly 
established government of independent T&T had everything to lose in the face of a renewed 
tone of internal discontent. 
 
The conditions of Postwar Trinidad  
 
Between 1947 and 1956 there was a general trend toward a reduction in executive 
dominance of government, while between 1956 and 1962 there was a key component of 
reversal towards greater executive power. This switch in 1956 corresponds to the arrival of 
the P.N.M. into government and represents its program of constitutional progression. The 
context of this switch and Williams’ rationale behind it is important, however the conditions 
in 1947 must first be situated to give context to the changes after 1956. In 1947 Williams was 
managing his time between duties as an Assistant Professor at Howard University, his work 
with the renamed Caribbean Commission, and as a research consultant with the Foundation 
of Foreign Affairs, all based in Washington D.C.429 He would leave Howard in 1947/1948 to 
work full-time with the Caribbean Commission as he took up positions as Head of Research 
Branch and Deputy Chairman of Caribbean Research Council in Washington. From 1948, 
Williams spent increasing time in Trinidad as one of four senior officers of the Central 
Secretariat for the Commission. 
Internal Security was the prime concern of both the colonial government on the island 
and in London. The main source of disturbance to that security in the post war period lay in 
labour disturbances and threats of ‘subversion’ that took issue with the organization of the 
economy. Routine reports produced by the Special Branch of the Police Force formed the 
backbone of local intelligence operations in postwar Trinidad. Infrequently, intelligence 
would be gathered from reports produced by trusted persons who would spend time in the 
colony and relay their observations and analyses to the Colonial Office. Prevalent in both 
formats of reporting were the underlying security concerns due to social disturbances directly 
attributed to the poor living conditions and labour frustrations.  
! *$!
Two Colonial Office reports written by British persons who visited Trinidad for a few 
months in 1947 gave prime attention to the hardships the local population faced.  These 
hardships were recorded by noting the high unemployment numbers, the weakness of rent 
board protections, and a comparative statistic that in 1947 Trinidad generally had the highest 
costs for basic foods in the British West Indies.430 The observations of one Mr. Seel noted 
that in consideration of the “high cost of living” “accentuated by the dependence on 
imported foods” and considerable unemployment, “it is easy to see how Trinidad has been a 
playground for agitators.”431 His comment on wage policies was that, “it seems quite 
hopeless, for instance, to obtain a definite statement of wages actually being paid in the sugar 
estates, and it is therefore impossible to deal with assertions made frequently that labour is 
being exploited.” The underlying social tensions were aggravated by “the existence of large 
incomes side by side with much glaring poverty.”432  
Weekly and Monthly Intelligence Reports were put together using information from 
the Special Branch. According to a Colonial Office memorandum of 1948, the “basis of 
collection of intelligence in Trinidad is in the furnishing of regular reports on labour 
relations, communal feeling, subversive activities”,433 “racial feelings”, communist organizing, 
and public opinion of the government.434 A local intelligence report of the same year noted 
that in the event of a serious outbreak of threatening disturbance, support troops from 
Jamaica would be made available within forty hours.435 In a line of correspondence between 
the Trinidad Governor and the Secretary of State regarding the organization of “intelligence 
and security” the Governor reported on the implementation of various components of the 
system, and highlighted the formation of a special “Defence Branch” made up of selected 
officers to deal with “matters of internal security and defence”. 436 He also commented on his 
“personal contact” and regular correspondence with the Director of MI5 and gave his 
opinion that an MI5 officer should once more be stationed in the region that was “such 
fertile soil for communist and other subversive activities”.437 
The potential for intervention persisted as an active option for the colonial 
government, where also in 1948 the Governor issued an alert to the Royal Navy’s 
Commander in Chief for America and the West Indies because the “[i]nternal security 
situation in Trinidad” was now a “cause for anxiety” due to the outbreak of a general strike 
with incidents of sabotage.438 Although the situation had not yet got “out of hand” the 
Governor feared an escalation of violence, and in the event where things deteriorated such 
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that the Police were unable to maintain control he requested naval intervention.439 The 
Commander-in-Chief gave the approval a day later with notice that a Royal Navy vessel with 
troops would be available within 36 hours and the possibility existed for infantry to be flown 
in sooner if necessary.440  
Internal security in Trinidad was also a matter of concern to the highest levels of 
British security planning at points of tension, as noted by a report and subsequent decision-
making meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1952. The report addressed the details 
of a plan for intervention in response to “communist agitators” amidst labour disturbances 
that presented a threat to the “oilfields and refineries”.441 The meeting finalized the 
arrangements for “an Infantry Battalion to be sent to Trinidad to deal with internal security 
troubles”, either transported from Tripoli or Jamaica and supported by Navy frigates already 
in the region, upon confirmation from the Governor of Trinidad.442 
Although there were no actual circumstances that precipitated British military 
intervention in T&T during the postwar period, the US occupation of the base territories 
continued to have consequences on the local population and government. A Colonial Office 
report on matters pertaining to the US base in Trinidad for the second half of 1947 noted 
that the US Navy employed between 2,000-3,000 locals and the Army 1,000-1,500.443 There 
were ten incidents involving US servicemen and local residents reported to the Police, none 
serious and all dealt with by US authorities in full cooperation with the Trinidad Police. The 
US also applied to retain its legal rights to the one-mile radius around Le Branche Rock near 
Manzanilla off the east coast of Trinidad for areal bombing practice. By this period the US 
removed its installations from Five Islands in Gulf of Paria, but made measures so that the 
local government could continue to operate its Quarantine Station there in tandem with 
nearby Nelson Island.444 
More serious incidents related to the US base were experienced in 1948 and 1950, 
where on both occasions a US serviceman’s actions resulted in the death of a Trinidadian, 
and a US court martial returned a decision of acquittal. In 1948 an officer on duty at the US 
naval base in Chaguaramas fired ‘warning shots’ at a small local fishing vessel at night 
resulting in a man being hit and killed by a bullet. The Attorney General’s report on the 
matter commented on the “peculiarity” of a US court martial where the Judge Advocate is 
both legal advisor to the court and prosecutor at the same time, and as there was no 
summary aired or any impartial review of the facts, “it is impossible to know what actuated 
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the court in coming to its conclusions.”445 In providing his review of the evidence the 
Attorney General did not dispute the Court’s verdict in dismissing the prosecutors’ plea for a 
charge of manslaughter. He noted that the US serviceman was following the procedure of 
given orders. Therefore it was a reasonable conclusion that there was no intent to murder, 
and “that the bullet was deflected in the direction of the boat when it hit the water would 
not be an unreasonable explanation of the facts.”446 
The 1950 incident brought out a different reaction from the British officials, but as far 
as the records tell the result of US impunity remained. In this case a motorcar driven by a US 
serviceman was involved in an accident that resulted in the death of a local Trinidadian.447 A 
US Court of Enquiry carried out a month after the incident exonerated the US serviceman. 
However, two months later a local summons was issued for the US serviceman and it was 
revealed that he was transferred out from the colony. The inquest concluded that there was 
ground for a manslaughter charge, and the British official remarked that in the past US 
officials “have been extremely high handed in questions affecting their own forces.”448 Sir 
Robert Wray of the Colonial Office commented that the “U.S. authorities should not be 
allowed to get away with this”, for in this circumstance it appeared “very much as if the 
offender was spirited away” and “if so this is not the first time that has occurred.”449  
No records of any follow up or action on the issue with the US were discovered in the 
searches conducted through the available declassified files. This presents a point to register 
the commonplace notice of files omitted or destroyed in these records, as noted in a War 
Office folder of files from 1948-1954 that was declassified until 2007 on the “Scheme for 
Defence and Internal Security in Trinidad”. Among others, this folder contained a six page 
list of documents that were destroyed, many of which were intelligence reports and defence 
plans, reports on movement of troops, “Unrest in Trinidad”, and one on “Methods of 
Dealing with Civil Disturbances”.450  
Government files are opened to public review decades after the events as some 
commitment to history and transparency, but it is known that these files are first filtered for 
select portions to be destroyed.451 This function is a overt example as to how power shapes 
what is registered as knowledge in its outright ability to circumscribe information at the 
source. Not only is the work of the this thesis processing through information that was 
secret at the time of happening, thus the knowledge of what occurred is belatedly retroactive, 
but in the same measure what is available is still limited by what is not permitted outright. 
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The consequences of this are a topic for many studies of their own. What is of concern in 
this discussion on the national security state and its relations to knowledge production is the 
fact that this system is built on the function of knowledge hierarchies (centralized 
intelligence gathering systems that can ascribe material indefinitely confidential). In latter 
sections of this thesis, the network of institutions that support this system is given more 
consideration. 
The highlights above indicate that the Trinidad population was still living under 
conditions where a foreign national security apparatus overshadowed daily life to a 
significant degree and it remained that local Trinidadians were disposable while the US 
untouchable. Similarly, the British security apparatus on the island kept a card of 
intervention at hand while the intelligence services conducted their daily observations on 
local happenings and persons of interest. In this way the possibilities for social organization 
toward decolonization were institutionally limited in scope, for certain ideas were openly 
prohibited, deemed subversive, and clamped down on. These mechanisms served to uphold 
the interests of foreign capital that dominated the island’s economy, as they were also cogs 
of a larger program of territorial strategic control in global power struggles. 
 
The Crown Colony constitution in motion 
 
The progression towards constitutional independence continued to reveal the division of 
local interests as they corresponded with or deviated from the underlying external interests. 
In 1948 a series of memorandums were sent from various interest groups in Trinidad to the 
Colonial Office. Each sought to lobby for their desired composition of government in light 
of the upcoming constitutional changes. The Trinidad Chamber of Commerce put forth its 
position for retention of a nominated component in the LegCo despite the admission that “it 
is indisputable that fully responsible government should be the objective of the people of the 
Colony.”452 This position of “responsible opinion” argued that the Colony was suffering 
from ills that were “principally economic” and the electorate was not yet “possessed of that 
political discrimination which is one of the pre-requisites of full responsibility.”453  
Similarly, the Petroleum Association and the Sugar Manufacturers’ Association put 
forth memorials to the Colonial Office adopting a line consistent with the Chamber of 
Commerce. Their calls for retention of a nominated element of the LegCo were also 
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couched in claims regarding the existing political immaturity of the population. 
Consequently, it was maintained that “with a wholly elected legislature” the interests of the 
most important industries “would not obtain any representation whatsoever.”454 The 
Petroleum Association put weight to its input by highlighting that its contributions to the 
economy were around 20% of the government’s revenue and that its exports amounted to 
75% of the Colony’s total.455 Likewise the Sugar Manufacturers Association emphasized that 
it was the single biggest employer and “trustee of a considerable amount of capital”, both 
foreign and local. Therefore, they argued that the nominated component was necessary to 
“safeguard the interests of these investors and preserve their confidence” which would in 
turn secure the “economic and political stability” of the Colony.456  
During the same period seven Counties put forth signed petitions with calls for full 
representative government. A meeting in the County of Caroni, for example, put forth a 
memorandum to the Colonial Office demanding a fully elected single chamber based on 
adult suffrage. 457 This letter further called for an Executive Council elected from and 
accountable to the legislature that had the power to remove the executive by a vote of no 
confidence. All of the significant Trade Unions in the Colony as well as the Caribbean 
Labour Congress put forth memorials to the same effect.458 In forwarding these petitions to 
the Colonial Office, the Governor commented that there were no public meetings held in 
support of retaining the nominated component, for in fact those who supported this 
position “are not among those elements in the community who organize and participate in 
public political meetings.”459 The division of interests is evident in the difference in lobbies 
for constitutional change.  
In January 1949 the Secretary of State wrote to the Governor of T&T emphasizing the 
need to ensure an “orderly process” towards the introduction of an elected legislature, noting 
that at “this stage in the development of Trinidad and Tobago the nominated positions 
could not fully be removed “without seriously disturbing confidence in the economic and 
financial stability of the colony.”460 When the next changes to the constitution in T&T were 
formalized in 1950, the LegCo was composed of eighteen elected and five nominated 
“unofficial members” while the “official” appointments remained at three.461 These 
modifications brought the first majority of elected members to the LegCo. Also for the first 
time, the Executive Council began to be placed within an accountability framework now 
composed of the Governor, three “official” appointments (Attorney General, Colonial 
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Secretary and Finance Secretary), and six members of the LegCo, five of which were elected. 
In this formation the LegCo could remove an elected member of the Executive with a two-
thirds vote, however there was no institutional mechanism to challenge any of the nominated 
positions.462 
The subsequent changes to the constitution occurred in 1955, and moved further 
towards self-government. This level of autonomy was unprecedented in that it entailed 
strong democratic ideals of institutionalized checks to executive power and accountability for 
elected representatives, which did not exist in England then or today (in England or T&T).463 
These changes shifted the LegCo such that there were twenty-four elected and five 
nominated “unofficial members”, and two British “official” members.464 The speaker was 
elected by vote in the LegCo, as was the position for the Minister of Finance (no longer a 
British appointment). The Executive Council was now composed of the Governor, two 
“official” members (Attorney General and Colonial Secretary) and ten Ministers all elected 
from the LegCo, one of which was the Chief Minister with whom the Governor consulted 
before allocating the other portfolios.465  
In this formation the Ministers of government, including the Chief Minister, were 
directly responsible to the LegCo along lines of electoral representation and not according to 
party dictates. Apart from this progression, a central component of security held by the 
British was the retention of the Governor’s reserve powers. These powers could be used to 
trump any local government policy direction considered a threat. Despite a local 
configuration which suggested dispersed government power, a key component of executive 
power remained intact to ensure that the continuation of vested interests was upheld by a 
national security state.   
In December 1955 the Governor reported to the Colonial Office in anticipation of the 
next general election that was slated to take place in 1956. His characterization was that 
“little progress has been made in the development of responsible political parties”,466 for it 
was apparent that “personalities are far stronger at present than parties” and thus “there 
should be some one person who is clearly authorized to speak for Trinidad and Tobago” and 
“who can answer for the Government as a whole”.467 The Governor also made a point to 
“admit that” the recent changes made to the constitution appear “to lead to a more 
democratic form of government in which the executive is compelled to respond to the 
pressures of elected backbenchers; but the fundamental object of constitutional reform is to 
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place so far as possible the management of the Government in the hands of the elected 
representatives of the people.”468  
 
Eric Williams’ entry into politics and the formation of the P.N.M. 
 
In this detailed memo the Governor also highlighted seven parties set to compete in the 
1956 election, noting the prominence of the P.D.P. and Butler’s party,469 but made no 
mention of the P.N.M. or Eric Williams. Despite the fact that he did not mention Eric 
Williams explicitly, his wish for “one person” “authorized to speak for Trinidad and 
Tobago” and the “Government as a whole” would in fact be fulfilled by Eric Williams.  Here 
it is important to focus on the process leading to Williams’ appointment since the underlying 
dynamic of centralized control is closely linked to the central thrust of the Williams’ policies 
and the formation of the P.N.M. as it sought to establish a ‘grassroots base’. One component 
of this dynamic is the extent to which Williams was able to present a substantive challenge to 
the British as the colonial power he had made his academic career and initial political 
reputation in Trinidad confronting. Another component is the US base occupation which 
became his primary campaign against colonialism once he attained control of the T&T 
government.  
The grassroots base Williams sought to claim was already coming together before he 
entered the political arena. The Teachers Economic and Cultural Association (TECA) was 
formed between 1935 and 1939 by Black and colored radicals that opposed the routine 
discrimination institutionalized in the religious and state schools overseen by white 
managers.470 The organization was only formally registered in 1942 with a mandate that 
demanded “equality of opportunity in education”,471 worked to attain further cultural and 
economic support for teachers in the country, and generally facilitated a wide range of 
cultural and political educational initiatives across the country.472 One of the early 
achievements of the group was the “Equal Pay for Women Teachers” campaign launched in 
1946.473 Shortly after the campaign, D. W. Rogers and John W. Donaldson formed the 
Peoples Education Movement (PEM) in 1950 under the auspices of the TECA.474  
Later in 1950, Eric Williams wrote to Rogers and Donaldson requesting an 
opportunity to collaborate with the education movement, and eventually joined the effort as 
a “consultant”.475 The active network built up through the years of work carried out by the 
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PEM would become Williams’ base of grassroots support once he formally entered politics 
in the mid 1950s. In many respects Williams inherited a political base that was established 
while he was still working with the Caribbean Commission. Williams attained his local 
reputation through the network of the PEM, featuring in public lectures organized in 
collaboration with the Library Association. A 1954 report by the Trinidad Intelligence Unit 
of the US Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence on one such lecture reveals the US security 
complex’s interest in local intellectual-political events.476  
The informant attending the events reported on details of topics discussed, and named 
communist suspects such as C.L.R. James and George Padmore as part of the evaluation of 
Williams’ political leanings.477 The report noted that known communists congratulated 
Williams for his lecture. However during the question period, these persons were surprised 
to hear Williams denounce the Soviet Union as an “utter Totalitarian State”. The report’s 
final evaluation was that Williams’ “pet theme is racialism” and although his “political views 
are to the left”, he “is not known to have taken part in any Marxist activities”.478 The report 
concluded that as Deputy Chairman of the Caribbean Research Council of the Caribbean 
Commission, Williams’ salary was partially paid by the US government, and in closing there 
was no further concern. 
Eric Williams’ career with the Caribbean Commission was coming to a close in 1954, 
as noted by the head of the British section S. E. V. Luke: “I have no doubts that Williams is 
a source of serious weakness in the Caribbean Commission secretariat, and that it would 
greatly benefit from the termination of his association with it.”479 The reason for such a 
position was the evaluation that Williams was an “intense individualist” who “showed 
himself unable to work harmoniously with his superiors, his equals, or his subordinates.”480 
These traits were deemed “most undesirable for the Head of a Branch in which practically all 
technical services are centralised” because  “other activities of the Branch suffer in the 
process from lack of attention, guidance and supervision.”481 Williams’ break with the 
Commission began when his contract was only renewed for one year in 1954 instead of the 
regular protocol of five years.  The notice given to Williams stated that this was “due to 
conflict” between the Secretary General and himself over the direction of the research 
program. 482 The notice reiterated that the sole responsibility and authority in this regard lay 
with the Secretary General.  
! *,!
The head of the British section of the AACC, S. E. V. Luke met with Williams to 
dispel any argument that he was a victim of “racial persecution” and to “ensure that [they] 
are not left with an embittered and anti-British Williams on [their] hands”.483 To support the 
roundedness of the case for Williams’ dismissal Luke had the following to say:  
The Commission gave him every chance and their final decision not to renew his 
contract was reached, after much hesitation, by the unanimous vote of the 
sixteen members of the Commission, the majority of whom are West Indian or 
Puerto Ricans and who are, in addition, Williams’ personal friends. On the 
evidence, there was no alternative. I believe Williams may emerge as a leading 
West Indian figure… he must do so as a politician and not as a civil servant, 
since he conspicuously lacks the qualities that are essential in the latter.484 
 
Williams maintained his “consultant” role with the PEM while he held his position at the 
Caribbean Research Council. However shortly after his dismissal from twelve years of 
service with the (Anglo-American) Caribbean Commission, Williams engaged his “two 
teacher friends” D. W. Rogers and John Donaldson with the idea to develop an extensive 
program of lectures and establish a political party.485 
The first lecture Williams gave under the TECA banner was his momentous 21 June 
1955 lecture titled “My Relations with the Caribbean Commission”. The lecture outlined the 
broad course of Williams’ time at the Commission and concluded by stating the reason for 
this speech was to clear his “name and reputation from any imputations of inefficiency or 
failure or factious opposition or disloyalty” during his time at the Commission.486 In this 
discourse Williams acknowledged his disagreement with the Secretary General, and claimed 
that because his work ethic could not be challenged, the decision to remove him was made 
in private.   
There is no sure way to evaluate the depth of Williams’ claim as compared to the 
Colonial Office’s position. However, it should be noted that the Public Records Office file 
on “Correspondence Concerning Dr. Eric Williams” 1954-1955 does contain a consistent 
bureaucratic record of the Commission’s deliberations on Williams’ work building up to the 
1955 decision not to renew his contract.487 Although Williams’ conclusion to this speech is 
widely quoted, I have not elsewhere come across a single reference to the statements he 
made on his work for the US military and intelligence services during the war. Nevertheless 
for the popularly quoted Williams, “the issues are not personal but political”, and his 
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intention was then to “let down my bucket where I am, now, right with you in the British 
West Indies.”488 
Within a month of Williams’ Caribbean Commission speech the decision was made to 
form the Political Education Group that would conduct political mobilization in tandem 
with the lecture schedule.489 It was D. W. Rogers who first suggested the idea of hosting the 
lectures in what came to be known as the “University of Woodford Square”, only initially 
supported by John Donaldson while others made disparaging and prejudicial remarks.490 
Similarly, at the first lecture only Williams, Rogers, and Donaldson got up on the public 
platform in Woodfood Square, and in a later reflection on the occasion Rogers notes that 
two members who refused to appear on stage were given the top positions in the party.491  
These details give some insight into the P.N.M.’s internal structure as it contained the 
divergent interests of those who primarily sought institutional power and those who worked 
towards representation for the broad base of the population. The PEM hosted 51 more 
lectures across the country, from Charlotteville to Scarborough in Tobago, and Port of Spain 
to Point Fortin in Trinidad, all before 20 January 1956.492 The only two persons to attend all 
of the lectures were Rogers and Donaldson who had the responsibility of organizing each 
lecture, and literally walked for miles to mobilize attendance.493 These two persons also took 
up the charge of political organizing in the consistently neglected “Behind the Bridge” areas 
on the outskirts of Port of Spain known to be areas of concentrated poverty, and 
stereotyped as hostile.494 The substance of Williams’ program for change as he appealed to 
the population is outlined in the speeches he gave on this lecture circuit leading up to the 
1956 election.  
It becomes increasingly evident that Williams’ political direction as head of the 
government was not a break from existing patterns in any major way, but more enduringly it 
was a continuation of the status quo. In July 1955 Williams gave a speech in Woodford 
Square titled “Economic Problems of Trinidad and Tobago” where he noted the lack of 
change between 1950 and 1955. In his analysis, the economy was dependent on an oil 
industry facing depleting reserves and a sugar industry providing fewer jobs, and the 
“obvious alternatives” lay in industrial development and tourism.495 Williams’ solution was to 
turn directly to the work of Arthur Lewis, a Saint Lucian Economist who had worked for the 
Caribbean Commission and produced a pioneer study on economic development in Puerto 
Rico. The program articulated by Williams was to encourage the development of “light 
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industries using imported raw materials” which “should be based on appeals and incentives 
to established manufactures in England and the United States.”496 In sum, Williams argued 
that the “British West Indian industrialisation programme must follow the example of 
Puerto Rico and produce for export rather than for its limited domestic market.”497 
Williams gave his following Woodford Square speech two weeks later and addressed 
the issue of constitution reform. Here, he argued for a new constitution based on the 
principle that “single chamber legislature is colonialism, in conception, in form and in 
operation.”498 His overarching goal was to enter “the stream of democracy”, which could be 
done “only by substituting a legislature of two houses.” Williams then called for a “lower 
house of elected members”, described as “automatic if you are to have a democracy”, 
alongside his insistence on “a second chamber of nominated members.” He claimed that the 
problem “with the constitution is not the principle of the nominated system, but its practical 
operation” and thus “[t]he nominated system is so essential that, if it did not exist, it would 
be necessary to invent it.”499  
In Williams’ formulation, the upper house positions would be filled by “six members 
representing special economic interests, chosen by those interests themselves”  (oil, sugar, 
commerce, cocoa, shipping, and local industries), five members from religious 
denominations, and two from distinguished public life as recommended by the Chief 
Minister.500 The insistence on nomination was also reapplied to the Executive Council, to be 
composed of the Governor, Colonial Secretary, and Attorney General as the British 
appointments, a Chief Minister position taken up by the leader of the majority party, and five 
Ministers selected by the Chief Minister.501 The organization of government envisioned here 
and operationalized by Williams once he got into power did not depart from the Crown 
Colony principles of government in any fundamental way. Both modes of governance were 
characterized by executive control in service of special interests and the displacement of 
popular representation. More specifically, these two speeches demonstrate how Williams’ 
policies addressed the government’s constitutionalized executive dominance and the 
economy’s orientation toward external interests retained prior governance patterns, thus 
leaving the fundamental basis of the national security state intact.  
The reality that Eric Williams was not prepared to fundamentally change the 
organization of the State and the economy would become overtly evident in the period after 
independence as the population’s discontent upsurged in various forms of demonstration. 
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Of focus now in these formative years is the organization of the party with respect to the 
population, traced through the vehicle of electoral representation. On 15 January 1956 the 
Political Education Group was closed, and on 24 January the P.N.M. was formally 
inaugurated.502 At this inaugural conference D. W. Rogers was removed from his position as 
a party officer, and John Donaldson had to engage an intense struggle to retain a position on 
the executive. In Rogers’ account he notes that other members who were not present at the 
P.N.M.’s inauguration would later come to attain executive positions as deals were made,503 
and it quickly became visible that from this early stage “loyalty to the party meant loyalty to 
the Political Leader of the party exclusively.”504  
The P.N.M.’s platform for the 1956 election was proclaimed as a ‘jobs’ program to 
invigorate the economy in a “welfare state” approach of increased allocations to 
infrastructure, health, education, and food. 505 This economic development plan relied on 
foreign capital investment for energy-based industrialization and economic “diversification”, 
explicitly packaged with a rejection of socialism. Diversification was both a means to create 
job opportunities and an attempt to move away from reliance on the petroleum industry, 
thus the slated mandate was to develop agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism industries.506  
At the center of Williams’ attacks on the existing political system were the entrenched 
corrupt practices that he vowed to uproot.507 A local Intelligence Committee report in early 
1957, not long after the P.N.M.’s first electoral victory, noted that “contrary to the most 
enthusiastic assessments” the P.N.M gained thirteen seats in the LegCo.508 This success for 
the P.N.M. was seen to be primarily due the “personality of Dr. Eric Williams, to his ability 
as a speaker” in advocating “nationalism” and “honesty and integrity in public affairs”. The 
analysis however, was that the P.N.M. now held power with “Williams as its virtual dictator”, 
and the party was fortunate in the polls because it “had no prior record on which it could be 
attacked, while most of its opponents had plenty to hide”.509  
 
The reconsolidation of the national security state amidst a struggle for power 
 
The 1957 Intelligence Committee report is revealing in its language, explicitly situating the 
concerns of political economy within its security framework. The committee’s “main 
activities were directed towards the containment of the threat to security occasioned by the 
unstable political situation during the pre-Election period.”510 Thus “in 1956 there was ample 
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cause to study political activity from the security aspect; until after the Elections in 
September a situation existed throughout the territory which threatened the peace and 
internal security.” However, the “situation at the end of the year was much better than could 
reasonably have been anticipated.”511 This was because “in 1956 Communism made no 
headway in Trinidad” and in fact continued to “lose ground” along with the “pleasant 
surprise” that was the arrival of “party politics” with the P.N.M. The concluding analysis was 
that “[f]rom a security point of view the danger remains in the possibility of the survival of 
racial politics as represented by the P.D.P.”512 At this point the P.N.M. was not a security 
threat to the British colonial interests.  
The September 1956 election registered 80% voter turnout,513 and a P.N.M. victory 
that secured thirteen of twenty-four seats, while the P.D.P. only won five seats, and the 
Butler Party, the Labour Party coalition, and Independents won two seats each.514 While 
P.N.M. won the largest number of seats in the election, it only attained the minimum 
number needed to form a government, and did not secure a victory with mass popular 
support as it only got 39% of the vote (P.D.P. 20%, Butler 11%, Labour 5%, Independents 
15%).515 Despite having the legal authority to form a government, Williams realized that he 
was in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the weak electoral support. Moreover, the P.N.M.’s 
minority position in the LegCo barred him from making any of the constitutional changes he 
mandated.  
Even though he held constitutional authority to form a government, Williams was 
reluctant to accept the responsibility without an assured legislative authority, and thus he 
made a direct appeal to the British Government. The Secretary of State agreed with the 
request to amend the constitution and directed the Governor to defer the two of the five 
nominated seats to Williams’ selection, thereby ensuring a P.N.M. majority in the LegCo.516 
In this fact it is noted that Eric Williams the anti-colonial scholar relied upon the Colonial 
Office to form his first government, and thus the P.N.M.’s first majority in the LegCo was 
not attained through democratic means but rather by executive appointment. Eric Williams 
published his History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago in 1962 and in it he stated that the 
P.N.M.’s “first achievement was the abolition of the Crown Colony system.” This claim was 
somehow supported by the immediate admission that the Colonial Office agreed to the 
party’s “request to modify drastically the system of nomination by including among the five 
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nominated members two People's National Movement members selected by the leader of 
the Party who had become Chief Minister.”517 
In this discourse Williams described his effort to establish a bicameral house as a 
“dramatic reversal of the Crown Colony pattern of Legislature”,518 however when the case 
was brought to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1959, his reply was that “I am 
willing to accept either a bi-cameral or a uni-cameral legislature, whichever is endorsed by 
the electorate.”519 The Secretary then sought to remind Williams that in 1956 an “important 
modification of the constitution was made by convention” in agreement that the changes 
would be limited to the P.N.M.’s selection of nominated members on the LegCo and 
modifications of the boundary commission until another election took place.520 There was no 
principled opposition to Williams’ modifications of the constitution on behalf of the 
Colonial Office in this response, and further less so in their acquiescence to him in granting 
his further requests for changes between 1959 and 1961, all before the next election took 
place.  
A report by the US Consul in Port of Spain notes that prior to assuming leadership as 
Chief Minister in 1956, Williams also made a direct appeal for technical assistance and capital 
investment from the US, leading the Consul to report to Washington that despite Williams’ 
apparent militancy he respected the US.521 It would stand that the US had serious economic 
interest in Trinidad and accompanied assurance of domestic political stability with the fact 
that in 1956 Texaco, the third largest US oil company at the time and known for belligerent 
bargaining, acquired the Trinidad Oil Co. for twice the market price.522 In 1956 Texaco not 
only made major acquisitions of existing oil assets in Trinidad, but also set about formulating 
its operations on the island around a transshipment complex hub.523 In 1957 breakthroughs 
in oil tanker construction closed the relative geographic space of the world’s oceans such 
that vessels were now readily able to circumnavigate Africa, and the Caribbean became a 
major transshipment facility. By 1959 the region was the world’s largest exporter of oil 
products.524  
In this instance when the oil market was strong and the assets desired by foreign 
capital Williams made no move to attempt to acquire a key component of the industry. He 
was in no position to challenge the US in a move that would bring him into association with 
the categorization as communist, and thus a threat. The continued strategic importance of 
the region heightened any position towards the oil-dominated economy, and the decisions 
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made had to directly consider the ability to endure the response from Washington. Williams’ 
first concern was to secure his internal hold on government, so at this point he was open in 
his appeasement of the US and requesting foreign aid.  
The configuration of political boundaries within T&T for the 1958 Federal election 
was different such that there were only ten seat divisions, while in the 1956 general election 
there were twenty-four.525 P.N.M. candidates were only able to win four of the ten seats in 
the Federal government in 1958,526 and thus the Colonial Office realized that the power it 
held to shift electoral boundaries had a determinative impact on the ability of the P.N.M. to 
hold power. In the T&T County Council elections of February 1959 the P.N.M. attained 
48.4% of the total vote and won 34 electoral seats while the opposition Democratic Labour 
Party received 41.9% of the vote and took 33 seats.527 This result further evidenced the 
limited degree to which the P.N.M. wielded electoral power. The constitutional changes 
made in the establishment of the system of Cabinet government in July 1959 demonstrated 
the extent to which the P.N.M.’s agenda relied on executive power to maintain political 
control.528 Under this Cabinet system the Premier was now head of the T&T Government 
and had the power to appoint or fire Ministers without any vote from the LegCo.529  
In November 1959 the Secretary of State held a round of “Trinidad Constitution 
Talks” with the government and the Opposition as the P.N.M. continued to push for the 
introduction of the bicameral legislature before the election. A memorandum written to 
prepare the Secretary of State for these talks noted the prime concern with supporting 
Williams’ request was that the Opposition in Trinidad would make a campaign out of the 
fact that “the Secretary of State would in effect be entering the Trinidad party-political arena 
on the side of the P.N.M.”530 A conclusion of the memorandum was that “there are genuine 
advantages in a Senate now. The position of the nominated members in the lower house is 
already thoroughly awkward.” Thus the decision was to agree to the introduction of the 
bicameral legislature, because refusal “would only postpone and prolong the row, whereas 
otherwise we shall have a short sharp protest from the Opposition but as good a chance of 
peace as has ever existed once the election is over.”531  
The above memorandum was written prior to the talks, and it is important to note the 
extensive minutes of the Secretary of State’s deliberations with the Opposition pretending to 
weigh upon matters that had already been decided.532 At a Press Conference on the 
“Constitution Talks” Williams stated that the  “reallocation of boundaries, delimination of 
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boundaries, will take effect before; the General Election will be fought on the new 
boundaries.”533 When inquired as to the composition of this “Delimination Committee” 
Williams admitted that it is the legislature (which he controlled) who would appoint the 
Committee and approve its report, and when pressed further the orator of Woodford Square 
claimed, “I don’t remember, I would have to check up on the files… I can’t be expected to 
carry all these things in my mind; it’s not a serious matter”.534  
The 1960 Representation of the People Act shifted the electoral boundaries, overseen 
and managed by a politically appointed Elections Commission and Boundaries Commission, 
and included the replacement of the ballot box by voting machines.535 Williams’ 
constitutional changes built up an effective institutional buffer to his ability to retain power, 
but what was most needed was a popular cause to garner mass attention and support for the 
P.N.M. 
 
The march on Chaguaramas  
 
The residual US base at Chaguaramas presented itself as the target for a public campaign 
“against colonialism” as Williams was drawn into the debate on where the Capital for the 
Federation of the West Indies would be located. In a May 1957 vote on whether the Capital 
of the West Indies Federation should be located in Chaguaramas, the Trinidad delegates 
abstained from the vote and Williams took an observer position in the negotiations.536 In this 
circumstance the US Department of State expressed “warm appreciation” for Williams as he 
deferred to the Colonial Office in these early Capital negotiations, and the opinion was 
formed that Williams could be further relied upon to disrupt the Caribbean front.537  Despite 
a lack of support from the Trinidad delegation the decision went in favor of Chaguaramas 
and when the Federation Standing Committee formally requested the removal of the US 
base the Colonial Office lamented that the Committee “made the most embarrassing 
solution of the site for the capital which they could possibly have made.”538 
At the following meeting in London, Eric Williams took a strong position in support 
of the Federation Standing Committee and the decision to locate the Capital in 
Chaguaramas. In what was a shock to the Department of Defense military officials at the 
meeting, Williams made a case for the removal of the US base from Chaguaramas primarily 
citing the British Governor’s 1940 protests against the location of the base in that area, 539 
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and argued for West Indian independence to be respected in its choice of Capital site. 
Williams’ challenge to the US base in Trinidad was primarily site specific, for he never did 
take a position for the complete removal of US navy, military or other security agencies from 
Trinidad.540 His case was also mostly built on challenges to the validity of agreements 
affected by shifting political landscapes since the war ended and the Federation was being 
formed, and allegations of the US abusing certain aspects of the agreement, including 
economic concessions it retained since the war.541  
In the records consulted, there was not a single record of Williams making out a case 
against US imperialism in principle during his Chaguaramas campaign, and similarly not a 
record of him highlighting the extrajudicial killings carried out by US servicemen in the 
number of incidents that occurred over the years. As an astute politician Eric Williams 
understood that the limit of his power was demarcated by his limits in what he was willing to 
challenge. Nevertheless his campaign was not void of risks, or opportunities. A comment by 
an official in the Colonial Office on Williams’ position with respect to the US base and the 
consequent issues of legislation reveals the balance of power: “Dr. Williams seems to be 
giving himself a considerable length of rope so that if we do have to twitch the noose rather 
sharply by reminding him of the existence of reserve powers it will be against a background 
that it is he rather than we who are manifestly being unreasonable.”542 
The Federation of the West Indies came into being in 1958. Although Williams had 
mounted his campaign to remove the US base from Chaguaramas the Federation was 
without a Capital site. A 1959 Colonial Office report on “Talks with Dr. Williams on 
Chaguaramas” opened by noting the Premier’s claims “that these are matters on which the 
Federal Government is not competent to negotiate” and thus Trinidad needed separate 
representation as the only island in the British Caribbean with an active US base.543 The 
Governor’s evaluation was straight to the point: 
Now that Dr. Williams has achieved a Cabinet system, including control of the 
police, he has to look for a new ‘cry’. He knows that social and economic issues 
are more easily exploited in opposition than in power, and he sees in 
Chaguaramas a political platform which can carry him through the next couple 
of years. It is a politically attractive platform… the American bases afford a 
target for ‘anti-Colonialist’ emotions such as we no longer present.544 
 
The substance of Williams’ challenge amounted to the point where he could then “extract a 
sizeable sum from the Americans for calling off the campaign” and there was no 
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fundamental concern to the Governor because “he is probably quite prepared for some 
compromise at the end of the day.”545 
According to the Governor’s meeting with US Admiralty and Ministry of Defence, the 
Gulf of Paria was of “considerable strategic importance” as the only available natural deep 
water harbor where the southern Caribbean bordered the Atlantic and remained a “very 
valuable assembly area for convoys”. The strategic concern was heightened by the concerns 
that the “the Soviets have built up a very large submarine fleet.”546 The US Air Force gave a 
tour of the tracking station that Williams had made protests about, noting that it was the 
biggest of its kind in the world and essential in providing a defence against intercontinental 
ballistic missiles.547 In the Governor’s own analysis Chaguaramas was important to the US 
for “another reason, which they seldom mention”, in that it would provide a base from 
which an intervention to “control Venezuela and Venezuelan oil fields” during a time of 
“crisis” could be launched. His position on the matter was that it “is probably to our 
interests that they should retain that capability” and that “Williams could not, of course, 
drive the Americans out of Chaguaramas”. The concern was that the issue could “create a 
running sore” which “would give an opening to Communist influence”.548  
The Governor’s assessment of the situation did not indicate any immediate threat or 
directed responsive action to Williams’ campaign other than to strategize how to bring the 
US to negotiate with T&T as a unit government. This position differed from US national 
security officials with a direct stake in the issue, for certain elements had an active agenda to 
remove the source of the problem, i.e. Eric Williams. The extent of these plans are not fully 
known for only limited insights have thus far been revealed in documentation, as noted by 
an FBI file from 13 August 1959 on “Eric Williams and Internal Security in Trinidad”. This 
memorandum records a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy for information 
of “personal nature” about Williams, as these agencies were actively interested in having him 
defeated in the upcoming election. As noted in the earlier FBI memo by J. Edgar Hoover, 
Williams was not a concern for the FBI and thus the FBI’s “Action” line at the end of the 
memorandum notes a decline of the request.549  
The highpoint of Williams’ Chaguaramas campaign was 22 April 1960, previously 
proclaimed by Williams to be the day of West Indian “independence”. As the base remained 
in place, the “March to Chaguaramas” was an official protest against both the British 
Governor and the US consul.550 In the lead up to the march Williams increased his public 
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attacks on the base, and proclaimed that the “road to independence leads through 
Chaguaramas”. C.L.R. James edited the P.N.M.’s party newspaper during this period, and 
inevitably this was the most ‘radical’ phase the party has ever seen.551 A Colonial Office file 
records an official notice from the US Consul regarding their concern for the Trinidad Police 
as a reliable means of securing the population during the march if things escalated due to 
their loyalty to Williams.  The Governor’s intelligence network revealed that the US would 
have an aircraft carrier just beyond the horizon of Trinidad on the day of the march.552 
Two days before the 22 April march the Governor reported to the Secretary of State 
that he “met all available Ministers this morning, and [the] meeting passed off better than I 
expected.”553 He reported on the plan for a “mass meeting” and a march in which “small 
delegations would break off” to present memorials to the Governor and the US Consul, set 
to last four hours and end with speeches. His conclusion was that “I do not (repeat not) 
anticipate trouble.”554 On 22 April the Governor’s telegram to the Secretary and the Senior 
Naval Officer of the West Indies simply read: “Demonstration and march passed off 
without incident. Numbers much below those expected.”555 The height of the imperial 
confrontation surrounding the march against the US base was not the challenge it has been 
made to be, and with detail of context it is in fact underwhelming due to its lack of 
substance. Furthermore, the internal workings of the party were such that any resistance 
displayed was already on the retreat, most notably evidenced by the ejection of C.L.R. James 
and the radical wing of the P.N.M. in opposition to the concessions that were made by 
Williams. 
In June 1960 the British Colonial Secretary discussed the outline for a new round of 
talks with the US Department of State representative where the format would be a tripartite 
basis with substantive components of direct negotiations between the US and the respective 
“unit” governments.556 A September NSC preparation meeting reaffirmed the importance of 
the region due military assets and raw materials and took the position that communism was 
the prime threat. With respect to the issue of Williams and the base, the military’s emphasis 
was that “the strategic position of Trinidad is the only suitable one in the area as [an] 
‘anchor’ to the Caribbean island!chain.”557 Along with this reaffirmation of strategic 
importance the US security state had calibrated Williams’ campaign. To their satisfaction 
there was no anti-imperialist threat at hand when the Commander of the Office of Naval 
Intelligence requested FBI assistance because the Navy was “particularly interested in any 
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information which might give us a clue as to the bottom asking price of Williams.”558 The 
sad reality is that Williams’ famous “Massa Day Done” speech on 4 December 1960 was 
given after the concessions began,559 already his growl or bite showed no teeth.  
The renegotiation of the Caribbean base leases began in November 1960 and finished 
in the first months of 1961.560 The culmination of Williams’ confrontation on the base issue 
was wittingly exposed by the leader of the D.L.P. opposition on 19 December 1960 after the 
first round of talks, where he sang a calypso aloud in the LegCo that was composed in 
support of the march on Chaguaramas: “we don’t want charity, give we back we land, Uncle 
Sam, we want back we land.”561 Stage two of the talks took place in February 1961, in 
Tobago, and it is here that most of the details of the resolution to the Chaguaramas base 
issue were put in place. The outcome was that the US retained the essential functional 
portion of the Chaguaramas base with a review set for ten years, while it conceded to give up 
20,000 acres (approximately half) of the leased territory in Trinidad. A key component of the 
deal was economic aid as a measure to ameliorate the sense of local injustice. The aid 
primarily came via assistance with five major capital projects centering on infrastructural 
development of roadways, a harbor expansion, and a university college (which became the 
University of the West Indies).562  
A British Defense Ministry review concluded that in light of the overarching US 
influence the real post-independence threat in the region was not external interference, but 
internal “political unrest.”563 In Trinidad, Eric Williams did all he could to prevent the 
internal unrest from displacing him, and was increasingly secured as the threat vis-à-vis US 
destabilization subsided. The last major bulwark to Williams’ hold on power in these 
formative years came in the form of the Trinidad and Tobago (Constitution) Order in 
Council, 1961, passed in June of that year. A prime function of the Bill was the introduction 
of a twenty-one member Senate; twelve on the advice of Premier, two of the Opposition, 
and seven economic, religious, social interests at Governor discretion.564 A Boundaries 
Commission was also formed to review electoral boundaries, composed of a speaker, a judge 
appointed on the advice of the Governor, two members on the Premier, one on the 





Aid, independence, and business as usual 
 
In September 1961 Jamaica held a referendum as to whether it would stay in the Federation 
and brought a close but shocking negative result. This circumstance produced Williams’ 
infamous remark that “one from ten leaves nought”,566 and a decision that immediate 
independence would be sought for T&T on its own. The run up to the December 1961 
election in Trinidad was marked by violent rhetoric and actual outbreaks of conflict. A State 
of Emergency was enforced in known opposition areas of Saint Augustine, Barataria, Caroni 
East, and Chaguanas, and this was accompanied by targeted police searches where the 
opposition leaders claimed victimization.567 Williams’ campaign was overtly pro-West and 
pro-Capitalist and he went further to publicly denounce the radical wing that had been 
purged from the P.N.M. as he declared “communism” one of the five dangers to the party.568  
In the December 1961 election the P.N.M. recorded a victory, winning 20/29 
constituencies with 48% of the vote.569 Coupled with these changes to consolidate the 
function of countrywide governance, the P.N.M. moved to suspend local government 
elections, successfully remaining in force until 1968.570 The last iteration of Williams’ protests 
against the US base came after the election when he advanced a challenge claiming that the 
US had promised to completely fund the major capital projects (including the College of 
Arts and Sciences in Saint Augustine) but had only put forth a contribution of 60%.571  
The Governor’s report on this matter stated that “[r]elations between the United 
States and the present Trinidad Government, under Dr. Williams, have been very much a 
love-hate affair.”572 The Governor noted that Bill Christensen was taking up the post of US 
Consulate in Trinidad and that he had become instrumental in managing diplomatic affairs. 
This was because Christensen “had previous dealings with Dr. Williams when they were 
both concerned with the activities of the Caribbean Commission”. The Governor kept “in 
close touch” with Christensen, who was now the source of “most” of the Governor’s 
information, and was well placed for the task as he maintained “fairly frequent access to Dr. 
Williams, and close contacts with him.”573 Christensen’s analysis was that in the field of 
economic aid, “Dr. Williams is showing himself insatiable” and this new action was “clearly 
intended as a means of putting more pressure on the Americans for granting economic aid 
on Trinidad’s terms.”574 
In April 1962, five months before T&T’s independence, the Governor reported on the 
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closing of the matter of US aid with respect to the base. Once more Bill Christensen was the 
key feature, and the Governor described the successful outcome as “a direct result of the 
initiative he has taken to try to get Dr. Williams back from the limb on which he had 
perched himself”.575 After noting that works were underway the report highlighted a 
comment by Christensen that Williams “seemed almost pathetically grateful to have been 
given a way out of the extreme position he had taken in relation to American aid.” Thus the 
Governor concluded, “Dr. Williams seems to have readily seized the opportunity to improve 
his relations with the U.S.” and the hope was that “this phase of sweeter relations” would 
continue.576  
The 1962 Independence Constitution of T&T remained very similar to the 1961 
version.577 A Governor-General replaced the Queen as the symbolic head of state, who 
would only act on the advice of the Crown or the British Prime Minister. Other changes to 
the constitution were such that a speaker was now listed and an Opposition Leader formally 
recognized. The Prime Minister effectively replaced the Governor in a constitution where 
the newly established Parliament was institutionally subordinate to the Executive.578 In 1962 
prior to the declaration of independence Eric Williams wrote to the Secretary of State with 
the assessment that “[q]uite frankly I see our role as an independent country in this light: the 
crucial issue is defence, with Trinidad and Tobago sitting astride the triangle of pro-Soviet 
influence from Cuba, to British Guyana and across to Venezuela with its Communist 
minority.”579 Williams put T&T in “obvious” contrast to these countries in order to establish 
an appeal for financial assistance from the UK to “expand” democracy and thus act as a 
form of containment. The thrust of the message was a direct appeal for support with the 
local Telephone Company, in which he was considering privatizing its operations, as well as 
support for the British West Indian Airways airline that was set to be the regional carrier.580  
Similarly, on 31 August 1962, the day of independence itself, the Governor-General 
met with Williams to give his brief courtesies but was held in discussion by Williams for over 
half an hour. He reported that the thrust of the “frank one sided discussion” was that 
“Trinidad did not wish to be abandoned by Britain to the Americans either politically or 
economically.” Again, Williams’ case was to appeal for more foreign investment in Trinidad, 
in this circumstance to “make it a show place of successful British decolonization.”581 On the 
day the T&T flag was first hoisted the constitution in place was not fundamentally different 
from that under formal Crown Colony rule. Also on this day it is shown that the empowered 
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head of T&T was primarily concerned with having a good relationship with the formal 
colonial power, openly making appeals based on the importance of foreign capital.  
The posture of the new government as it saw its role between the interests of the 
corporate economy and that of the workers is revealed in a communiqué of the British High 
Commissioner in November 1962. The message contained a report from a recent meeting 
between the government, the Regiment, the Coast Guard, the Police, as well as leading 
businessmen and the General Managers of Texaco and BP.582 This meeting was concerned 
with oil and sugar workers strikes and was convened with urgency when the threat of the 
Civil Service joining the strike action became real. According to the T&T Government this 
situation was apparently “not a coincidence, but was part of a sinister left wing plan” and the 
evaluation was that it must be assumed that strikes will lead to violence and sabotage.583 The 
most telling conclusion to the meeting was that Williams’ Acting Prime Minister, Dr. 
Solomon, invited the oil companies to arm their security guards.584  
Based on the parameters of analysis used to delineate the national security state, there 
is no doubt that the formation remained intact, still rooted in its Crown Colony foundations. 
In 1962 the external orientation of the economy was secured by government policy, 
determined by an executive that was ready to act in service of corporate interests with 
outright worker suppression. The attainment of political decolonization did not remove the 
national security state under Eric Williams. The analysis showed that the centralization of 
government actually increased under Williams’ tenure, to the effect that the P.N.M. relied on 
executive measures to attain hold on electoral power by manipulating the constitution and 
electoral institutions to suit. Despite his rhetoric of anti-colonialism and his symbolic march 
against the US base in Chaguaramas the substance of Williams’s political position was 
commitment to the Anglo-American system of reliance on foreign private/capital as the 
driver of the economy coupled with an anti-communist commitment in the post-war order. 
The next chapter shifts to the first decade of independence, giving attention to the details of 
how the national security state remained intact. In this case it was mobilized primarily against 
the population Eric Williams and the P.N.M. claimed to represent in independent T&T.  
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Chapter IV, 1962-1972 
The national security state of T&T in the first decade of independence 
 
The previous section situated the coming to power of the P.N.M. under Eric Williams, his 
struggles with the US, and the assistance given to him by the Colonial Office in attaining a 
strong hold on government through executive actions. It was shown that the national 
security state remained in place with its Crown Colony features of strong executive control, 
open suppression of worker organization and the prominence of foreign military forces on 
the island, all set to protect the major private/corporate interests that owned the principal 
stake in the islands’ economy, essential resources, and services. The focus of this segment is 
the continuity of all of these patterns in the first decade of independence that culminated in 
the first ‘national’ crisis; the uprisings of 1970. The patterns of executive dominance are 
linked directly into an analysis of how this formation affected the security forces that are 
designed to secure the State in the interests of private capital. In this period Trinidadian 
personnel took over command of the security services, breaking a long line of British 
Commanders and Commissioners. The strong continuities of executive dominance, and the 
direct interference of the civilian executive of government in the affairs of the security 
services ensured that this transition was not a smooth or stable one. Nonetheless the 
national security state remained intact, and it is the population that was compounded with all 
of the violent negative impacts, state liabilities, and continued suppression. 
The initial segment of the chapter details the context of independent T&T as a 
national security state of internal control, and as a proxy of strategic importance to the US. 
In this section the ideology of capitalist fundamentalism and Western alignment is situated as 
the basis of the national security state, where anticommunism is the vehicle into which any 
resistance is collapsed and targeted; the contrast of Guyana and T&T demonstrate this. The 
body of the chapter covers the affairs of the security services, primarily concerned with the 
social context surrounding the Regiment due to its role in the 1970 uprisings. The Police 
Force is also situated, as it became the Police Service in this period, consistent in its function 
of arresting Trade Union and Black Power leaders and suppressing mobilizations. The 
concern in this section is the impact of direct interference in the security agencies by the 
government executive, and insight into the means through which the national security state 
endures despite undergoing some ruptures.  
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Independent T&T: An anticommunist national security state 
 
In 1962 Eric Williams wrote to the Secretary of State about the “crucial issue [of] defence” 
against the “triangle of pro-Soviet influence” T&T found itself located in. At the time 
Guyana was the closest ‘communist’ government to T&T, then under the leadership of Dr. 
Cheddi Jagan and the Peoples Progressive Party (P.P.P.). Jagan had been given the 
designation of Soviet proxy in public by the US Government and especially the media during 
this period.585 However, the forces had been overtly displayed against him since 1953 when 
the British landed military troops, suspended the constitution, and imprisoned Jagan and 
other top P.P.P. members. A US State Department file from 1961 highlighted this 
background of the then current P.P.P. Government that was re-elected despite the previous 
intervention and a split in the P.P.P. The file noted, “since the restoration of the democratic 
process in 1957, the elected government has behaved reasonably well”.586 The paternalistic 
power relationship is inherent in this statement, where the US was ready to discipline the 
Caribbean government on its move towards autonomy.  
Jagan was re-elected in 1961, and faced with this circumstance the US Director of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research stated there was an “effort to get along with Jagan” but 
at “the same time resources are to be built up to enable a harder line to be put into effect”.587  
A harder line was indeed later enforced despite “the belief that Jagan himself was not a 
controlled instrument of Moscow; that he is instead a radical nationalist who may play both 
sides of the street but will not lead British Guiana into satellite status”. The real problem was 
that “it is another matter to accept the general thesis that we should support and live with a 
British Guiana under Marxist leadership with what this implies for the structure of the 
economy and the character of its political and social institutions.”588 
While the US was opposed to Caribbean governments with Marxist tendencies, the 
officials dealing with Guyana made no mistake in noting that the real danger was in 
politically aggravated “racial tension between Africans and East Indians in the colony”.589 At 
a meeting in Washington on 17 March 1962 the White House representative, Mr. Fraser, 
“said that he felt British Guiana was in the United States' sphere of influence.” The danger 
then existed “in the real possibility that chaos would come to the colony and bring 
communism after it … This racialism had been stimulated by Burnham's African bias and by 
the actions of D'Aguiar.” Burnham became the primary leader of opposition against Jagan, 
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and would later form a coalition government with D’Aguiar after the destabilization program 
successfully had Jagan ousted. Mr. Fraser further stated, “that Jagan was a nice man but he 
was surrounded by a mildly sinister group of advisors, several of whom were the worst kind 
of anti-colonialist.”590  
Despite these admissions, and notice that British companies in the colony were not 
worried about nationalization, the favored outcome of the meeting was that “[w]e must 
maneuver British Guianese opinion into wanting some kind of an adjustment in the present 
political machinery.”591 In this case an amendment of the constitution to introduce 
“proportional representation” would assist “in affecting the outcome of a new election.” 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., President Kennedy’s assistant, followed up this line of action in a 
letter of July 1962 where he agreed “that there is no future in Jagan” and thus the question 
was: “Does CIA think that they can carry out a really covert operation - i.e., an operation 
which, whatever suspicions Jagan might have, will leave no visible traces which he can cite 
before the world, whether he wins or loses, as evidence of U.S. intervention?”592  
There is ample evidence that the US had an active destabilization campaign in Guyana 
during this period.593 Proportional Representation as an idea for Guyana was implemented 
from Anglo-American circles, introduced in 1963, and large sums of money were directed 
toward unions and other organizations that supported the Burnham-D’Aguiar challengers to 
Jagan.594 Of note here are records of files that show US favour for Burnham, as he had 
discussed giving the US “the legal right to reactivate the base in British Guiana [1! lines of 
source text not declassified].”595 Furthermore, regarding a Burnham-D'Aguiar coalition,  
under present conditions, such a government would collapse by itself. However 
if the United States Government was prepared to shore it up, this would change 
the situation, specifically if the US could provide money [1! lines of source text 
not declassified]. The Secretary pointed out that Africans control the police and 
the towns so that Jagan would be relegated to agitating in the countryside.596  
 
The simple, but most important point in acknowledging this context is to note the ever-
present threat of open imperial intervention into the political process in the Caribbean. 
Which governments were targeted in this period was a direct measure of their social and 
political program of decolonization and whether their economic policy remained committed 
to the Anglo-American capitalist camp. Any transformation of the political and economic 
system would not be tolerated. 
The US national security state, consolidated in 1947, set out to extend its claim of the 
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Monroe Doctrine to a global scale with an anticommunist insistence. In the Caribbean, the 
‘soft underbelly’ of the US, the anticommunist insistence had a particular emphasis due to 
proximity, and the enduring defiance of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution. In 1963 the 
US ambassador in T&T reported that Williams “adopted a generally constructive position 
toward the US”;597 the P.N.M. government presented no threat, as it was loud in its 
anticommunist thrust. The national security state of T&T was turned inward on any dissent, 
all under the charges of ‘subversion’ utilizing the underlying anti-communist sentiment. In 
this manifestation the national security state of T&T serves as a proxy for US foreign policy, 
and is in turn reinvigorated by its alignment with the imperial powers as the P.N.M. faced 
internal threats from its own political base. Furthermore, as there was no Soviet-backed 
communist conspiracy in Guyana or T&T, the real consequence of the existing national 
security complexes is the undermining of independent Caribbean thought.  
In 1962 Special Branch Intelligence Reports continued to list “communism” as the top 
concern, recording details of named communists and their various activities of interest. As 
there was no real threat of an organized communist takeover, attention was focused on cases 
such as that of Martin Sanchez, an Education Officer at the primary school level, charged 
with an agenda to “propagate communist ideology”.598 The report noted that an Enquiry was 
formed because of  “his conduct at school where he was until recently employed.” An 
example of this “conduct” in concern was that Sanchez gave a lecture on “Socialism and 
Democracy” during “Civics” period.599 Furthermore, when confronted by the Head Teacher 
Sanchez retorted that the Head was a “stooge of the Church”, and spoke favorably of the 
leader of the Teachers’ Reformist Group who was convicted for “possession of subversive 
literature.” This report also contained intelligence from a source that provided personal 
information and commentary on Sanchez regarding his background and possible intentions; 
as an orphan Sanchez “feels that he has never been given a fair deal in life.”600   
Following reports on the matter called for “every possibility to be explored of the 
Ministry of Education imposing sanctions on school teacher Sanchez”,601 for although he 
had lost his job at the Roman Catholic school he was able to find a position at a Muslim 
school.602 When Sanchez was brought before a Commission, it was reported that he 
continued to host meetings and possess “subversive literature”. In addressing a call to  
“demonstrate why he should not be terminated” Sanchez responded that it was only because 
of “Marxist” ideas that actions were taken against him, and in anticipation of dismissal he 
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was already looking for other jobs, outside the country if possible.603 In addressing the 
general issue, the Intelligence Committee called for a  “review of existing legislation and 
machinery for control of subversive literature” and expressed direct concern that “the real 
security threat in the labour situation of the Sugar Industry is the deliberate subversive 
efforts of Arthur Smith, an active communist”.604 
These 1962 Intelligence Reports listed banned publications and named communists, 
and highlighted specific concern for figures such as the labour leader George Weeks who 
was attaining increased prominence. Also listed was C.L.R. James, who in this period gave a 
lecture on the “British Democratic Tradition and the West Indies” and argued that 
“democracy in the West Indies would have to be fought for on economic grounds”.605 
Cheddi Jagan’s visit to Trinidad was recorded, listing his meetings with political parties and 
labour organizations. In 1963 the British High Commissioner reported on a discussion 
where Eric Williams thanked the Commissioner for information on Guyana and “started 
with an attack on Dr. Jagan”.606 According to the High Commissioner’s report, Williams 
“said that in light of the current situation, Trinidad was writing [Guyana] off.” Despite this 
dismissal Williams stated that there should be more constitutional protection for “an 
Opposition” and “an impartial commission to re-define electoral boundaries”. Further, these 
“constitutional guarantees should perhaps be ensured by means of a United Nations 
force.”607  
Here, while maintaining his complicity with the imperial anticommunist insistency, 
Williams also reveals the contradictions of his position in advocating democratic 
constitutional advances that he refused to institute himself. This is demonstrated in a quote 
from the High Commissioner as he reported on the case of Guyana, and made a point to 
note that Williams “said specifically that he would publicly oppose any proposal to put 
forward proportional representation because of its repercussions in Trinidad.”608 Continuing 
in this contradictory pattern Williams further “complained bitterly of Jack Kelshall” who was 
in Trinidad on behalf of the Guyana Government. Williams “said he had in mind to deport 
Kelshall,” and when the Commissioner commented that Kelshall was Trinidadian, the Prime 
Minister said “he could have it both ways”, because if he arrived in Trinidad as a 
representative of the Guyana Government, “Trinidad would treat him as a Guianese” and it 
would give him “great pleasure to have [Kelshall] deported.”609 
In April 1963 Eric Williams announced in the House of Representatives that two 
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Commissions of Enquiry were being established, one into the Oil Industry and the other 
into “subversive activities”.610 A report from the British High Commission in early May 
addresses this general context with the title “Dr. Williams and His Policies”.611 The report 
began with an observation that Williams’ government was over-centralized, and “[t]he result 
is that problems needing attention are frequently left unattended because Dr. Williams has 
not pronounced.” His analysis of the situation was that,  
Trinidad also has two faces and, like the two faces of Dr. Williams, both are 
relevant to the country’s relations with her neighbours. The per capita income of 
Trinidad is the envy of many… [but] the high per capita income is not fully 
reflected in the standard of living of a large number of people of Trinidad, and 
the poverty in the slums of Port of Spain is probably as bad as anywhere in the 
West Indies.612 
 
The persistence of unemployment was getting worse and was coupled with “constant 
emigration”. A significant portion of this exit flow was “highly trained and skilled 
Trinidadians” who showed “no keenness to return to their native land where material 
rewards are less and frustrations greater.” 613 In many respects emigration served to release 
some of the internal pressure in the society, as there were less people with mobility and 
aspiration stuck on the island. This flow also had (and continues to have) intergenerational 
consequences as noted by the phenomena of ‘brain drain’.614  
In his comment on the two Commissions of Enquiry the British official stated the one 
into the oil industry had the objective of “milking” it for more revenue. On the other hand 
the “enquiry into subversive activity” was “regarded as a sop to the oil industry”, and “unless 
indeed the objective is to whitewash the unions” it won’t improve the economy “because 
talk of Communist influence” “is bad for investment.”615 The Mbanefo Commission, as the 
enquiry to subversives became known, was formalized in September 1963 and set out to 
determine “the nature and extent of subversive activity” “with particular reference to its 
influence in the Trade Union movement, the public services and the youth organisations; to 
ascertain the extent to which external influences contribute to such activity”.616 Lloyd Best 
wrote to Kari Levitt in the same month from his post at the University of the West Indies 
campus in Trinidad. The letter inquired whether important files relating to their Plantation 
Economy work had been sent, and noted that it “is not at all unlikely that the authorities are 
holding them up - the way things are in Trinidad at the moment.”617 In commenting on the 
context of Trinidad and their efforts to grow the newly established New World Group, Best 
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warned that “[o]ne of the things we want to guard against is the building of a one-man 
organisation, be it group, paper or place. That is what killed the PNM from the start.”618 
The following letter from Best to Levitt in this series is in October, and in it Best 
expressed shock that he was “called up before the Commission of Enquiry into Subversive 
Activities, incredibly.”619 Best charged that the P.N.M. government was “in a state of panic 
and trying its best to suppress articulate criticism in the country and to frighten real 
opposition.” The circumstance was dire because “the official opposition is more corrupt and 
bankrupt than the government” and “the establishment” was active in its attempts to “buy 
off Union leadership where possible, and where not, witch hunt.”620 According to the official 
discourse, C. L. R. James was “directing from London, a movement which aims ultimately to 
overthrow the Government”. For Best, such a proposition showed that “the Government is 
completely out of touch with reality or that they are prepared to go to any lengths to 
suppress democratic aspirations, or both.”621 There was no sense of despair in his 
conclusion, only resolve, for he intended “to put out a pamphlet; Towards a Police State in 
T&T”. 
 
Sowing the seeds of discontent: political interference in the security services  
 
The T&T security services are an essential function of the national security state, explicitly so 
for internal control. This is set apart in scale from the precedent national security state 
analysis of the US which is inherently an active imperial posture of hemispheric and global 
dominance, with strong components of internal control. What also makes this case stand 
apart from the national security state of the US is that the security services in T&T have 
been openly marked by a high degree of political interference. This directly introduces 
volatility into the forces, as it does create conditions that directly undermine the 
government’s attempts at establishing security control. As a result the independent national 
security state of T&T increasingly relies on the US security state for its backing.   
The T&T Regiment was created in 1962, and by 1963 there was a Commission of 
Enquiry into the armed forces, to evaluate (i) “conditions of service”, (ii) “community 
relations”, and (iii) the “disturbances at Carenage May 1963”.622 The Defence Office file on 
the matter noted that the Regiment existed for “two functions; performing ceremonies, and 
[to] act as [a] riot squad to support Police if things get out of hand.” 623 In 1963 the 
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Commanding Officer of the Regiment was Lieutenant Colonel Pearce Gould, an 
Englishman. His memorandum to the Commission gives insight into the “conditions of 
service”, which were directly affected by political activity, or lack thereof, when it came to 
matters of responsibility. 
The Commander noted that, “On 1 April 1962 the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment 
was no more than an idea” but a year later it had a Headquarters at Teteron in Chaguaramas, 
and a force of three companies totaling 503 officers and soldiers.624 Prior to this any regular 
forces on the island were imperial troops controlled by the War Office of London. The basic 
problem was that there was “no experience of the administration, discipline and problems of 
regular military forces either within or without the Civil Service. Furthermore there were few 
people with even five years of military experience available to start off the Regiment.”625 
The memorandum gave its focus of attention to the material conditions the Regiment 
had to face, and the root cause of each of the problems lay with political bureaucracy. A key 
issue was that of fuel, where due to the strategic importance of supply and large usage 
requirements the Regiment submitted required proposals for a fuel station at the base in 
August 1962, but only got approval in May 1963.626 The six-mile distance from the Teteron 
barracks along a single narrow road to the nearest gas station proved a source of great 
frustration and functional compromise. This was compounded by the fact that approvals for 
accommodation quarters were delayed and housing opportunities lost, while applications for 
furniture and appliances submitted since September 1962 still had not been forwarded to the 
US Aid Mission.627 
This case was a repeated scenario for matters of essential clothing, ammunition, and 
militia equipment, all held up for periods over three months because of considerable delays 
in getting things authorized by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. 
With respect to the Regiment’s rank and file relations the Commander noted that any 
“antipathy is only in the lower ranks” and that the incidents at Carenage were “not 
symptomatic of general dissatisfaction with conditions or of bad relations with the public at 
large.”628 The Commander was generally correct in his evaluation of the troops’ relations 
with the public, however he would be later proven wrong regarding the general 
dissatisfaction and to whom it would be directed.  
A study by military historian and security analyst C. M. Kelshall on Armed Forces and 
Government (2011) focused on the case of the T&T Regiment and concluded that it was the 
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breakdown of civil-military relations that led to the events of 1970. For Kelshall (and 
Williams himself) it is important to note that the T&T Regiment was “a condition of 
Independence” set by the British,629 and it was hurriedly put together in such a way that “no 
attention was paid to the quality of men recruited”. The focus was on quantity “so that a 
sizable force could be presented to impress the crowds” and the Crown on the day of 
Independence.630 Due to the lack of persons with rank and experience available, the decision 
was made to enlist “short service officers” made up of former Customs and Immigration 
officers, bank clerks, and a number of ex-civil servants who were put through three to five-
week training programs.631  
The idea was that this cadre would ‘hold the fort’ until the selected younger officers 
completed their professional training at Sandhurst Military Academy in England. Upon their 
return to T&T these trained officers were set to take over the positions of rank, but by this 
time “the temporary short service officers were advisors to the ministry (as senior officers) 
and they would have hardly advised phasing themselves out.”632 This created a situation 
where the discontent would no longer be confined to the rank and file of the Regiment, but 
now professionally trained officers had an ongoing and aggravated legitimate grievance 
against the military hierarchy, as well as the government. The entire issue was compounded 
by fact that the location of the Regiment HQ at Teteron in Chaguaramas was based on a 
“purely political move on the part of Dr. Williams” as an attempt to counter the remaining 
US military presence in Trinidad, despite the fact that the US provided a considerable sum 
towards construction of the base.633  
The issue of discipline and accountability in the security services was also a key issue. 
The 1963 Commission of Enquiry noted there was also aggravated tension as the local 
officers began to actively push for the removal of the British seconded officers and the 
Commander.634 A record from September 1963 brings these tensions together in a case 
where one of the higher ranked local officers was involved in an incident with three British 
officers at a cocktail party hosted by the Police.635 In this event Quartermaster of the 
Regiment, Lt. Col. Joffe Serrette, allegedly attempted to physically assault one of the British 
officers, and although there was no actual altercation, formal reports against Serrette were 
made. In dealing with the matter Commander Pearce Gould noted that Serrette submitted a 
written statement that conflicted with the accounts of the British Officers and, no witnesses 
would come forth to give “any evidence which was in any way adverse to Serrette’s case”.636  
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The conclusion to the matter was that the British officers were being transferred out 
the country, and Pearce Gould decided against a “show down” with “Trinidad Ministers.”637 
Serrette became Commander of the Regiment in 1965 when the last British officers left, but 
was pressured into retiring in 1968 after losing political favour in 1966. The British official 
writing the memo on this incident thought it relevant to include the comment that a senior 
Defence Advisor described Serrette as “efficient, a bully, and a womaniser.” 638 In this pre-
1970 context the last element leading to the breakdown of the Regiment was the 
appointment of Lt. Col. Stanley Johnson as Commander, after which there was “an 
unmistakable decline in standards of discipline and morale in the unit.”639 These conditions 
would result in a revolt within the Regiment as it was put under pressure by the conditions 
of the country leading up to 1970. The rank and file was in the same position as the public 
with its open discontent. As stakes heightened there was an underlying current that sought to 
dispose of the government. 
Throughout this period the police was consistent in its service of upholding the 
government and maintaining public order, suppressing worker mobilizations and protecting 
the assets of industry. Despite that function, the organization did face serious problems 
similar to those of the Regiment. While there was a Commission of Enquiry into the 
Regiment in 1963 the police faced one in 1964. This was provoked when a clerk from the 
University of the College of the West Indies died in custody after having been beaten by the 
police,640 and the official statement was that “no one was responsible”.641 The case later 
rested on a single officer who was charged for murder, acquitted, and then was able to have 
later manslaughter charges dropped much to public disapproval. The overall Commission 
was set to enquire into the “organization, administration and discipline of the police 
force”.642 
While the enquiry was underway a “Police Scandal” emerged separately where ten 
policemen, including the Assistant Commissioner and a Senior Superintendent, were 
suspended for involvement in a “racket connected to the issue of gun licences”.643 The 
enquiry itself revealed “deplorable” living conditions of the police barracks, and a 
characterization of training methods that were “sadistic”.644 The biggest scandal in the 
Commission of Enquiry emerged when the Police Association submitted a memorandum 
with evidence that there was direct interference in police duties by the Minister of Home 
affairs, Dr. Solomon (who served as Acting PM). 645 The incident in question occurred in 
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January 1962 when Dr. Solomon went to a police station where his stepson had been 
charged and detained, and made demands for him to be released from custody irregardless 
much protests from officers on duty. Solomon stated he would talk with the Police 
Commissioner in the morning.646 
Despite the fact that the Opposition put forth a no confidence vote in Parliament, 
which failed, there was no statement from the government on the matter and two years later 
the High Commissioner commented, “official silence prevails”.647 His concluding comments 
on the Commission of Enquiry was that the findings were “generally well received”, and in 
his feedback to one of the official authors of the report he stated, “I think you were prudent 
to skate over the Cadogen case and Dr. Solomon’s ‘interference’”. The High Commissioner 
also commended the “well publicised Government overtures to Police integration” with the 
move to appoint a new Home Minister and change the name to “Police Service” instead of 
“Police Force”.648 
Highlights from the Commission’s report were given public broadcast, and prominent 
in the list of recommendations was for the Commissioner of Police, and the service, to be 
“free from interference on the part of Government”.649 In addressing the organization of the 
police, the recommendation was that “as soon as conveniently possible, the Police Force be 
trained, equipped, staffed and commanded as a Police Force pure and simple … and not as a 
quasi-military body”. The quasi-military historical legacy of the T&T police is noted in the 
fact the police force is the oldest institution in the country, thus has been the at the forefront 
of controlling the population since 1592.650 In this period police deployment in response to 
protests escalated up to the 1965 Industrial Stabilization Act (ISA), which created a final 
court of arbitration for worker disputes and contained measures that effectively curtailed the 
ability of worker organization to withhold labour as a means of collective bargaining.651  
 
The Black Power ‘Disturbances’  
 
During a period of high tension in 1965 before the ISA was passed, a memo for the British 
Prime Minister noted that Eric Williams tabled the possibility of requesting military support. 
This request came in light of threats arising from “subversive elements” which were seen to 
be the cause of “labour troubles in the oilfields” and the projected concern regarded a 
violent outbreak, heightened by a comment regarding “gun running”.652 The request was met 
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with tentative support, and the file noted that Williams previously indicated that he would 
obtain US assistance if needed. In 1968 the Transport Workers Union maintained a strike 
action beyond the Industrial Court’s ruling against them, claiming they were unfairly 
treated.653 The workers were joined in solidarity by university professors and students, but 
the State’s response was a series of arrests and a threat to fire any who did not return to 
work. This suppressed organization and soon enough work resumed.  
Lloyd Best put out a pamphlet in defence of the workers, noting that GDP had 
increased fivefold since 1951 but “the nation has ended up with large-scale unemployment 
and inequality of a sort that produces profound frustration”.654 As the Black Power 
mobilizations began in 1969 the police faced another round of increasing tension, and this 
escalated during the “February Revolution” of early 1970 when Black Power protests were at 
their highest point. At the forefront of this emergent movement was the National Joint 
Action Committee (NJAC) that sprung forth from student leadership at the Trinidad campus 
of the University of the West Indies.655 The conditions that catalyzed these events were the 
now deep set and widespread currents of discontent against the P.N.M. government, and the 
depressed economic conditions across the country.  
A key event that triggered the outbreak of NJAC mobilization was the Sir George 
Williams University affair in Montreal, Canada.656 In this incident black Caribbean students 
(many Trinidadians) were caught in a standoff with the University over allegations of racism, 
and it escalated in an occupation of the computer lab, and a subsequent surprise tactical 
action against the students by the RCMP.657 The outcome was the destruction of the 
computer lab, and the arrest, trial and eventual deportation of a number of the students 
involved. These events brought initial protests that were directed towards Canadian Banks 
and an action to block the Canadian Governor-General from visiting to the University in 
Trinidad.658 By 1970 this discontent began to shift and square itself on the P.N.M. 
government. 
Although the Black Power movement began to target the T&T Government explicitly, 
their actions still maintained a challenge to US and Canadian institutions, and on 25 February 
the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Port of Spain was occupied in a highly impactful symbolic 
protest.659 The next morning nine NAJC leaders were arrested and it was this targeted action 
after an impactful moment that catalyzed the public attention and sympathy, and thus the 
Black Power movement grew significantly in size. In March the historic procession from 
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Port of Spain to Couva was organized as the movement began to realize that a genuine mass 
movement was needed to pose a real challenge to the government,660 and in Trinidad that 
required a direct organizing link between African and East Indian populations.  
At a court hearing for the NJAC leaders on 25 March, Dave D’Abreau (Makandal 
Daaga) pointed a finger at the police guard: “You police should be on our side. The Army is 
on our side. All we need now is your help to seize power.”661 At this point the NJAC 
movement was militant and growing in size, and definitely posed a security threat to the 
establishment as it openly appealed to the black urban populations from marginalized areas 
on the Capital’s periphery. A resident US commentator reported, “although NJAC never 
organized terror campaigns, the moltov cocktails became an extension of the movement.”662 
The prejudice and condemnation through rhetoric of fear is not new, but is consistently 
manipulated by those in service of the national security state and is used as a means to justify 
the extraordinary difference in coercive power that maintains the status quo. It should be 
noted that most of these firebomb attempts were directed at Canadian Banks or the US 
Consulate, broken storefront glass was not uncommon, and “vigilante groups began to form 
in the middle-class, wealthy, white housing developments which surround Port of Spain.”663  
There was no Police support for the Black Power movement, but more so there was 
increasing resentment directed at the Police by the population.  The height of the mass 
movement came when a young NJAC supporter, Basil Davis, was shot and killed by a 
policeman almost two weeks after the Cathedral affair.664 A file from the British High 
Commission on 10 April notes a line of intelligence from a well-placed disaffected P.N.M. 
member who informed that there was a considerable degree of interchange between Black 
Power leaders in Trinidad and in the US. More importantly, with “strict confidence” the 
informant said that “many young professionals and technicians, including those in 
government service, were fully committed to Black Power and the government could not 
rely on the Army since both officers and other personnel had to some extent been 
affected”.665 A further comment on the Regiment was that certain officers who had been 
sent to Sandhurst were “influenced during their time there by the views of their African 
colleagues.”  
On 13 April A.N.R. Robinson resigned from his post as Minister of External Affairs in 
protest against Eric Williams, and the Acting Police Commissioner informed the British 
High Commissioner that the government was preparing to declare a State of Emergency, 
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ban protest demonstrations, and arrest the NJAC leadership. In this measure the Police and 
Regiment were called to prepare for the plan, and the High Commissioner’s comment was 
that things would depend on the police remaining loyal because “[m]any elements in the 
regiment are certainly unreliable”.666 At this point, great pressure was built up on Williams to 
clamp down on the Black Power movement. Here it is important to note the factors as to 
why Williams was not in a rush to declare a State of Emergency. This consideration 
illustrates the fact that the national security state does not depend on one strongman 
individual ‘dictator’. Rather, the national security state is a multifaceted formation with the 
ability to sustain social turbulence and endure radical challenges by channeling the liberal 
currents of those challenges into its service, control, and profit mechanisms in the long run. 
When the Sir George Williams students were being charged and later deported from 
Montreal to Trinidad in 1969 Williams successfully moved the government to cover all their 
expenses related to fines and fees etc.667 The P.N.M. also introduced a cash program to 
reduce unemployment and enacted a five percent levy on corporations and wealthy 
individuals. The British High Commissioner met with T&T’s first local non-white Governor-
General, Solomon Hochoy, on 17 April 1970 to discuss the “Black Power” situation. 
Hochoy thought that Williams,  
will not ask for the proclamation of a state of emergency until he is surer than he 
is now that the mass of the people have lost patience with NJAC … he is also 
anxious not to put the police and the regiment to the test which the imposition 
of curfews and bans on assemblies would bring about, so long as fairly 
widespread sympathy with black power activities remain.668       
 
Eric Williams addressed the Black Power issue with two public talks in this period of 1970. 
The first was “Revolution and Dignity”, given on 23 March. The discourse situated T&T in 
the context of a “worldwide revolt against authority”, noted by decline of the church, “third 
world” protests “against foreign investment”, and notably “the revolt of black people against 
growing indignities”.669  
Despite the attempt to apportion blame to the population for their “lack of 
awareness” regarding government policy and its slow process, Williams perhaps made his 
strongest statement in support of Black Power: 
But the fundamental feature of the demonstrations was the insistence on Black 
dignity, the manifestation of Black consciousness and the demand for Black 
economic power. The entire population must understand that these demands are 
perfectly legitimate and are entirely in the interest of the community as a whole. 
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If this is Black Power, then I am for Black Power. The question is how to provide 
the means by which these legitimate demands can be satisfied.670 (emphasis added) 
 
For Williams, the demand and advocacy for Black dignity was unquestionable and 
consistent. A reading Williams through his thesis of Capitalism and Slavery one might 
expect that his demand and active work for Black economic power would be 
consistent, critical, and anti-imperial, but his political record indicates otherwise. His 
use of legitimate was a qualifier that underscored the emphasis on the question of how to 
address these conditions of concern. Despite a strong statement, Williams had already 
built his own exit door departing from the path towards the real challenge that is Black 
Power. 
On the 3 May, after the foreign aircraft and vessels had vacated the area of T&T, 
Williams gave his second address, titled “The Black Power Disturbances”.671 In this 
speech Williams responded to questions from “[b]oth home and abroad” as to why he 
waited so long to respond to the movement. 672  Principally this was because the 
resentment of discrimination was a “legitimate grievance”, and so he stated, “I identify 
myself fully with its constructive aspect.” The delay was “tactical”,673 for “these young 
idealists” had to see that there were “ulterior motives” “seeking to use slogans of black 
dignity and black economic power as the basis of enlisting mass support.”674 After 
stating that the movement had “degenerated into race hatred” Williams claimed that 
“if I had told the general population of the larger plan I have indicated to you tonight, 
75 per cent of you would have been sceptical and would not have believed it. You had 
to be made to put your finger in the wound in order to have believed it.”675 In 2018 
this might be described as gaslighting. 
Williams’ rhetoric regarding Black Power-inspired “race hatred” was not just 
whim of discourse, for the infamous “Public Order Bill” passed on 7 August 1970 
included an offense of inciting racial hatred, which could result in a $2500 fine or 2 
years in prison.676 The Commissioner of Police strictly regulated the organization 
meetings or marches, and the Police was authorized to search people’s premises 
without a warrant. Detained persons would face a tribunal and would not be held 
more than three months without review.677 The Bill was met with sharp protest and 
opposition, and although it was repealed a month later the British High Commissioner 
noted that by early October the “Government now proposed to rush through, in 
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separate legal packages, legislation dealing with such matters”.678 This did indeed occur, 
and when the original Bill was repealed the Minister of Home Affairs submitted his 
resignation, which Williams refused to accept.679 
 
The Regiment-backed coup d’état of April 1970 that failed 
 
On 20 April 1970, the day the decision was made to enact the State of Emergency, 
Williams summoned the British High Commissioner. The Commissioner’s report on 
this occasion noted, the immediate threat that forced this response was that the 
general strike action driven by the oil workers and Black Power leaders was now joined 
by “public utilities including electricity, water, docks and airports.”680 This action posed 
a direct threat to shut down all of the country’s integral utilities and services. Black 
Power militancy was not a serious threat to Williams, but widespread solidarity action 
that sought a physical shutdown of the country did pose a real security threat. This 
action was an open material challenge to the standing economic and political powers. 
Williams told the Commissioner that he had been issued a “virtual ultimatum” by 
interests such as the “Pro-Government Labour Congress” who “would take matters 
into their own hands” unless action was taken.681 
The State of Emergency was signed on the night of 20 April and was publicly 
announced the following morning after the targeted arrest of 25 Black Power and 
Union leaders.682 The events that followed as the State of Emergency was put into 
force are still yet to be clarified with testimony and record validation. Established 
historical accounts refer to 21 April as the culmination of the mass protests of 1970 
when the Black Power and Union leaders were arrested, and notably, a subsequent 
Regiment mutiny in response to the government’s demand to put down the protests.683 
At a 2012 panel discussion on the topic Major General Ralph Brown stated that he 
was briefed with weekly intelligence reports through the whole period in 1970. He 
concluded that there was “no connection between the mutiny that took place and 
politicians and the Black Power movement.”684 [emphasis added]  
This claim runs counter to evidence that indicates otherwise. Although the 
intelligence reports did not make the connection between a Civil and a Military 
component to establish grounds for treason charges, a record of conversation between 
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the British High Commissioner and the Governor General on 11 June 1970 adds this 
to consideration:  
In [Hochoy’s] view the marches and demonstrations could have been kept under 
reasonable control if the trouble had not been compounded by the mutiny of 
the Regiment, which he described as ‘unexpected’. The mutiny of the Regiment 
was not merely the result of dissatisfaction with service conditions and 
prospects; it was part of an organised plot to achieve a coup d’etat. If Captain Bloom 
and the Coastguard had not prevented the move of the mutineers from Teteron 
the Government might well have been forcibly disposed.685 [emphasis added] 
 
The High Commissioner’s qualification of the supposedly ‘unexpected’ actions of the 
Regiment, coupled with his previous comments on the Regiment being “unreliable”686, 
indicates that he was forewarned of the possibility of an organized revolt to overthrow 
the government.  
The High Commissioner did include a similar conclusion in his following 
diplomatic report, noting the “threat of a coup d’état, possibly of a bloody character, by 
Black Power extremists in conjunction with mutinous soldiers had been narrowly 
averted”.687 [emphasis original] This “narrow” escape was attributed to three primary 
reasons. The first factor was the response of the Coast Guard, who were informed of 
the rebellion at the Regiment base by persons who remained loyal to the State and ran 
to inform.688 Due to the revolting forces’ complicated internal power struggles the 
Coast Guard had the time to prepare two-armed patrol boats and drive around the 
point to fire shells into the Army base. When the Army trucks eventually tried to leave, 
the Coast Guard fired upon the convoy.689 As the trucks took fire a piece of shrapnel 
hit and killed a soldier,690 halting the convoy, bringing its turn back to the base and 
ending the armed advance on the Capital. 
C. M. Kelshall situates the formation of the Coast Guard alongside the Regiment 
and notes its small size, its being called to action in hurricane response twice, early 
exercises with the US and Royal Navies, and the successful establishment of discipline 
and control in the force from time spent at sea on a vessel.691 The Coast Guard was 
seen to be the key bulwark, loyally under the command of Captain Bloom, whom the 
High Commissioner described as a “tough and shrewed Yorkshireman”.692 The High 
Commissioner also commended the Acting Commissioner of Police, a “white 
Trinidadian who rose splendidly to the occasion”, along with “an officer of darker skin 
who is Head of the Special Branch”.693  
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The Police faced widespread protest, looting and vandalism in Port of Spain and 
some other urban areas on the day of 21 April, and the situation was indeed tense as 
fires spread and a few deaths recorded.694 By noon the High Commissioner reported, 
“all the wanted leaders have been detained and the utilities under guard. So far there 
has been no Black Power reaction.”695 Standing apart from that, there was a total lack 
of communication from the government to the population informing and updating as 
events proceeded, to the extent where it was noted that BBC bulletins were being 
rebroadcasted when some communication began.696  
The second factor the coup was narrowly averted was the role of negotiations in 
de-escalating the stand off, warranted by the course of events once the soldiers in 
revolt returned to the base. This is noted by the High Commissioners assessment:  
On the face of it, the outcome is extraordinary. The mutineers have successively 
given up each card they held - the hostages, their ability to filter out of the base 
and join black power elements outside, the sympathy they could expect from the 
various interests concerned if they held out for the release of the political 
detainees and the dismissal of ministers, and finally their arms - in return for no 
more than some chance of avoiding court martial charges.697   
 
In the process of negotiating the surrender the State relied almost entirely on former 
Commander Lt. Col. Joffe Serrette, who was called from retirement and sent to head the 
negotiating team with soldiers. Serrette was re-appointed Commander of the Regiment and 
given executive authority to negotiate agreeable conditions, and in the end made 
questionable accommodations to the soldiers in coming to the terms of surrender.698 
The court martial found an initial conviction but disregarded pleas from the Defence, 
and the Appeal court threw out the initial sentences as it found the court martial to be a 
mistrial.699 The term mutiny was solidified into history through the court process. There were 
no civilians held at the base and the State had no evidence of such a connection, thus the 
treason charges were never substantiated and the courts only deliberated on ‘a mutiny’. 
History thus far has left it at that, and this work begins to ask directed questions, based on 
evidence, as to what is at stake when we forego our understanding of history. Evidence from 
the official record has been presented here to suggest that the Regiment’s actions were part 
of a pre-planned attempted coup d’état. The depth of this position and its significance calls 
for further work in itself that goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the historical 
analysis undertaken here could not have remained intact had it avoided this recognition.  
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The national security state approached the de-escalation of the Regiment’s uprising of 
1970 through executive action, where one person was arbitrarily empowered to undertake 
negotiations.700 In so doing provisions were made that effectively compromised the State’s 
integrity, and forced the process of law to overturn the convictions. The specificity of the 
Appeal case was, “that [the revolting officers’] actions were condoned by their Commanding 
Officer,” and this fact “was not allowed by the Court Martial”.701 The Appeal Judge, Mr. 
Aubrey Fraser, stated, “it is perhaps the acme of irony that the two men who boldly and 
brazenly proclaimed themselves to be the leaders of a mutiny in the regiment and whose 
plans and purposes were aimed at disruptive and dangerous courses should escape 
punishment for their actions. But the law must take its proper course.”702  
The third and perhaps most fundamental but ‘external’ reason for the outcome of a 
failed coup d’état was that those in revolt were not prepared to overcome the pressure that 
lay on the larger scale where foreign intervention loomed. It would stand that the fear 
wrought by the loss of one man at the hands of the T&T Coast Guard that caused the 
convoy to stop was inherently magnified by the known realization that a larger intervention 
was probable. Raffique Shah, one of the officers who led the revolt, stated in court that they 
saw warships on the horizon.703 The British High Commissioner concluded, “the well-
published presence of foreign naval vessels and of the arrival of arms, blown up by rumours 
of actual landings of Venezuelan troops, may have been an element contributing to the 
irresolution of the mutineers.”704  
For Williams, the events of 21 April 1970 were definitely a severe shake up. Records of 
the British High Commissioner of that period noted the sharing of information between the 
US Ambassador and himself, and updates on their respective interactions with Williams. On 
20 April, the day before the State of Emergency and the Regiment revolt, the British High 
Commissioner noted a discussion with Williams where the PM anticipated the need for 
external military support.705 Williams stated that he did not want OAS support as it “was 
dominated by the US”. The preference was for a Commonwealth country, and Nigeria was 
suggested in large part because “such help could not be white”.706 Jamaica refused, as did 
Guyana, primarily because of the negative impacts that action would have with their own 
populations who were sympathetic to Black Power.707 As it came to be on the day of 21 
April the High Commissioner reported, “My American colleague whose confidence should 
be respected has told me that Dr. Williams has telephoned him repeatedly this afternoon 
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pressing for any kind of American help.”708  
The only material foreign backing came from the US as it supplied fifty machine guns 
and 75, 000 rounds of 9mm ammunition, ten 81mm mortars with 200 rounds, one hundred 
51mm motar smoke bombs and fifty 81mm smoke bombs. 709 The US refused Williams’ 
request for armored scout cars and anti-tank weapons. The US also sought to avoid high 
publicity and any image of intervention “but [would] justify action, if necessary, as a 
commercial sale to a constitutional government, whose arsenal has been captured by 
mutineers.”710 A memo relaying the details of the arrival of the first consignment of arms 
stated that, “[a]t the news of the promise of American arms, Dr. Williams is reported to have 
swung from depression to a state of euphoria and to have withdrawn all other requests for 
arms supplies.”711 Reuters reported that “two British guided missile frigates, the Sirius and 
Jupiter” were on “special alert” along with “five U.S. warships hove to off Trinidad after 
dashing to the area.”712  
Thus containment was ensured. The records suggest that the US and British vessels 
were sent for conducting evacuations if necessary,713 and the most probable posture of 
intervention came from Venezuela who at this point was prepared to shore up the Williams 
government against any radical overthrow.714 For the purpose of this critical historical 
engagement, it would be only speculation to say what forces would have intervened if things 
did escalate and take a course towards the Cuban Revolution. Cuba was the inspiration and 
intention, however the attempt was not materially supported by Cuba or the Soviet Union. 
That being said, links were set so that Cuba would immediately recognize a new 
revolutionary government had one been established. Speculation aside, the national security 
state endured. 
 
The un-reconciled consequences of 1970 and continuity in the national security state 
 
In early May the British High Commissioner reported that “two near white ministers” were 
relieved from Cabinet duties as an “expected” “concession to the Black Power movement” 
and that the Ministry of National Security replaced the Ministry of Home Affairs.715 A 
National Security Council was also created at this point in early May, chaired by the Prime 
Minister and represented by the various heads of security agencies.716 Liberal symbolism of 
‘representation’ was put into action as some commitment to uplifting Black people through 
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targeted State support had to be displayed. However the State simultaneously underwent 
further consolidation of power as the new National Security executive was founded upon the 
repression of worker organization across the country. The Black Power movement had been 
given all the attention, but it was the mass cross-coordination of worker strikes threatening 
to shut down all of the essential utilities, infrastructure, and services in the country that 
forced the State of Emergency. Black Power leaders were key targets in the arrests made at 
the outset because they were able to channel the mass discontent into a mobilized social 
formation, and at this point the Black Power movement was not separate from the worker 
mobilization.  
This link between the Black Power movement and the organized labour mobilization 
presented the utmost threat to the national security state and its position in the imperial 
order of the West. Thus national security in independent T&T was established to destroy 
that link, explicitly so as the Ministry of National Security was created in 1970. To do so, the 
national security state channeled liberal undercurrents to debase demands of Black Power 
from its class basis through overtures and partial gains that were offered as long as the 
fundamental organization of the economy around external interests remained in place, as it 
has. The initial response and lasting consequences of the actions of those groups that uphold 
the national security state reveal the interests of what is being secured, with its concomitant 
mobility, and who is left to confront the problems with no opportunity of escape.  
In a summary report by the High Commissioner on 21 July, two months after the 
attempted coup, it was noted that, “[m]any white Trinidadians had dispatched their wives 
and children to Barbados and large sums of liquid money had been sent out, much of it 
never to return, to Nassau, London and other places overseas.”717 The interests secured by 
the national security state are consistent, and similarly so with who had the means and 
mobility to move their valued persons and assets out of harm’s way, regardless of the 
outcome. In this same report the Commissioner noted that Williams,  
has had to rely heavily on the police and Coastguard to remain in power. 
Perhaps more awkwardly he has had to rely on a single man, Brigadier Serrette, 
to end the army mutiny: and the aftermath of these singular events is still very 
much with us. The security forces, and their leaders, are now very prominent in 
the body politic, and new pressures and ambitions may be at work. In the 
continuing absence of any effective Parliamentary Opposition the threat, if there 
is one, to Dr. Williams’ position would most likely come from somewhere inside 




Williams did face some internal threat as presented by A. N. R. Robinson who resigned from 
his Ministerial post. In this instance Williams informed the High Commissioner that there 
was a plot of “mischief against him”, revealed by “unusual telephone calls”. This was 
confirmed to Williams when he surprised Robinson by not leaving for his planned trip to 
Jamaica on 13 April without any notice.719 
In the immediate aftermath of April 1970 Eric Williams was Prime Minister and held 
the portfolios of Finance, Planning and Development, National Security, and Tobago 
Affairs.720 By the end of the year Williams undertook a Cabinet reshuffle and officially gave 
up the other portfolios to only retain position as PM. The British High Commissioner noted 
that this shift “would suggest a devolution of responsibilities but closer examination 
indicates that such is not the case in practice.”721 This was because Williams continued “as 
Chairman of the Budget Committee, the National Security Council and of the Co-ordinating 
Committee of Community Development.” In effect executive dominance was retained, for 
the evaluation of any such change was “the amount of decentralisation it brings both within 
the Government and within the Cabinet itself”,722 and in this measure there was no 
substance to it.  
Williams would later introduce constitutional amendments “to strengthen party 
discipline” and “prevent floor crossing”, provoking the comment of a British Foreign Office 
official who observed that the “situation certainly looks close to resembling that in Guyana 
of a virtual dictatorship with a single party which does not command majority support”.723 In 
December 1970 the government acquired one of the major radio stations on the island as 
well as the Trinidad and Tobago Television station, and enforced a “monopoly on political 
broadcasts” where the Opposition were “forbidden to even buy commercial air time.”724 
There is no question as to whether the national security state remained intact, dominated by 
a strong executive with no apparent mechanisms to enforce accountability on the use of 
power. 
It was important to situate the context of the pressures in the Regiment that had built 
up before 1970, and the fact of their origin in political interferences.  This is necessary in 
understanding the events of 1970, but also what has come thereafter. The High 
Commissioner at the time noted that the Police were to be strengthened as a result of the 
Regiment’s actions in April 1970.725 The analysis presented has also considered the same 
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patterns of political interference and executive impunity at play in the Police Service. With 
the currents of executive dominance unchecked, the decision to strengthen the police 
indicates the continuation of the status quo. Counter to the advice of the 1964 Commission 
of Enquiry, the Police Service were not reorganized away from its “quasi-military body” 
origins but indeed further strengthened as such.726 
As he faced the court martial, Raffique Shah, one of the leading soldiers in the 
Regiment uprising stated, “[i]n almost every section of our society, in the public service and 
in the private sector, there is some form of corruption.” However, he continued, “I don’t 
think Trinidad and Tobago is unique in this respect.” In speaking directly from his 
experience Shah noted, “The Trinidad and Tobago Regiment is no exception”, thus in any 
institution, “when senior members of the unit take an active part in corrupt practices, it 
becomes scandalous.”727 The consequences come down the line to undermine the respect 
and standard of discipline, hence a breakdown. Scandal had not stopped, noted by a headline 
in the Trinidad Express on 17 November 1970, which stated, “Shah: Serrette said what 
happened was 2 years too late”. In this article it states that Serrette was fired from his post as 
Commander of the Regiment in 1968 “because he refused to bow to certain High 
Government officials”, and thus what is implied is that had the revolt occurred before his 
dismissal in 1968 it would have likely succeeded with support from Serrette as 
Commander.728  
Another layer of scandal is highlighted by a US foreign correspondent resident in 
Trinidad during this period, who is given more attention in the next Chapter as his links to 
the US national security state are considered. For Frank J. McDonald, “it is both ironic and 
sad that ten years after” Williams led his 22 April 1960 protest march calling for the eviction 
of the US base from Chaguaramas, the Prime Minister now “thought it necessary to call on 
the Americans to return.” Thus, “[n]othing other than this ironic twist of history could 
possibly demonstrate more effectively how bankrupt Williams’ government had become.”729  
Scandal would come full on to the Police Service before long, increased in power and 
executive control as noted by the notorious rise to prominence of the ‘Flying Squad’ under 
Captain and later Commissioner of Police, Randolph Burroughs.730 The Flying Squad was 
created in 1970, initially catalyzed by the need to counter any continuing Black Power 
struggles, most significantly in the form of the National Union of Freedom Fighters (NUFF) 
that undertook guerilla tactics and actions coordinated from the forested hills surrounding 
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Port of Spain.731  One historian whose work brings forth the fascinating transatlantic linkages 
behind the NUFF movement that formally emerged in 1972 was apt in describing the 
group’s composition, literally as “the progeny of the PNM.”732 The NUFF came and went, 
not without some violent struggle and heavy-handed response by the police’s new 
paramilitary outfit,733 thus the national security state remained in force, and the abuses of 
executive power unrestrained.  
A Commission of Enquiry into the Police belatedly revealed in 1986 that there had 
been years of power abuse and outright police involvement in the illegal drug trade and other 
criminal activity.734 The Scott Drug Report was the outcome of the Enquiry and linked the 
then Commissioner of Police, Randolph Burroughs, directly to known high-profile drug 
dealers and other violent criminals wanted by the Police.735 The recurring theme was the 
unrestrained abuse of executive power that inevitably disrupted and corrupted any legitimate 
working of the Police Service, and in the end directly served to undermine State authority 
leading up to 1990. Having considered the colonial origins of the Police as a means to 
contain indigenous and enslaved peoples while serving the propertied elite, and further 
having connected that precedent to the continuities in suppression in the independent era, 
there is a lingering question as to what integrity is there to the idea that the Police exist to 
protect and serve the general population without partiality or discrimination. 
This chapter first sought to detail the continuity of the national security state in T&T, 
outlining its interventions against local academics and other dissenting figures, in stride with 
the government’s anti-communist insistence. The significance and function of T&T was 
contrasted with the simultaneous experience of Guyana. In the first decade of independence 
the national security state faced the challenges of the turbulent 1960s, utilizing a Commission 
of Enquiry, an industrial court with executive authority to pronounce on labour disputes, 
and outright physical suppression by deploying the police to break apart and suppress labour 
organization. A key theme was the role of political interference in the armed forces that 
resulted in destabilization of the society, serious enough that deep-set grievances took root 
and contributed to the Regiment officers being part of an attempted coup d’état. The 
recurring pattern was of an unchecked executive that was active and heavy-handed in its 
responses to worker demonstrations, and circumstances where the armed forces continued 
to occupy a high profile in the country’s body politic. Also consistent in this period was the 
role of foreign powers in backing the national security state of T&T, most notably with the 
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presence of US and UK warships. This holds with the fact that the Coast Guard was the 
main local force that initially halted the Army’s uprising, and its commander was British.  
The dominant executive patterns which dominated as the country entered the 1970s 
have continued unabated, and have grown into more sophisticated forms, still with 
destabilizing effects. Despite known persistent corruption in the Police, there has been a 
recurring government insistence on the need to continue empowering the force with more 
weapons, despite its obvious senior level management issues. Similarly, more powers were 
increasingly given to the national security executive, whose integrity has also been brought 
into question. Joint Police-Army patrols and exercises were first established due to the crisis 
of 1970, and have remained a constant feature of policing in T&T, continuing to this day. 
Eric Williams stood for Black Power, only as this phrase was devoid of economic redress 
and as long as he could make it fit within the security framework of Western alignment.  
When put to test, Williams chose to clamp down and suppress organized dissent of the 
demographic that was his electoral base. The myriad impacts of that commitment to the 
national security state is considered in the final chapter as the focus turns to the struggle to 
build institutions that would cultivate new modes of social and economic organization in the 
Caribbean.  
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Chapter V, 1962-1978  
The national security state and the targeting of independent thought 
  
 
This chapter reviews the period from the year of independence to the year when T&T was at 
the peak of its 1970s oil boom, two years after the country became a Republic. Despite the 
replacement of a British Governor-General as the head of state in T&T by a locally born 
President there were no major constitutional changes to break away from the embedded 
Crown Colony features of executive dominance. The primary focus of this chapter is on the 
impact of the national security state’s insistence on “anticommunism” and the consequent 
targeting of “subversives” on those local groups working to build institutions for 
independent Caribbean thought. The narrative provides further insights into this period of 
T&T’s history, situating the various groups in their actions against the security state while 
also countering with the regime’s response. This record situates and utilizes the letters of a 
US foreign correspondent resident in Trinidad during the period that provided participant-
observation reports on political events, organizations, persons, and their ideas, to 
Washington. The network behind this correspondent is used to situate the function of those 
researchers and academics that set themselves to work for the national security state.   
In this period the New World Group’s work spread across the region and focused on 
building local systems of knowledge production as a means of furthering the imperative of 
decolonization. The New World Quarterly was an outlet for observation and insight into the 
world of the Caribbean through the ideas and creations of Caribbean people on their own 
terms. This section highlights the case of a few key members of this group whose story 
provides some particular insights into the dynamics of the national security state and its 
consequences for institutions of independent thought. Ultimately the chapter is a 
juxtaposition of these networks of resistance, against the networks of the national security 
state, where each sought to mobilize knowledge production for their very different means 
and ends. The purpose is to gain insight into how the networks of the national security state 
function through knowledge production mechanisms, and the endurance of this formation 
in T&T despite an oil boom and status as a republic. The chapter closes by situating the 
conditions of T&T at the peak of the oil boom, where a British High Commissioner’s 
snapshot already holds the forewarning signs of dark horizons, and it is from there onwards, 
the social conditions continue the downhill trend towards 1990, and today.  
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The national security state against organized independent thought 
 
In a letter addressed to Eric Williams on 26 March 1960 C.L.R. James tendered his 
resignation as Managing Editor of The Nation, the P.N.M.’s newspaper. James stated there 
was a chasm between the Party and its organ. This was because the General Council had 
publicly laid blame squarely on the management of The Nation for various internal and 
external tensions in the party as the campaign against the US base in Chaguaramas 
escalated.736 James’ understanding of Williams’ policies with respect to the matter was that 
the US must vacate Chaguaramas, and if the US did not agree to do so “legal and 
constitutional” steps would be taken “to make life impossible for them there.”737 Coupled 
with this were also stated positions that the “Colonial Office is to be denounced as the main 
enemy of progress” and the Federal government in its current form was “a tool of the 
Colonial Office and the United Kingdom Government.” These principles constituted a 
policy towards “genuine independence” for “[o]therwise the United States Government and 
the others would establish financial and moral domination over the country which would kill 
the spirit by which anything really new could emerge.”738 
James took the cue that reactionary forces had taken hold of the party when he was 
attacked openly in the P.N.M. convention and nobody came to his defence. In realizing that 
there was a break between stated policy and actual practice James resigned and gave this 
warning to Eric Williams, who at this point of close association he called Bill: “your position 
is not nearly as secure as you think. I have suspected it for some time but now I know. The 
Convention showed it as clear as day. Organize your Party, Bill, organize your party.”739 In 
addressing Williams’ reversals James stated that a determinative point was the visit of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to Trinidad in 1960, just prior to the march on 
Chaguaramas and some months before the final negotiations.  
During this visit the Secretary agreed to all of Williams’ demands, stating that 
independence was ready to be granted upon formal request. Further, the British would 
secure Trinidad a direct negotiation position with the US apart from Federal representation. 
James’ analysis in such a circumstance is poignant: 
This agreement on everything put Williams’ whole political personality in a 
terrible spot. He had built up his reputation and his own view of himself on the 
denunciation of enemies and himself as the one who would fearlessly lead the 
people against these centuries-old exploiters. Now there were no enemies to 
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abuse … Williams was now face to face with the economic and social relations 
of Trinidad and Tobago.740 
 
This circumstance was the proverbial fork in the road for Williams, as his response largely 
determined the direction of independent T&T. Either Williams would mount the real 
confrontation of organizing the party, the paper, and the economy or “give it all up.”741  
The break came at this point, for in James’ view the response by Williams to move 
toward increased executive control “was a bad sign.” James’ position was: “I might make 
temporary sacrifices of my politics for a party some of whose aims I thought merited 
support. For an individual, never. I resigned, Williams turned around, ran, and has been 
running ever since.”742 C.L.R. James left Trinidad after his break with the P.N.M., and when 
he returned in 1965 as a cricket reporter he was immediately put under house arrest for six 
weeks.743 James’ assessment of the situation was serious, for he took it upon himself to write 
to Andrew Salkey at the BBC Colonial Service office in London to inform him of the 
danger.744 He first noted that a person active in organizing sugar workers was recently shot in 
an attempted hit, and “that government ministers knew about the attempt before it was 
made.” James’ claim went further to state, “I believe I am next on the list”, thus “I have felt 
it necessary to prepare you for anything” and “you should circulate this personal letter as 
freely as possible”.745 
This vignette from C.L.R. James brings forth the national security state, active in its 
targeting of ‘subversion’, and arbitrary in its intervention against James’ arrival for cricket 
reporting. The irony is that this action put James into a confrontational mode, where he then 
helped form the Workers and Farmers Party with labour leader George Weeks and contested 
the upcoming election, though unsuccessfully.746 This highlight introduces the main theme as 
it does begin to set the context for this chapter. The concern is the impact of the security 
formations on independent thought, and this first section continues with a focus on the New 
World Group, noting the context and form of its challenge, and the countering security 
responses. 
In 1958 Lloyd Best finished his graduate studies in London and was subsequently 
offered a position as a junior research fellow at the Institute of Social and Economic 
Research at the University of the West Indies in Mona, Jamaica.747 His arrival corresponded 
with Arthur Lewis taking up position as Vice-Chancellor of the University, the first 
Caribbean-born and black person to hold that position. The West Indian Society for the 
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Study of Social Issues emerged at Mona in this early period of 1960-1961, and in many 
respects was a precursor to the NWG.748 In this period Best also worked with William 
Demas on an economic planning project in Trinidad, during which time he was influenced 
by C.L.R. James’ challenges to the increasingly executive dominated P.N.M. government and 
the failure of Williams to confront the core issues facing the country.749  
In 1962-1963 Lloyd Best went to Guyana to work for Cheddi Jagan’s P.P.P. 
government as an economic planning advisor paid by the United Nations.750 Best found a 
deeply divided Guyana, where the actual political platforms of the two parties were not 
drastically different as each advocated some form of socialist democracy.751 The internal 
division had been politically provoked along Black-East Indian racial/ethnic lines, and 
externally with respect to alignment with foreign powers. It is in Guyana during this period 
that the New World Group was formed, and in 1963 the first issue of the New World 
Quarterly was published.752 The first issue contained an article titled Working Notes Towards the 
Unification of Guyana, written by Lloyd Best and Miles Fitzpatrick, and it took the following 
position:  
it was the new imperial position within the Hemisphere which re-opened the 
extra-continental dimension. The position of the U.S. as one of the two 
ideological poles which straddled the world by 1950 meant that the idea of social 
change in the New World became once more closely tied to the struggle 
between international imperial rivals. Whatever the positive policies of the 
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., their positions at the top of the two poles ensured that 
Inter-American affairs could not remain a continental question but had to 
become an international question. Cuba today is only the best example of this. It 
was not the first (B.G. and Guatemala came before) and is unlikely to be the last. 
The new Papal Donation (i.e., Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam) had once more come 
under fire!753 
  
In this statement the authors directly targeted the postwar formations of the US 
national security state and its anti-communist imperial posture, and linked it to the 
original colonial demarcations of influence. They further linked the problem of 
decolonization in the Caribbean directly to the Monroe Doctrine as it was carried into 
the Cold War tensions in the region.754 This geopolitical circumstance complicated the 
attempt to address the “total bankruptcy of the imperial system as a framework for 
national development, [and] its distorted conception of educational needs”.755  
The social issue was that “the nation is an imperially imposed coalition”, and 
thus “the mess the imperialists have left demands a radical programme!”756 The task at 
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hand was then to achieve “political stability and a balanced Legislature” by putting 
forth a “radical programme” that can be “jointly agreed on.” Specifically, any such 
political platform had to firstly address constitutional change by acknowledging the 
existing “unstable power imbalance” of “the British imperial system” and its 
consequent “social, cultural, racial and economic” asymmetries. This platform would 
then need to “define the future relations of the community with the outside world in 
such a way as to recognize the imperial situation”.757  
These “Working Notes” outlined the set of problems and the concomitant search for 
a framework of analysis and planning that the New World Group would engage with as it 
evolved over the next decade. The fact is that the group had many currents of thought 
running through it, and thus a varied set of opinions depending on the issue at hand. These 
varied currents would inevitably be part of the reason the group broke apart in the late 1960s 
as political tensions and the demand for action reached unprecedented highs. One consistent 
principle maintained by the group was its preparedness to challenge the current leadership of 
the newly independent Caribbean States for their failure to break from the colonial order and 
thus the group offered its visions for a program toward a complete change of the system. 
Coupled was the position that any development program tied to either of the imperial 
powers was unsuitable to the program of decolonization, and the attainment of social and 
economic independence.  
In what could be a directed analysis of Williams, Best and Fitzpatrick noted that the 
established leadership “rationalises its bankruptcy by charging that the people do not 
‘understand’; they have to be ‘educated’.”758 “Dr. Politics” was Best’s characterization of this 
mode of governance most iconized by “The Doctor”, Eric Williams.759 It was this the 
pattern of executive dominance and continuity in a hierarchical relationship between the 
government and the people the NWG set out to break, and its primary medium was a locally 
produced publication, containing Caribbean oriented political, economic, social, and cultural 
content designed for general readership across the region.  
In October 1965 the NWG held a weekend-long seminar in Jamaica to further 
coordination with the Young Socialist League, the Council for Afro-Jamaican Affairs, and 
the Unemployed Workers’ Council. On this occasion the NWG presented itself as “an 
instrument of radical change” working “in the field of ideas.”760 The central idea that had to 
be broken was that the Caribbean should remain a periphery to Europe and North America. 
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This historical relationship was noted in the fact that the ruling class of the Caribbean has 
been “in transit” and inherently “outward looking”, and the mass of population was 
“imported” from all over the world, and referred to “not as people, but as capital” in an 
economy organized toward “imperial favour”.761 The consequence was an unbroken 
tendency to “see the world through outside eyes” and a social context that “puts its highest 
premium on achievement by mimicry.”  
Thus for Lloyd Best, the cry was for “independent thought”, relevant in the 
observation that in the Caribbean there were no previous efforts “to organise a fund of 
knowledge about the home environment or even about the wider world.”762 The NWG was 
bold enough to rebuke the acclaimed Caribbean literary figure Derek Walcott for his 
suggestion that the New World Quarterly should conform to standards of Encounter magazine. 
The point made here was to break from the “obsession with ‘publishing abroad’”, and thus 
Encounter was dismissed as a model, along with Arthur Lewis who had recently published a 
“thinly veiled attack on Nkrumah in a recent Encounter article”.763 It is interesting to note that 
Encounter was first published in 1953, and became widely read by the political left, only to be 
exposed as a CIA front in 1967.764 It was revealed that the CIA funneled the money through 
the Paris-based Congress for Cultural Freedom, and Encounter was not the only popular 
‘leftist’ publication backed by the CIA.765   
In January 1966 George Beckford was on route to the Eastern Caribbean islands to 
undertake research for a Caribbean economic integration project but the Jamaican 
immigration authorities at the airport seized his passport and refused him the possibility of 
leaving the country. Beckford noted that he was told his name was on a “Watch List” for 
departing passengers, and that the officer on duty gave no explanation other than he was 
following orders.766 There was no official government notice given to Beckford at any point 
in this episode, except for a prior visit to his house by a high ranked police officer who 
similarly gave no explanation and stated he was only following orders. The press commented 
on Beckford’s recent visit to Cuba in a story on the matter, however for Beckford the 
underlying issue was that “citizens should concern themselves with what a legitimate 
government may define as subversive and what procedures such a government may adopt to 
fight subversives.”767 Furthermore he put emphasis on the “maxim that arbitrary action by a 
government should be reduced to a minimum”.768  
Lloyd Best, who was previously called up by the T&T Government to appear before 
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the 1963 Commission of Enquiry into subversive activity wrote to Kari Levitt on the matter 
of the ‘Beckford Affair’ and once more noted that his mail was being opened and delayed. 
Best stated, “the Government is keeping a close watch on our place” but “we are stronger 
than ever”.769 Levitt described the NWG’s activity as a “movement to free the mind from 
mimicry of metropolitan styles in everything from dress, food, and hairstyles to political 
philosophy and economic models of development.”770 Furthermore the work they undertook 
“was to theorize Caribbean reality in terms of Caribbean experience and historical process 
and to build political commitment. The objective was to provide intellectual leadership to 
transform Caribbean economies to become self-reliant, defining their own needs and how to 
meet them with their own resources.”771  
As political tensions escalated across the globe in 1968 the NWG succumbed to the 
external pressure that heightened internal differences regarding tactics of political action. In 
general the NWG began to be critiqued for its resistance to jump to the fore of the 
increasingly militant mass actions of the period. This is not to say that the group was on the 
sidelines, for some of its key members were involved in organizing the 1968 Congress of 
Black Writers in Montreal, were key in the support group for the students involved in the 
1969 Sir George Williams affair, and did take to the streets in 1969/1970 in Trinidad. Lloyd 
Best was a key figure of the NWG’s insistency on “thought is action for us” that led to the 
criticisms.772 Best however, did put to word the basis of his radical position: 
Revolution, that is to say, fundamental change, is achieved when we also see so 
clearly through the regime that we can take the steps required, not to replace it 
with another tyranny, but to displace it with a better order … This is not to deny 
that a time might well come when guns and violence may be necessary to 
overthrow those who have dispossessed us, in the last resort, by guns and 
violence. We know this very well, and our strong sympathies with the current 
revolt arises from precisely this understanding.773 
 
The NWG provides a unique insight into engaging the dynamics involved in attempting to 
sustain radical organization in the Caribbean when faced by a multitude of interconnected 
issues and varied senses of urgency. While there were internal struggles over revolutionary 
principles and strategy there was a consistent external pressure applied by the security state 
which heightened any tensions and generally undermined the cohesiveness of the group’s 
work plans. 
The fracture in the NWG largely centered on a break between political strategies of 
Lloyd Best and James Millette, though it was definitely a result of more broad based tensions 
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over differences on Black Power militancy, the Caribbean Free Trade Agreement, the 
relevance of Marxism to the Caribbean post-plantation context, and the question of formally 
entering the electoral arena.774 Best wrote to Millette on 22 June 1968, a few months before 
the dissolution of the group, in an effort to redress the situation. The letter acknowledged 
the “critical juncture” the group faced and expressed concern for the internal differences and 
conflicts that were arising within the group, heightened by the external conflict with 
“established interests.”775 Best was certain to “appreciate the existential situation which has 
been transforming the character of the New World in Trinidad” and agreed on “the genuine 
need for political organization and directly political work.” Despite this admission he stated 
there was “great danger” in becoming a “platform-kind” of movement where the people are 
not organized and active in working to grasp the issues, the group, or the “real possibilities 
and limitations on change.” For Best, this “is the surest way to another P.N.M.”776 
The concern of this analysis is primarily to situate the internal conflicts of the group, 
as varied and legitimate as they may be, within the wider context of the national security state 
as an active front against organized independent thought in the Caribbean. The NWG could 
not sustain the pressure of the political tensions of 1968, but this did not mean that the 
energy was lost for its various members continued to be active in their efforts. The New 
World journal continued until 1972 primarily through efforts of the Jamaica group, though at 
a significantly slower rate.777 Lloyd Best formed Tapia House movement and newspaper in 
1968 and James Milette formed Moko publishers with a newspaper and the United National 
Independence Party in order to contest the 1971 general elections in T&T.778  
Voter participation was 88% in the 1961 elections, 66% in 1966 and by 1971 had 
dropped to 33%.779 The 1971 election was largely boycotted as a protest against the 
government where public discontent after 1970 remained high. The P.N.M. won all the seats 
in the 1971 election and soon after announced a Commission on Constitution reform. This 
move sought to address the lingering discontent regarding the apparent inability to remove 
the P.N.M. from government, either constitutionally or otherwise. The Wooding 
Constitution Commission recommended a constitutional republic and but left the 
Westminster system intact where the “Executive remains much as it is at present”.780 This is 
despite it’s admission that the “Westminster political system has a propensity to become 
transformed into dictatorship” and those persons who brought forth the problem of this 
authoritarian tendency faced a situation where “their criticisms were brushed aside.”781  
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The report further noted the characteristic of a “Cabinet dictatorship” dominated by 
“the Prime Minister himself, assisted by his inner Cabinet, the Cabinet Secretariat and a few 
individuals who may not even have any formal responsibility in the system.”782 (emphasis added) This 
point is a key feature of the national security state, where non-elected ‘experts’ with ties to 
the government executive have direct channels of influence, and thus accountability 
sidelined. Furthermore, the Commission situated the success of the P.N.M. at the polls with 
respect to the system of “political patronage”,783 noted by the fact the Government “is now 
unquestionably the largest employer” in the country with 35% of the “total paid work force”. 
This system of “tremendous patronage” was widening in scope, as noted by the “expansion 
of government activity in industrial, commercial and financial areas, in agri-business, in 
public utilities, in special works.”784  
The insights above indicate the continuity of the national security state and the 
simultaneous dispersal of organized independent thought. This context further reveals that 
those in the government bureaucracy were aware of the fundamental continuities of 
executive power from the Crown Colony system, and despite its negative consequences 
made no attempt to address it. Decolonization of the Crown Colony origins of the national 
security state in T&T was never fully undertaken despite the country achieving status of a 
constitutional republic.  
In this analysis of the national security state versus organized independent thought it is 
important to situate the foreign intelligence structures operating in T&T, and this study 
engages some lesser known and less studied organizations that operated in the Cold War 
context. The uninhibited function of these ideologically bound organizations in their 
commitment to the Western power structures stand out in striking contrast to the actions 
against organized independent thought that are given further detail in the latter section. 
 
The establishment’s intelligence networks, knowledge production servicing power 
 
That T&T was well integrated into the intelligence networks of Britain and the US has 
already been demonstrated in various instances in this thesis where anti-communism was 
situated as the foundational concern. This formation has elsewhere been referred to as the 
“Western Intelligence Community”, described as, “Anglo-American-Commonwealth 
communities of human intelligence collectors, signals intelligence collectors, analysts, 
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domestic security officials and covert action specialists.”785 Here the focus is on those 
organizations that operationalized information – knowledge production – in service of 
Western governments and their respective corporate interests as these organizations targeted 
the various groups in Trinidad who sought to confront the State.  
Most accounts of the onset of the Cold War with respect to anti-communist 
intelligence and propaganda operations center the US as the unquestioned forerunner with 
the precedent of the 1947 National Security Act and NSC 68. However, not-so-recent 
studies that are somewhat neglected in these discussions present the case that Britain was in 
fact the first off the starting block in this regard. A factor in this has been the longer period 
of classification enforced by Britain as compared to the US, and it has been duly noted that it 
is the “overclassification of the intelligence archive” that is the main obstacle in the work to 
map these interconnections.786 This is important to situate in the context of T&T undergoing 
decolonization from Britain while being situated within the “sphere of influence” of the US 
and its imperial posture. What this circumstance reveals is the continuity of interests in the 
Anglo-American bond; macro-scale continuity between British colonialism and US 
imperialism with its consequent impacts in T&T.  
The Cultural Relations Department (CRD) was formalized in 1945 but has its roots in 
a unit of the Foreign Office’s British Council that was operationalized in 1943, and was 
understood to be “the cutting edge of Britain’s information Cold War, focused upon the 
twin issues of culture and organized youth and working closely with MI5 and to a lesser 
extent with the Secret Intelligence Services (SIS).”787 A 1948 meeting between British and US 
intelligence executives in London discussed the British information warfare operations, and 
details of the British program brought the containment policy advocate George Keenan to 
comment that the British were ahead of the US. The CRD specialized in the production of 
“grey propaganda” and creating anti-communist front organizations that worked with 
government departments, journalists, intellectual, cultural, social, and artistic figures, trade 
unions, and youth organizations.788 The CRD was operationalized in T&T during the 
1960s,789 and remains an active unit of the contemporary Foreign Office.790  
The Information Research Department (IRD) was a counterpart British front 
organization that preceded the onset of US “psychological warfare” programs, beginning in 
1946 with senior Foreign Office officials such as Assistant Under-Secretary Christopher 
Warner in the move to commence an anti-communist propaganda campaign.791 In early 1948 
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a policy memorandum that outlines the function of the IRD was outlined and adopted 
within four days by Cabinet, without discussion. Its job was to collect and disseminate 
information that would be used to promote the anti-communist agenda “through our 
Missions and Information Services abroad”. 792  The Central Office of Information 
supported the IRD and it had the “fullest co-operation” from the BBC Overseas Services.793 
Its network also included Ministers, labour representatives, and various British overseas 
delegations and was staffed by many personnel who worked with the Secret Service. The 
IRD carried out covert operations alongside the military, the Chiefs of Staff, SIS, the MI6 
and its Anti-Soviet Section IX.794 The US anti-communist campaign received greater 
allocations of resources as part of it’s wider commitment behind the Marshall Plan, and by 
1949 the IRD followed the US lead and worked closely on information exchange with the 
US State Department via British Embassy offices.795  
The British High Commissioner became the primary channel of information to 
London once T&T became independent, as noted in the number of detailed reports from 
the High Commission in Port of Spain. IRD was active in Trinidad in the 1960s leading up 
to and through the 1970 disturbances.796 Both the High Commissioner and the IRD unit in 
Trinidad submitted detailed reports on the “Black Power Disturbances” shortly after the 
events.797 These reports also correlate closely with those of a US foreign correspondent 
resident in T&T during this period, Frank J. McDonald, who provided even more detailed 
reports on the context and persons involved in the Black Power events of 1969/1970. These 
three sources of intelligence have been used to cite a lot of the detail in these sections on the 
independent period in T&T and are used to bring this section to a close.  
An insight into the workings of the intelligence network the IRD maintained in 
Trinidad reveals what points of influence it was able to assert itself through. An example of 
this intelligence network is a record in 1967 where the British High Commissioner opens by 
thanking the Foreign Office for IRD information.798 The purpose of the note is an 
intelligence request from the Special Branch of the Trinidad Police and the Security Liaison 
Officer to the Foreign Office. The concern regarded possible impacts of recent disturbances 
in Hong Kong on established Chinese communities in T&T, and thus any “local links 
between Trinidad and that part of the world are of special interest to the Police.”799 The IRD 
file on Trinidad in this period details other reporting of activities, publications distributed, 
and supporting organizations in the network. 
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A key mention in the IRD file are the activities of a certain “Father Tiernan of the 
Catholic Centre [who] was recently instrumental in forming a small committee of leading 
Trinidadians who recently organized a series of 6 weekly television programmes”.800 The 
series would feature students from prominent secondary schools in the country and the 
executives of the Chamber of Commerce. The participants were briefed for discussion the 
topics using IRD material.801 The Catholic Centre was also a major distribution point of anti-
communist literature through its newspaper and by supplying books to many outlets, of note 
to the Central Library and the Institute of International Relations at the University of the 
West Indies. Also of note was mention of one of the “leading figures in the Catholic 
hierarchy” who “plays an important part in the Senate debates and also frequently gives 
public lectures.”802 In this IRD file we see the transnational intelligence networks arrive right 
into the local of Trinidad, and in this last example we see Williams’ retention of the 
nominated component of the second house at work in the service of vested private 
economic interests and full swing in the anti-communist crusade.  
In 1967 Williams moved to block Stokely Carmichael’s entry into Trinidad and enacted 
a law to “ban certain Communist literature”.803 The British High Commissioner reported on 
this event by sending his IRD point of contact in the Foreign Office a copy of the 
government proclamation and newspaper articles of interest. One such article was from the 
Trinidad Guardian of 14 October 1967 that carried a headline “Red literature ban seen as 
extreme”, referencing the opinion of a senior official of the Library Association of Trinidad 
and Tobago.804 The official found the ban “shocking in this era” of independence, and in the 
context of a developing country the ban was “putting us ten years backward”. He stated: 
“You don’t clamp down on the whole society – don’t inhibit them, but deal with those 
persons who are known activists.”805 The Librarian was concerned for the broader impacts 
on education through the medium of literature and the foreclosing of exposure to different 
world experiences, and saw such executive and blanketed actions to stop revolution 
unsuitable. The High Commissioner and his IRD counterpart were concerned with any 
serious opposition to their anti-communist program. The most significant impact of such a 
ban was indeed as the librarian feared, to undermine the organized possibilities for 
independent thought.  
The block against Stokely Carmichael was instituted when it became known that he 
was planning a trip to Guyana and he was set to stop over in Trinidad on the way. The IRD 
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reported that the first real signs of Black Power organization in Trinidad were the protests 
against this ban in 1967.806 In 1968 the Jamaican government decided to revoke Walter 
Rodney’s work permit and refuse his entry into Jamaica upon his return from the Congress 
of Black Writers in Montreal, Canada. These events brought forth a sharp response of 
protest led by students and other intellectual-activists and a march that ended in physical 
suppression and dispersal by the police.807 In the aftermath of what became known as the 
‘Rodney Riots’ the Jamaican government placed increased pressure and clamped down on 
any political activity at the university. Those professors who were overtly involved in labour 
organizing were targeted and some of the professors from Caribbean countries had their 
work permits revoked, such as C. Y. Thomas, a Guyanese scholar who was banned from 
Jamaica in 1969.808  
Walter Rodney was put on a plane back to Montreal, and ended up returning to 
Tanzania to take up a post at the University of Dar es Salaam in the period following the 
Arusha Declaration on socialism and self-reliance.809 Clive Thomas returned to Guyana, and 
when he applied for a work permit to undertake a collaborative research project in Trinidad 
in the latter part of 1970 he was denied.810 Similarly in the immediate aftermath of April 1970 
Lloyd Best travelled to London, and provoked a response from the national security state. In 
this case the British High Commissioner relayed an urgent request from an “anxious” Eric 
Williams concerning Best,811 who was the head of the Social Science faculty at the University 
of the West Indies in Trinidad. The Commissioner described Lloyd Best to his Foreign 
Office counterpart as “a political firebrand who is leader of what is called Tapia House 
group, a radical and near subversive organisation. He is also a leader of the ‘Non Violent 
Committee for Democratic Freedom’.”812 The concern was to prevent any broadcast of 
“inflammatory material” facilitated by Best through his many contacts there, including at the 
BBC.  
Once more the transnational intelligence networks were prepared to follow and 
intervene against independent thought wherever deemed necessary. This stands in stark 
contrast to the work of Frank J. McDonald (FJM) in the period of 1968-1971. FJM produced 
a total of 48 “newsletters” for the Institute of Current World Affairs (ICWA) from his time 
in the Caribbean during this period, visiting and reporting on Anguilla, Virgin Islands, 
Trinidad, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, Curacao, Guyana, Barbados, Jamaica, and Cuba (in 
that general order).813 Ten of these letters were written from Trinidad, most in the range of 
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fifteen to twenty five pages typeset with a good amount of photographs of subject places 
and people. The letters in Trinidad included the topics of “Dr. Politics”, “The Race Factor in 
Trinidad Politics”, “The Radical Alternatives”, “The February Revolution”, and “The 
Commonwealth Caribbean IV: Black Power”.814 The content provided a generally liberal 
analysis of events by and for an American perspective, included many (sometimes lengthy) 
quotes from persons of interest, and would be categorized as a politically oriented 
participant-observation mode of reporting.  
The interesting thing about FJM’s “newsletters” is that on most of the documents, 
“NOT FOR PUBLICATION”, is printed on the top right corner. In none of the reports 
does FJM describe any issue with security services except for in Cuba. On his second visit 
after a seven-month stint lecturing at the University of Havana and doing research on the 
Cuban Revolution he was accused of betraying the Revolution, questioned regarding his 
linkages to US intelligence agencies, and imprisoned for three months.815 At no point does 
FJM report any physical abuses while in detention in Cuba (but in fact by the end he 
describes somewhat comfortable conditions). Shortly before his arrest FJM stated, “the 
prospect of writing about what I’d seen also made me anxious to be on my way”,816 and 
elsewhere he noted he had an uncle active in the CIA and that he was also approached by 
the agency.817 Some of FJM’s newsletters were adapted into a chapter in a 1971 book edited 
by Tad Szulc (who did work for the CIA in Cuba).818 After the Cuba affair FJM settled in 
Ireland for twenty years. In the 1990s FJM owned BioMatrix, a counter-terrorism 
consultancy firm based out of Cambridge,819 MA, and in 1997 was a select participant in a 
Symposium sponsored by the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Division of the 
American Defense Preparedness Association.820  
The Institute of Current World Affairs (ICWA) was founded in 1925 under the 
directorship of Walter S. Rogers and the backing of the Chicago plumbing magnate and 
Jekyll Island Club member Charles R. Crane.821 Both Crane and Rogers had close 
associations with President Woodrow Wilson, and when the Federal Reserve legislation was 
being drawn up Rogers was instrumental in bringing key Chicago banking representation to 
Washington to inform the process.822 The ICWA’s function was to select suitable scholars, 
put them through “a rigorous training program”,823 and send them to designated 
international areas “to investigate and report back with papers that circulated to select 
constituencies, including the State Department in Washington, DC.”824 The initial areas of 
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focus for the ICWA were Soviet Russia, China, and the Near East, however the program 
broadened to largely cover the globe, and hence FJM’s reports from the Caribbean. 
As early as 1933 Walter Rogers was working with the US Ambassador in Germany to 
get an ICWA fellow placed in the country to produce confidential reports that were to be 
forwarded to the State Department.825 John Hazzard was one of the key early ICWA 
members to be sent into the field, spending four years at the Moscow Juridical Institute, and 
upon his return to the US in 1940 became President Roosevelt’s principal Russian 
Interpreter.826 In 1951 Walter Rogers founded The American Universities Field Staff as a 
counterpart organization to the ICWA, financially supported by twenty US universities active 
in International Relations.827 In many respects the ICWA was a forerunner of the model that 
was picked up by the Ford Foundation and Fulbright programs on a larger scale post WWII. 
Some of the ICWA’s key early Russian fellows, such as John Hazard, Bruce Hopper, and 
Geroid T. Robinson, were key in establishing the Russian Institute at Columbia (Harriman 
Institute) and the Russian Research Center at Harvard (Davis Center).828 Geroid Robinson 
was the head of the Russian section of the OSS during WWII and was a working member of 
the Council on Foreign Relations after the war.829 These institutes served as Cold War think 
tanks contributing to US foreign policy, and had varying degrees of linkages to the CIA.830 
The Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie Foundations had many organizational overlaps 
and staff interlinkages with the highest executive levels of government, through both 
Democratic and Republican administrations.831 One example of these cross-linkages is John 
J. Mcloy, a former chief of the World Bank who was at one point the simultaneous head of 
the Ford Foundation, Chase Manhattan Bank (Rockefeller owned), and the Council on 
Foreign Relations while being in a position to advise Eisenhower on various matters. So it is 
with the case of Rowan Gaither who was instrumental in founding RAND Corporation as a 
non-profit organization run by the US Air Force with Ford Foundation support.832 In 1953 
Gaither would later become the head of Ford, and in 1957 he chaired a NSC committee to 
evaluate the US national security posture. The Church Committee revealed the links between 
the CIA, Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations,833 but even more incriminating were 
the exposures of plans and involvement in directly and indirectly overthrowing foreign 
governments, and assassination attempts on foreign leaders such as Fidel Castro and Patrice 
Lumumba.834 
In this section the Anglo-American-Commonwealth “Western Intelligence 
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Community” has been situated in broad scope and brought directly into play in the local 
context of T&T as it targeted local intellectual-activists. The links between institutions of 
knowledge production committed to (white) Western supremacy and the US national 
security state are deep and widespread, and work through liberalized proxies such as the 
ICWA fellows who are able to move through various places and give detailed intelligence to 
the US establishment. This is a stark contrast to those members of the New World Group 
who undertook the “The Struggle for a Relevant Economics”835 in the Caribbean as they 
were repeated victims of the national security state’s interventions. This is not without 
significance for it is this contrast that is probably the most lasting impact of the national 
security state remaining in place in T&T: the undermining of institutions for understanding 
the world from our own perspective and submission to the ‘universalism’ of the Western 
doctrines of economic freedom and ‘democracy’ upheld by free market fundamentalism and 
an empowered intelligence-military complex. The next case in focus reveals this function 
where an economic statistician becomes a threat to national security, by association, and as a 
consequence economic planning for T&T went out the window even before the neoliberal 
counterrevolution. 
 
Kari Polanyi Levitt and economic planning as a threat to national security 
 
For Kari Polanyi Levitt, ‘development’ engages the question, “how peoples and societies can 
secure economic livelihood, eliminate poverty, indignity, and injustice, and protect the 
heritage of cultural and environmental diversity from plunder and destruction by the global 
reach of unconstrained capitalism.”836 Furthermore, “It is unnecessary to enhance 
[development] by adjectives like ‘human,’ ‘participatory’ or ‘sustainable’ because without 
these attributes there is no meaningful development.” Levitt’s first encounter with the 
Caribbean came as graduate student of the University of Toronto, where Professor 
Keirstead, at the invitation of Arthur Lewis, was spending a sabbatical at the University of 
the West Indies in Jamaica.837 In December 1960, Levitt was asked to assist Professor 
Keirstead in completing a research project on an inter-island shipping service commissioned 
by the Federal government of the West Indies. The research was done in the archive of a 
British Shipping Company in Port-of-Spain and published as Inter-Territorial Freight Rates and 
the Federal Shipping Service in 1963.838 
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The wider networks of Confluences (2005) that brought and have kept Kari Levitt 
closely linked to the Caribbean are fascinating and have been documented on various 
occasions.839 The focus here is the type of work Levitt undertook in the Caribbean, the 
repeated interventions by the national security state, and her persistence to carry forward and 
move around these serious setbacks. In Trinidad, she met west-Indians economists working 
for the Federal government and also the chief economist of Trinidad, William Demas. Later 
in the year, she encountered Lloyd Best, Alister McIntyre and Roy Augier on the Mona 
campus of UWI.840 In this early period the West Indian Society for the Study of Social Issues 
was the organization through which these economists began to envision the role of 
Caribbean economics in the decolonization movement. In 1961, Levitt attained an entry-
level position to teach Economics at McGill University in Montreal, where she initiated a 
course on techniques of economic planning and began to facilitate Caribbean students and a 
Caribbean-oriented discussion group that would later become the Montreal chapter of the 
NWG.841  
In 1964, Best and Levitt, in consultation with McIntyre (then Dean of the Faculty of 
Social Sciences at UWI, St. Augustine) outlined an approach to development planning in the 
Caribbean based on the legacy of the slave plantation. The purpose of this meeting was to 
address the following question: “what would be in economics matters, economics language, 
the representative firm in this Caribbean economy?”842 The group “decided that it would 
have to be the plantation.” The problem of economic planning in the Caribbean then, 
would, “have to go back historically to the slave plantation which evolved with 
emancipation, then wage labour, which in current terms had become the subsidiary of a 
foreign company.”843 In Levitt’s recollection: 
It was Lloyd's genius to perceive the manifold correspondence of the slave 
plantation with contemporary business practices of foreign - and also local - 
firms operating in the Caribbean environment. For Lloyd, the proprietors, 
merchants, planters, attorneys, and house and field slaves of the ‘Model of a 
Pure Plantation Economy’ became a language to describe the metropolitan 
financial and merchant capitalists, the local margin-gathering merchants, the 
absentee foreign owners of multinational corporations, the resident local 
business classes with metropolitan consumption patterns and social aspirations, 
the managers of overstaffed private and public enterprises (complementing 
salaries with generous perks of housing, car, and travel allowances), and the 
working population - descendants of slaves and indentured labourers. The 
imagery has not lost its resonance,844 
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In 1964 the core thesis of The Theory of Plantation Economy (2009) was germinated. In the same 
year, the Center of Developing Areas Studies at McGill invited William Demas as a Visiting 
Research Fellow. The lectures he gave during this period were published as The Economics of 
Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean (1965). George Beckford also 
came into this circle and began to utilize the plantation as a lens in his own analysis of 
Jamaica’s agricultural economy, and in 1966 Lloyd Best moved to Montreal with his family 
for two years to further the work on the planning models. It is in this period that Montreal 
became a focal point of radical Black activism and thought. 
Montreal has long had links to the Caribbean via its diaspora, most notably the Haitian 
connection but also largely supported by people from across the wider region.  This high 
point of Caribbean political activity in Montreal led up to the Congress of Black Writers in 
1968 and the Sir George Williams Affair in 1969.845  At this time however, Montreal was 
explicitly situated in Québec’s political dynamics as tensions built up to the 1970 October 
Crisis when the War Measures Act was declared in response to the Front de libération du 
Québec’s drastic actions. In 1968 the New World Quarterly featured an article by Kari Levitt 
titled Economic Dependence and Political Disintegration: The Case of Canada. This article achieved 
wide circulation via pirated reprints and attracted the interest of Macmillan Publishers in 
Canada, resulting in the publication of Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporations in Canada 
in 1970. The subject matter was highly contentious. Among her supporters was Jacques 
Parizeau, a prominent economist, who wrote the introduction to the French translation of 
the book. The French translation contained a postscript, which was reproduced by 
prominent union leader Michel Chartrand and widely circulated in worker’s circles of 
Montreal. 
When Parizeau became Minister of finance in the first Parti Quebecois government, he 
invited Levitt to Quebec city for the presentation of his first budget. This may have 
contributed to her troubles with security authorities. More specifically, Levitt stated that 
persistent RCMP surveillance began after Cheddi Jagan visited her home for one of the 
NWG meetings in this period, and described somewhat amusing and ironic beginnings of 
early telephone wiretap operations.846 By 1969 the commitment to completing the Plantation 
Economy work was such a priority that Levitt was set to move to Trinidad with her two 
children for a two-year contract as Acting Director of the Institute of Social and Economic 
Research at UWI, St. Augustine.847  
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Alister McIntyre as head of the Faculty had made the necessary arrangements within 
UWI for Kari to fill the vacant spot, and CIDA was to provide the funding. After a delayed 
response to the application CIDA returned a negative result with respect to funding, stating 
that the University had been in touch with the High Commissioner and the evaluation was 
that there was no demand for professors in the social sciences.848 This was counter to the 
position of McIntyre and others well placed in the University. A student of Kari Levitt 
employed by CIDA was shocked to discover that her file was flagged with an instruction “no 
action to be taken”.849 In this circumstance the Canadian security agencies and their links to 
State development organizations were the intervening force against an appointment as 
Acting-Chair in the Institute of Social and Economic Research, and completion of the 
Plantation Economy work. 
Having made arrangements to leave Montreal and determined to spend time in 
Trinidad, Levitt then accepted, somewhat hesitantly, an offer by William Demas to work for 
the Civil Service of T&T in the Ministry of Planning and Development.850 The position was 
to head a project alongside the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, Eugenio Moore, to 
completely reformulate T&T’s database for the Ministry and the Central Statistics Office.  
Her initial salary was paid via IMF technical assistance funding and Kari Levitt did not have 
any issues with US security services.851 The task was to construct a unique multi-sectoral 
Trinidad and Tobago System of National Accounts.852 The system was a database to serve 
for the next five-year plan, organized specifically to suit the geography and economy of 
T&T, and had estimates to manage integrated real and financial flows.853 This was a planning 
tool to help improve efficiency and accountability of government expenditure.  
Levitt described a motivated atmosphere in this office of the Ministry where graduate 
students were employed from UWI, and there would often be volunteered work sessions on 
the weekend. During many a lunch break they would all go down to Woodford Square to 
listen to Geddes Granger speak as there was a general sympathy for the protests of the 
young and unemployed in the Black Power movement.854 Work continued for one full year 
in Trinidad on the system of National Accounts, and Kari then spent the next two years 
teaching full-time at McGill with the summer periods of 1971 and 1972 in Trinidad. In 1971 
Kari Levitt had an exchange with Eric Williams where she sent him a copy of Silent Surrender 
with a note, and he replied with a copy of his latest book From Columbus to Castro (1970). He 
commented positively on Levitt’s book, and made a point of interest regarding the extended 
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function of her branch plant analysis where “Canada is doing to the Caribbean just what the 
USA is doing to Canada.”855 Williams was not unaware of the negative consequences of 
reliance on foreign investment at the basis of the economy.   
The discontent in the country during this post-1970 period was most notably 
expressed by a younger generation under the banner of the National Union of Freedom 
Fighters (NUFF). Levitt’s circles overlapped with this group that was supported by a 
somewhat widespread but diffused network, and she described the core of the group as 
“quite literally the children of the P.N.M.”856 During a period of work on the National 
Accounts system in 1973 Kari Levitt happened to be spending a weekend by her friends, one 
of who was a doctor known to provide medical assistance to the NUFF. In the early hours 
of a morning, the Flying Squad of the Trinidad Police commanded by Randolph Burroughs 
raided the house, and according to Levitt “they didn’t really find anybody there except the 
national income advisor for the government” but “they took my passport.” Then she noted, 
“when I came into work the next day, Monday,” my co-worker Joyce Alcantara, “said you 
are in trouble now, they have taken your passport, they have done you a wrong, and now 
you have become a danger to them.”857 This incident made Kari Levitt a “persona non grata” 
with the government.  
Shortly thereafter the government “locked up all the worksheets, they just 
disappeared”,858 “our interim report was declared confidential” and “long-term economic 
planning was abandoned.”859 The closing down of the System of National Accounts was part 
of wider shifts and uncertainty within the Williams government in this period. The move to 
consolidate control was clear in the passing of Act 5. of 1973 which established the Minister 
of Finance as the “Corporation Sole”, with control over the state owned enterprises and the 
management of their assets.860 Williams was facing discontent in the public, in the party, and 
increasingly the Civil Service where he would claim that he was “a victim of inactivity.”861 
In late 1973 Williams was at his low, and announced that he would not run for head of 
the party in the upcoming P.N.M. party election. As fate would have it the OPEC oil 
embargo and the consequent drastic price increase of oil on the international market offered 
an immediate new source of revenue, and Williams surprised everyone by coming forth at 
the party Convention to take his place, and ran ahead for the rest of his life once the massive 
AMOCO offshore gas discoveries were announced in early 1974. Williams is supposed to 
have said, infamously, “money is no problem”, but economic planning was definitely 
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abandoned. For Kari Levitt, “it is a very strange logic that from the time you actually have 
financial resources, you can abandon economic planning. If that is not an example of utter 
shortsightedness, I don’t know what is.”862  
Williams announced in 1975 that he was set up to be a victim of a coup by “a small 
ambitious minority of civil servants”,863 dubbed the “‘technocrats’ takeover”. He then 
announced that the services of top Permanent Secretaries were no longer required, including 
Scotty Lewis, Dodderidge Alleyne, and Eugenio Moore of the Ministry of Planning and 
Development”.864 The Civil Service has never recovered and remains subordinate to the 
cadre of Ministers, and T&T’s Central Statistics Office has also been in an abyss since then. 
Later events would reveal the massive proportions of waste and theft of government 
expenditure that was commonplace during the oil boom of the 1970s.865  
A glaring example of this mismanagement was the handling of the Trinidad-Tesoro 
joint venture that took over BP’s assets in 1969. At this point BP Trinidad had consecutive 
years of declining profitability, depleting oil reserves, and a lack of capital reinvestment into 
its facilities, driven by a low price of oil, Trinidad’s relatively high costs of production, and 
new prospects in the North Atlantic. The evaluation of the company’s assets were 7 million 
USD on the books, BP requested 14 million, and when a US firm was called to consult the 
final figure rose to 17.5 million USD.866 A record of the British High Commissioner at the 
time, noted this context of a bleak outlook for the industry that was compounded by 
challenges from organized labour and social discontent. With respect to the BP takeover he 
also noted that what had “become an unwanted asset, [was] being taken over, by agreement 
with the Government”.867 (emphasis added) 
In the Trinidad-Tesoro partnership the T&T Government was the majority 
shareholder with 50.1% ownership of the company, but the US Corporation carried out the 
management and operations of the company. In the original agreement the government 
retained the rights to licensing in the case of bankruptcy, but in 1972 this was changed such 
that Tesoro would hold the licenses.868 Furthermore, the Petroleum Taxes Act of 1974 was 
showcased as the government’s willingness to tax foreign corporations and take its stake in 
the industry. The taxation changes were not insignificant, where in 1973 the government 
collected 0.50 USD per barrel through tax and royalties from AMOCO’s offshore drilling 
operations, that figure rose to 4.69 USD per barrel by the end of the year, and in 1974 this 
would then be doubled.869 The increase in government revenues was enormous. In 1975 the 
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government’s ‘partnership’ corporation, Tesoro, began legal proceedings to challenge the 
T&T’s 1974 tax bill. The corporation produced evidence that the former Minister of 
Petroleum and Energy Department gave a special accommodation, and a legal settlement 
was negotiated where Tesoro was to be compensated for “over-taxation”. 870 Shortly 
thereafter other companies challenged the law using this precedent and before long the 
overall taxation rates were equalized accordingly. Economic planning was out the window, 
and despite increased State ownership (which entails not only assets but also liabilities) the 
foreign corporations retained strategic control of the economy on profitable terms for them.  
In the immediate context of having the National Accounts project shut down, Levitt 
was given an opportunity by the UWI St. Augustine to utilize the rest of her work permit as 
a visiting professor. This she did, and in that time was offered a three-year contract with the 
Institute of International Relations.871 The goal was to finally complete the work for the 
plantation economy planning models, and by mid 1975 before the start of the school term 
Levitt had made arrangements to leave McGill, Montreal, and move to Trinidad to live. In 
her recollection the circumstance was that in August 1975 she participated in a conference 
on the New International Economic Order, in which there were many high-level persons 
working on international development. There, she let it be known that she had accepted a 
three-year contract with the Institute of International Relations.872 
Kari Levitt arrived in Trinidad in September, for the second year of the appointment 
and discovered that her work permit had not been renewed. The University protested but 
the government stated that “after careful consideration”, the work permit had not passed the 
Ministry of National Security. No explanations were given.873 A visitor’s visa was quickly 
secured, but then revoked the day after.874 The sociologist Lloyd Braithwaite, then Principal 
of the UWI St. Augustine, was key in organizing the protest by the university. The Faculty of 
Social Sciences at St. Augustine released a statement noting the case was not singular, and 
the concern was for the use of work permits as an “instrument of political control” that was 
being used “to prevent the academic community from doing its work”.875 The analysis 
recognized the impact of an active, ideologically dogmatic, national security state on 
independent thought:  
Perhaps one of the most unfortunate effects of such use of work permits is to 
make it difficult for West Indians to work freely at the St. Augustine campus and 
to threaten the regional character of the university. The further effect of such 
harassment is to suggest that the Government of Trinidad and Tobago is less 
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than serious about maintaining the integrity of the University as a centre of 
learning, research, debate and critical analysis.876 
 
There was nothing that could be done by the university, and beyond the notice of denial by 
the Ministry of National Security there was a wall of silence on behalf of the T&T 
Government. Kari Levitt was soon forced to leave the country. A devastating interruption, 
nonetheless, this did not stop her work. Fortunately well-concerned friends and colleagues in 
her Department at McGill had delayed in forwarding her resignation papers, and thus her 
job and livelihood was secured.877  
 In the interim, Levitt had a contract in Guyana relating to economic planning, and an 
invitation from the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex in the U.K. By mid 1976, she 
was back in Montreal.878 At this time, close to ten years of work on the construction of 
Input-Output tables for each of the four Atlantic provinces of Canada was coming to a close 
at Statistics Canada. A contract for the final phase of the work was presented for signature to 
the Chief Statistician who had recently received a new black list of economists and other 
professionals not to be hired by any Canadian governmental agency. Kari’s name was on the 
list. A senior colleague presented the Chief Statistician with a conditional resignation.879 The 
contract was signed. In Ottawa, Levitt was invited to lecture on the international financial 
system, including the history of the IMF, to senior public servants. It seems that Levitt made 
a good impression on somebody of importance, because shortly after this seminar she was 
invited to join the international executive board of the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC), a Canadian federal Crown Corporation. After some delay, she received a 
phone call from the chief of the IDRC expressing his disappointment and embarrassment 
that Cabinet had not approved the nomination. Independent investigation by Levitt 
established that the nomination did not pass the national security clearance.880 
Levitt’s lingering question is, what does a development research center have to do with 
national security clearance? This is the type of concern that has driven this enquiry. In many 
respects the national security state interventions against Kari Levitt have been arbitrary, 
though directed in their consequence of interrupting her work and undermining the efforts 
to build strong institutions of independent thought. RCMP files from NWG meetings were 
linked to a CIDA red flag that resulted in revoked funding to do plantation economy work 
in Trinidad. A random run-in with the police’s paramilitary unit in Trinidad led to a 
confiscated passport, a closed project, and ejection from government employment. A 
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comment on moving to Trinidad in a forum of Canadian officials led to a reactivation of 
intervention by the Ministry of National Security in Trinidad to block her work permit and 
visitor’s permit.  
The national security state functions through arbitrary actions because the empowered 
channels of executive decision making were committed to an ideological fundamentalism of 
anti-communism, heightened in the context of Black Power of that period. The routine 
targets of the national security state were those that actively worked for decolonization of 
the State and society, and attempted to build institutions of independent thought towards an 
alternate mode of economic organization. In one very tangible way five years of work on a 
database for the T&T Central Statistics Office was destroyed along with the economic 
planning models and the uniquely designed Trinidad and Tobago System National Accounts; 
declared confidential material and confiscated by the Ministry of National Security. Similarly, 
the plantation economy models were only published in full form as a book, in English, in 
2010. Perhaps it is telling that there is something to be reflected upon when it is known that 
the Spanish translation was published first, a year prior, in Cuba.  
 
Dissent contained, piecemeal reform policies appropriated to work for the establishment 
 
Two High Commission reports in January 1970 give an assessment of conditions in T&T 
and the government’s policies on the eve of the February Revolution and the attempted 
coup d’état. The British High Commissioner stated that T&T was pursuing closer ties with 
the US as shown by its commitment to the Organization of American States and Williams 
taking up position as chair of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.881 In a 
review of 1969 the highlights are the acquisition of BP by Trinidad-Tesoro and Williams’ 
meeting with Nelson Rockefeller in May, an agreement with the US for financing for the 
Caribbean’s regional air carrier, the British West Indian Airways, in June, and a Commission 
of Enquiry into racial discrimination in hiring practices of the private sector.882 It is evident 
that Williams kept close ties to the US and did not fundamentally shift the orientation of the 
economy away from its commitment to the interests of foreign capital despite some moves 
to increase state ownership. Similarly, he did make an effective move to tackle discrimination 
in hiring practices, but the fundamental problems of high unemployment and inequality 
persisted unabated. Williams’ program brought gains for some, inclusion of individual 
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possibilities, but not social and economic redress for the many.  
The Canadian High Commissioner also reported on the situation in January 1970 and 
began by commenting on the “increasingly conspicuous non-appearance of vast new 
benefits for the negro masses in the years after Independence” and the crisis this posed for 
the P.N.M.883 The analysis was that it was the commitment to “foreign business interests” 
that resulted in this context where Williams’ government was now “rather remote from its 
working class electorate.” Persistent unemployment and underemployment were the 
consequence of the P.N.M.’s reliance on the petroleum industry and its derivatives as the 
prime movers of the economy, for these capital-intensive sectors did not have high labour 
needs but did have high wages that effectively distorted the rest of the economy.884 The 
situation was volatile due to the fact that the young demographic was the largest in the 
country, and it was in this group where unemployment was most pronounced. The Canadian 
official did note the challenges presented by Lloyd Best and James Millette, but the 
evaluation was “that the political climate is not yet ripe for their political ideas”.885 
The bottom line concern of the IRD’s report on Black Power was radical 
organizations in Trinidad and the use of the 1969/1970 protests by “international 
Communist interests” for their propaganda purposes.886 The situation was that “extensive 
coverage of the events in Trinidad and Tobago reveals significant and growing Communist 
support for Black Power manifestations throughout the world.” The report highlighted 
evidence of “certain elements” planning a military force, citing the seizure of a large number 
of khaki uniforms and early reports from within the T&T government and sources in Britain 
that the agenda of April 1970 was a indeed a plan to neutralize the police, seize the public 
broadcast stations, overthrow the government, and declare “a revolution”.887 Of the dissident 
forces the IRD identified the “extreme-left wing leader” of the OWTU, George Weeks, and 
his close links to NJAC as manifested in the worker-backed Black Power mobilizations in 
the streets to be the most prominent civil challenge to the regime.  
Lloyd Best and the Tapia newspaper were also situated, noting its platform that called 
for a constitutional republic based on participatory political representation, diversification of 
the economy, and nationalization of the industries.888 The report noted the protests against 
Stokely’s ban, the calls for the removal of censorship on ‘communist’ literature, the 
condemnations of police brutality, and demands for State control of the economy. It also 
commented on the New World Group – Tapia cross pollination, and stated they had a 
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“radical rather than a Black Power view.”  
A month after the State of Emergency was declared it was extended for another six 
months.889 In reporting on this matter the British High Commissioner also commented on 
the recent Exchange Control Bill as a forced reaction to reports of substantial capital flight 
from the country. Tapia issued a call for a constituent assembly as a forum for the people to 
begin to mandate an alternative political program, however the draconian laws in place at the 
time greatly restricted any such efforts. Tapia stated, “the measures taken to restore ‘law and 
order’ have had the effect of clamping a lid on all the means of expression of the 
dispossessed classes” while the “well-to-do, on the other hand, have breathed a sigh of 
relief”.890 In such a circumstance the elite “evaluate governmental performance in terms of a 
successful holding operation, a state of vigilance against possible disturbances of the status 
quo, rather than in terms of the formulation and achievement of developmental goals and 
the building of a just society.”891 Similarly the danger was that “having been saved, as we are 
repeatedly told, by the police”, the rhetoric of the state and its elite sought to ensure that “we 
will not be disposed to be critical about the role of the police” who were “extolled for their 
‘loyalty’” and consequently set to be empowered.892  
The arrests of 21 April 1970 primarily targeted NJAC and labour union leaders. The 
records state that 54 civilians were arrested and detained first in the Royal Gaol, and then on 
Nelson Island,893 including both the Chairman of Tapia and the editor of Tapia newspaper.894 
In a High Court appearance on 12 May the leader of the OWTU, George Weekes, claimed 
that he had suffered “physical and mental torture” as he was being held in solitary 
confinement for twenty-three hours a day.895 The detainees were not all released at once, for 
the last five detainees were released in the middle of November, after seven months, on bail 
conditions as they still faced a trial of sedition charges.  
Similar to the court martial and appeal for the soldiers’ case, the charges against the 
civilians for sedition in 1970 did not substantiate to convictions and sentencing. The 
punishment national security state is often in the process, noted by the detainment of labour 
and Black Power leaders for up to seven months before release. In many respects the police 
and prison system served as an immediate means of containment by detention, to physically 
block people from action and organizing, but the courts have been less than effective as a 
means of due process. The discontent did not subside and new groups such as the New 
Beginnings Movement emerged, as well as NUFF with its guerilla-type actions, to which the 
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Police increasingly responded with outright, often lethal, violence.  
The empowered police was not the only mechanism that Williams relied upon to 
endure the challenges of 1970. What the government and its supporters promoted were the 
changes made in the economy, said to be representative of Williams’ nationalist 
commitment, toward increased state participation.896 The Trinidad-Tesoro partnership was 
the flagship project of this claim, and its end result revealed that the foreign corporation 
retained control and profit while T&T was liable. Further in this pattern was the use of the 
gains from the oil boom of the 1970s to develop further downstream sectors, which soon 
boasted a world-class array of petrochemical industries.897 This petrochemical sector became 
the new flagship, and was referred to as ‘diversification’, a title with no substance for it was 
very plain to see that these industries directly depended on the parent oil and gas extraction 
and refining processes.  
Petrochemical industries are capital intensive and present minimal employment 
opportunities, thus wage distortions persisted, and ultimately the economy still depended on 
foreign firms both on the import and export sides of the country’s primary industries.898 The 
local economy experienced significant growth of GDP in the second half of the 1970s, 
primarily noted in an infrastructure boom and in the expansion of service and consumable 
industries. A significant component of the government’s program in this period was the 
instituted use of subsidies to underwrite entire aspects of the economy, not for growth and 
development of new and interlinked industries, but primarily subsidies that served direct 
services of consumption. One of the key subsidies was fuel, allocated $99 million USD 
between 1973-1978, used to catalyze quick growth of the local transport network. In the 
same period food subsidies received $175 million USD, however most of it was used to buy 
imported food.899 
Tapia’s first public meeting was held on 19 March 1970 open to the public and was 
titled “Black Power and National Reconstruction: Proposals Following the February 
Revolution”.900 Lloyd Best was active in his program of social-political organizing across the 
Caribbean in the decade of the 1960s, and by 1970 was in Trinidad with his organization and 
its outlet, as one of the most consistent platforms of critique focused on the P.N.M. regime. 
The “February Revolution” was his term, and his discourse was sharp and widespread across 
the society. Williams’ post April 1970 national address was titled “National Reconstruction”, 
given on 30 June 1970, after the streets had subsided and both the soldiers and Black Power 
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protestors in their respective confinements. Williams showcased his State acquisitions of 
industry and a bank, and promised to build more schools and houses, and as would become 
the recurring unfulfilled theme, diversification of the economy.901  
Eric Williams was confronted in the Senate in 1975 regarding his claims of having 
made important State acquisitions, yet in the Trinidad-Tesoro ‘partnership’ it was the US 
corporation that retained the upper hand. Similarly it was noted that there was little 
substance to the fanfare about the National Commercial Bank established by the 
government, because it was “run like a foreign corporation, in terms of its lending 
policies.”902 Similarly the Foreign Commonwealth Office took note of an incident where the 
“Trinidad and Tobago Government revealed the uncompromising nature of its attitude 
towards the University of the West Indies (UWI) last week”. 903 The case was a request from 
the University that had gone to Cabinet for the use of “certain radio frequencies for the 
reception and transmission of television programmes between the campuses at Mona, Cave 
Hill and St. Augustine, with a view to teaching and research.” The request was denied 
because the Cabinet said it had the right to be involved from the initial process and it 
“disagreed with the procedures adopted in this ‘important and far-reaching matter’”.904  
A Diplomatic Report from the British High Commissioner to the Secretary of State in 
1977 gives insight into the conditions in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, a year after it 
got that status. The prominent feature of the report was the oil and gas boom, where “there 
is little sign of the bonanza ending or of the stresses and strains it creates yet being so severe 
as to be a serious threat to Trinidad’s stability.”905 Despite this overview it was noted that 
unemployment was “virtually at the same level as before, and among young people it is 
almost certainly higher”. From the Commissioner’s perspective, it was “hardly expected” 
that there would be even distribution of the high oil prices, but “one of the more worrying 
changes of the past three years is the widening of the gap between rich and poor, and the 
growth of a typical ‘consumer society’”.906  
The other trend of note for the Commissioner was the stagnation of the Civil Service 
where the issue was “now compounded by growing corruption because of the greater 
temptations of an affluent society”.907 At the time of writing he noted that there was 
extensive local press coverage on a report on corruption in the Magistrates’ court. Eric 
Williams commissioned the enquiry and the report was submitted in 1973 but had only just 
come to light, “after most of the copies have mysteriously disappeared from Government 
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Offices.”908 1978 was the year of the peak of T&T’s oil production, and a year later the 
British High Commissioner’s report was titled “Wealth and Worry”. His assessment was that 
“the country is deeply divided class against class, race against race, and the whole place is 
going down the drain, while everyone fears to speak up.”909 The concluding analysis is that 
the national security state endured and the primary victims are independent thought and 
those organizing the effort to build institutions for an alternate mode of social and economic 
organization.  
The national security state in T&T maintained its continuity through a constitution 
that ensured the executive of government functioned with a high degree of discretion and a 
low degree of accountability. This arrangement also maintained the direct channels for the 
influence of special interests in government programming, and thus the economy also 
retained its patterns of strategic control by foreign interests alongside weak protections for 
workers. The oil boom immediately exposed the persistent high degrees of inequality in the 
High Commissioner’s observation. Eric Williams’ political career was saved by the onset of 
the oil boom after having the close call that was the Black Power uprisings and attempted 
coup d’état of 1970, on which occasion he was saved by his alignment with the imperial 
powers. In material form the decolonization process was suspended by the onset and 
penetration of imperialism. Eric Williams could not reconcile that reality.  
Williams’ P.N.M. regime in the first decade of T&T’s independence was active in its 
anti-communist program and this chapter detailed Williams’ break with C.L.R. James over 
the party’s regression into alignment with US interests. The NWG was also an important 
concern noting the imperative of their ideas in this context, and the circumstances where 
Lloyd Best, George Beckford, and Kari Levitt were among the members of the groups’ 
network that were targeted by the national security state. The strain put on the group by such 
interventions was situated alongside tensions regarding the different political emphases 
between the various members as factors in bringing the fractured outcome. This was 
counterpoised with the widespread support the intelligence and knowledge production 
network of the national security state received, seemingly uninhibited. Kari Polanyi Levitt’s 
contributions to economic planning and the building of institutions of independent thought 
were also situated, again noting the persistent interruptions she had to deal with.  
The oil boom came as economic planning went out the window in T&T and Williams 
further consolidated his control over various aspects of the State machinery. The outcome 
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was that despite his major acquisitions of assets in the economy the government remained 
subordinate to the dictates of foreign capital interests. As quickly as the profits of the oil 
boom arrived they would disappear in the early 1980s, and the high degrees of 
unemployment and stark inequalities would once more make their effects sorely felt. The 
national security state remained intact, upholding the fundamental conditions of organization 
of the economy and society according to the outlines of its Crown Colony origins. In this 
case individualized freedoms were given to those who could get ahead (legitimately or 
illegitimately, legally or illegally) and the measure of success was the display of ownership of 
luxury material goods (unproductive liabilities). In a perfect recipe for disaster, aspirations 
were materially high and reality would bring a serious low. In many respects that was the 
pattern for 1970, and for 1990. In light of the historical detail considered here, an analysis of 
the problems of 1990 and thereafter necessitate the consideration of the un-reconciled deep-






This thesis argued that a national security state existed in Crown Colony rule in T&T, and 
remained fundamentally in place despite the postwar progression to full internal self-
government in 1956, independence in 1961, and republic status 1976. The strategic 
importance of Trinidad was secured in the early 20th Century with the emergence of its oil 
industry as a vital source of supply for the British Empire. The oil industry in T&T posted 
large profits in the late 1930s while worker conditions were poor and unprotected, and the 
1937 labour riots set a heightened security tone with British military intervention. This 
security concern took a new form under the US occupation in WWII, and life in T&T was 
harsh due to the record high submarine attacks that targeted strategic supply lines of oil and 
bauxite. The US bases continued after the war ended, and its influence was also ensured 
through its corporations, and organizations such as the Anglo-American Caribbean 
Commission (AACC).  
Eric Williams worked for the AACC for twelve years, and as a consultant for the OSS 
in relation to setting up the bases in Caribbean between 1942-1943. These organizational 
commitments indicate that at the start of his career Williams was not in any way prepared to 
break from colonial and imperial influence. The British Colonial Office was instrumental in 
using executive decree to establish Williams’ P.N.M. as a majority government with power 
centralized in the executive. The substance of Williams’ campaign against the Chaguaramas 
Naval base in the late 1950s amounted to a demand for increased aid from the US. Eric 
Williams’ vision of the constitution did not fundamentally differ from the oil and sugar 
lobbies as he retained their channels for “special interests” and was effective in consolidating 
power in a largely nominated executive of government. The Crown Colony principles 
remained intact under the T&T independence constitution of 1962. 
During the first decade of independence, the prerogative of national security rested on 
anti-communism and the targeting of any ‘subversive’ activities, in direct continuity with the 
patterns established under British rule. The government utilized the security services to 
enforce its ideological commitment through surveillance, literature bans, blocks on persons 
travel, physical suppression, arrest, detention, and death. The police was the consistent force 
to broke down mobilizations of the population, despite having a record of high-level 
mismanagement and political interference. In 1970 the National Joint Action Committee was 
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at the forefront of the Black Power movement that openly challenged the P.N.M. 
government. After months of mobilizations the protests had escalated to a point where cross 
union organization threatened to shut down the country. Williams enacted a State of 
Emergency, and when the Regiment activated a failed attempt at a coup d’état Williams’ 
response was to call for US assistance, and was supported with imported weapons and 
ammunition, and five US naval vessels offshore. Ten years after Eric Williams led a march 
against the US base in Chaguaramas he called on the US Government to back his regime. 
The Coast Guard and the Police Service were the primary local forces that subdued the 
unrest, for the coup attempt quickly was contained and the social unrest was confined to 
looting and a few fires. The government’s executive actions to empower an ex-commander 
as head negotiator resulted in the accused soldiers being released. The discontent and 
disturbances persisted only to be continually contained by an increasingly empowered, and 
corrupted, police force.  
The New World Group emerged in this period of the 1960s and as its members 
carried out their work they were consistently interrupted by the national security state. Lloyd 
Best was set against Williams and had to endure the consequences. The same pattern is 
present with the case of Kari Polanyi Levitt, who was blocked from jobs at the University via 
funding and visa cuts. A random intervention by the ‘Flying Squad’ operations unit of the 
police force resulted in a confiscated passport and the shutting down of the project of the 
System of National Accounts she was coordinating. These repeated interventions were set in 
contrast to the workings of foreign intelligence analysts operating in Trinidad, as well as the 
active British anti-communist propaganda unit, the Information Research Department. Anti-
communism remained the ideological underpinning of the national security state in T&T, 
but this was primarily enacted through a targeting of ‘subversives’, and thus any organized 
dissent deemed a concern was targeted. This was a consistent function before and after 
independence, and the achievement of republic status in 1976.  
Republic status brought a symbolic change to the head of the State no longer being a 
British appointed Governor-General (as is the case with contemporary Canada), but instead 
a locally determined President. Despite the symbolic move, the constitution remained true to 
its Crown Colony origins of executive dominance. This difference in appearance and reality 
was also a feature of Williams’ actions in ‘taking control’ of the economy as the nationalist 
leader he claimed to be. This analysis showed that Williams left the core operational function 
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of the economy to foreign corporations, when he did acquire major assets it was not at a 
period when they were in high demand, and the terms of operation of the new enterprises 
put the T&T Government on weak footing with respect to foreign counterparts. The 
economy continued to primarily rely on its petroleum sectors and the expansion of refining 
processes was sold as ‘diversification’, where in fact the industry continued to rely on terms 
set by foreign players who controlled both the input and output of T&T’s petroleum 
economy. Although the windfall from the 1970s boom was significant, little was done to 
transform the economy and thus inequality and discontent persisted.  
Consistent throughout the period 1947-1978 was the function of internal security that 
targeted any organization of people that sought fundamental economic redress from the 
system of stark inequalities and consolidated political power. The underlying function of the 
intelligence networks was to keep track of, and be ready to intervene against, any targeted 
persons/groups that were most often accused of being anti-communist or subversive. This 
intervention was sometimes outright and blunt in moments of peak tension, but it also took 
more prolonged and mundane, yet impactful forms. The consequent effect of the 
fundamental insistence of anti-communism was the collapsing of all modes and forms of 
dissent that sought to principally challenge the basis of the State and the economy. The New 
World Group (NWG) was a network of radical economists that were directly impacted by 
the national security state in this period, where attempts to produce literature were 
undermined along with the efforts to build institutions of independent thought. A primary 
contribution of the NWG was to emphasize importance of historical insight in the analysis 
of conditions, and that has been taken seriously in this study of the national security state in 
T&T. Although the work was hindered, and has largely fallen out of attention in the 
neoliberal era, the contributions of the NWG’s members endure across networks that are 
not on the front page today, but the relevance of the groups ideas and efforts may begin to 
take a new meaning as the world of 2018 approaches the turbulence of the late 1960s.  
That historical reference is made not to suggest that things are the same, for this time 
around the people are so much more exposed and the volatility surely amplified. The 
collapsing of dissent into ‘anti-communist’ and ‘subversive’ that functioned in the historical 
period studied takes a different form today, with the same result. An example of this was 
given in the introduction with the discourse surrounding ‘homegrown violent extremism’, 
and is also directly evident in the function of the 2018 Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Gang 
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legislation. The Anti-Gang Bill significantly broadens the definition of a gang and what it 
means to be a gang member, enforces even heavier punishments for gang-related crimes, 
empowers the Police to arrest anyone suspected of being a gang member or search any place 
where a gang member is suspected to be, all without a warrant, and with the power to detain 
persons for 72 hours (or longer).910 The patterns of the national security state persist and are 
increasingly empowered. As the discontent builds up to new heights the questioning of 
fundamental assumptions and taken for granted mythologies is picked by renewed currents 
of activity. This historical analysis has presented a fundamental problem to some of the 
taken for granted ideas surrounding the contexts and causes of the issues that are addressed 
through the medium of national security today. 
This thesis has argued that the national security state primarily served to uphold the 
function of the State as a mechanism that serves private/corporate interests while it actively 
expands its institutions to suppress and divide the population. The continued patterns of 
executive dominated government were situated at the root cause of many of the disruptions 
and upheavals the country endured. The consequences of the unbroken national security 
state were the persistent inequalities and social cleavages in the society, and thus it is because 
this formation was never decolonized that the country faces the dire conditions it does 
today. Decolonization has been suspended in T&T, and the privatized, consumerist trends 
have accelerated the corruption of the State. National security is given top budget priority 
and everyone cries out to the government to address the escalating murder rate and 
widespread violence in the society, yet there seems to be little questioning if national security 
can address these issues at all.  
The broken logic prevalent today is apparent in the case of the illegal gun trade in 
T&T, which consequently affects the fact that around 80% of murders are committed with a 
firearm.911 At a Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on National Security hearing and 
subsequent media briefing in July 2017 it was revealed, via Strategic Services Agency 
intelligence, that there was an illegal gun trade operating in T&T with an value of over $100 
million TTD (15 million USD) annually.912 There were no questions in the Chairman’s mind 
that these issues were connected to the “Protective Services” where he noted there was 
“lethargy, corruption, and complicity” to be dealt with across the board.913 The overall 
recommendations of the Joint Select Committee directed attention to strengthening border 
security, while the Strategic Services Agency also revealed that most of this illegal gun trade 
! $(&!
was operating through legal ports in containers and not through small smuggling boats as is 
the common misconception.914 This intelligence does not deter the government’s emphasis 
on interception requirements for the Coast Guard. The lingering question however regarded 
the admission that 40% of the containers at the ports were not being scanned, the criteria for 
scanning did not follow any scientific procedure but relied on personnel discretion where 
“Captains of industry” were given clearance, and that the scanners were actually off for a 
long period because of “radiation” concerns.915 The problem is not rooted in national 
security systems or appropriate hardware, but more so the breakdown is fundamentally 
occurring at the executive level and its responses only serve to add further volatility to the 
system.  
The historical analysis of this thesis situated the long historical precedent that the 
problems of executive imbalance and abuses of power have in T&T, and argued that these 
patterns will not begin to change until the constitution begins to move toward separated 
powers and distributed responsibility across the intuitions of elected representation 
accompanied by a civil service that functions with autonomy. That requires planning, and 
economic planning must once more be institutionalized and supported by the Universities 
and other institutions of independent thought. A goal of this thesis is to profoundly impact 
the way people understand the ‘national security’ problems faced by T&T today, and the 
entirely misplaced emphasis on national security itself. The national security state was built 
to undermine emancipation and to target worker organization. It was modeled into anti-
communist mechanism post WWII and became a means to suppress and co-opt Caribbean 
decolonization movements. The ultimate victim of the national security state, as it 
transitioned from the war on communism to the war on drugs and terror, is autonomous 
organizing in the Caribbean and institutions of independent thought. The destruction of 
those institutions that sought to bolster Caribbean societies against the unrestrained 
influence and penetration of imperial powers by the national security state has resulted in a 
case where there was little to stabilize the society once the rise neoliberal imperialism up-
surged in the 1990s. 
The most appropriate analysis that comes out of the New World Group’s inspiration 
and work is that of Dennis Pantin in his formulation of the Rentier State, economy and 
society at the basis of the cleavages which brought about the conditions of 27 July 1990. 
Pantin notes the JaM’s militant actions and taking the parliament hostage as the prime 
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highlight, but for him the most telling aspect was the “widespread lack of sympathy for, if 
not wished demise of the Government hostages.”916 The persistent “extremely 
unsympathetic attitudes towards the seizure” are manifestations of “more subterranean 
currents which have a long run in the society”, and Pantin’s analysis is that 27 July 1990 was 
“a political and not a security crises.”917 The basis of this crisis then was that the Rentier 
State, economy and society remained principally in place in T&T, where a “Rentier 
Economy may be defined simply as one which services primarily out of the incomes 
accruing from the exploitation of natural resources by foreign firms which either own the 
natural resource based activities, or control the technology used and markets in which the 
output is sold. “Open Petroleum Economies”, such as T&T, “are Rentier Economies par 
excellence.”918 
The consequences of the Rentier Economy is that it is “dominated by parasitic, non-
productive elites”,919 and in the case of T&T this was established “under conditions of 
colonialism, [where] the colonial elites were in charge of the Rents. Adult suffrage and 
political independence reduced but did not eliminate that control.”920 For Pantin, the most 
important factors in the continuation of the system is the non-transparent party system that 
is directly beholden to financiers, the constitution that ensures a Prime Ministerial 
dictatorship with minimal restraints from parliament, and a media dominated by state-owned 
and corporate “‘conglomerates’ that are aligned with the current system of syphoning profits 
from state rents.”921 A principal means by which the “Rentier elite maintains itself in power 
is through the virtual absence of popular economic or political education”,922 replaced 
instead by “the growing dominance of free market theology” promoted by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, headquartered in Washington.923 This thesis has shown 
how the national security state undermined those institutions of independent thought that 
sought to challenge the government for its unwillingness to transform the economy away 
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The unbroken pattern of this formation is in large part why T&T imports around 85% 
of its food today,924 why the economy is so downturned with the low price of oil in past 
years,925 and why there is a broken record of proclamations regarding diversification.926 In 
contemporary T&T those who live among the street hustle refer to money as ‘food’. The 
trend line from 1960-1978, Figure 1 above, gives a picture of Eric Williams’ program of 
decolonization when applied to the outcome of his political career as taken by a measure of a 
popular neoliberal term, ‘food security’. Self-reliance in terms of food production should be 
a core value of a notion of national security that has integrity in its commitment to the 
wellbeing of the population on the land of the nation, and separation from ideological 
absolutism. The reliance on food imports is a norm for the globalization agenda, and thus 
food security within that rhetoric is an oxymoron. The lack of integrity behind the 
institutions that have peddled and enforced this doctrine is becoming undeniable.927 
Similarly, the hollow basis of the neoliberal dogma is being awkwardly backpedaled by its 
proponents in the face of their abysmal record.928 The questions remains, are there 
institutions of independent thought in T&T today that are prepared to begin confronting 
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and planning for a world where the dominant ideology which governed the society begins to 
disintegrate?  
In the realm of national security where it is a fact that T&T is a proxy/dependency of 
the US when it comes to policy and power, is there any preparedness to confront and plan 
for a future where the US has already acknowledged fundamental shifts necessary to secure 
itself in its self-declared “Post-Primacy World”.929 This does not mean a withdrawal of the 
US by any means, but more likely an imperial beast that is backed into a corner, volatile and 
unpredictable, with sights on Trinidad’s neighbor six miles away.930 These are serious 
questions for national security, and all evidence suggests that the status quo is totally 
unprepared to confront the scale of the challenges. Geographically, Trinidad is piece of 
South America. That is becoming increasingly so demographically on a daily basis in 2018,931 
and will undoubtedly follow this trend politically in the future. The question will remain as to 
along what basis will the State, economy, and society will be organized? Will the opportunity 
present itself for the space to begin a process of fundamental reorganization? Until then 
national security will remain an inward cycle of violence in T&T, and even though the elite 
are still recording high profits they are worried because an island imposes natural borders, 
and it is not a big place.932 Will the “Scared Cows” remain? 
Eric Williams established himself before the population of T&T most symbolically in 
the celebrated ‘University of the Woodford Square’. This phrase is a solid fact of T&T’s 
history, just as is Christopher Columbus, who is rightly castigated today as a genocidal 
explorer that set the tone for the 500 years of colonization, pillaging, and slavery that 
followed. In 2018 there is a movement in Trinidad, as there is across North America, to 
remove statues of colonial era figures that represent slavery and genocide. The Columbus 
statue in Port of Spain is a target, and in no way is the position here to suggest that it should 
be kept up, but more so, to ask if that commitment will it follow through to the ‘University 
of the Woodford Square’? Is Eric Williams a “Sacred Cow”? Taking that history has weight; 
a lot of T&T’s future confrontations and decisions may be altered if this reality is embraced. 
Ralph Woodford was Trinidad’s longest-serving Governor under the Crown Colony system 
and was a staunch opponent to emancipation. Eric Williams’ was opposed to the 
symbolisms of Crown Colony government, but relied heavily on its principles once he 
established himself as head of the government. This pattern of executive government lasts to 
this day, and thus the question is, will the energy directed at the statue be directed to the 
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constitution? Symbols are a concern, are quite often deceiving, but what remains a tangible 
danger is the substance of the matter.  
Eric Williams’ presented lectures in the ‘University of Woodford Square’, long orations 
that greatly impressed the crowds. As Lloyd Best wittingly exposed in his statements, and as 
was visibly demonstrated in the Black Power movement against Williams in the late 1960s, 
the people had not understood Williams and what he stood for in the first place. This is 
materially so, for this thesis has considered those speeches where he outlines his firm 
commitment to a system of nominated government and executive control, with an economy 
oriented toward foreign interests. The power relationship between the head of the 
government and the people never changed, and this is symbolically true in Eric Williams’ 
Woodford Square lectures. A simple observation from Paulo Freire, an intellectual who was 
targeted by his own Brazilian national security state, highlights the power relationship in a 
teacher-student role, and argues for the fundamental need for a “dialogic” process of 
exchange between the two, and thus he reveals the structure Williams embodied. Williams 
was seemingly unquestioned, “The Doctor”, and that legacy of consolidated and 
unquestioned power is what T&T most acutely suffers with today. Eric Williams did not 
create it, but he surely bolstered it, and it is all the more difficult to reconcile, as he was a 
black anti-colonial historian.  
There is an alternate vision, highlighted here through Walter Rodney’s groundings with 
my brothers (1968). The symbolism of a process of groundings as compared to ‘University’ 
lectures is most significant, and in T&T the National Joint Action Committee did attempt 
such a move in socially renaming Woodford Square the “People’s Parliament”. Walter 
Rodney’s groundings took place in Jamaica when he was first a University student and later a 
professor, and these exchanges were not in a classroom but in and amongst the poor and 
downtrodden in the Kingston. At first Rodney was not celebrated, but a lasting relationship 
of exchange was formed, and in 1968 when the Jamaican government decided to ban his re-
entry into Jamaica there were mass protests and riots ensued in certain sections. Rodney’s 
exile was not futile for he returned to Tanzania at the height of anti-colonial socialist 
influence, and was celebrated in the University of Dar es Salaam. Rodney’s commitment was 
to the Caribbean however, and Guyana most notably, and this unwavering dedication to a 
grounded revolutionary-intellectual struggle brought him head on with the CIA-backed 
Forbes Burnham government, that eventually assassinated him in June 1980. This is a cold 
! $(+!
reminder of the directed attacks on independent thought by the national security state, and 
the struggle one faces when power is confronted in a serious manner. Ideas never die, and 
Walter Rodney lives on in many forms today; a fire in the mind and heart of the youth of 
tonight and tomorrow. A fire that is ready to bun down the system that is Babylon, the 
system that is hanging us by a different tree. The imperative of decolonization endures on the 
capture land, and the struggle is far from over. Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery… for until 
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